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Abstract
The contention of this thesis is that the independent English examining boards have
been gradually transformed from independent organisations administering a national
qualifications system to virtual outsourcing agencies working within a centrally
controlled framework.
The thesis begins with a review of the literature of English education which reveals
that within that literature the examining boards have remained peripheral bodies,
accepted as an element in the secondary assessment structure but never seriously
analysed. Within a theoretical framework based on the central concept of the
encroaching "managerial state", this absence has informed the methodology, which
locates the university examining boards as the focus in a historical narrative of the
development of the unique English post-16 qualifications providers.
The central section of the thesis concentrates on the examining boards in the 1990s,
and suggests that the pressures of that decade threatened their stability. Data in
support of the analysis of this section was gathered in a series of interviews with
significant actors from the boards and their regulatory agencies. Then a section
dealing with the A-level grades crisis of September 2002 suggests that this event
provides clear evidence of the Boards' loss of professional independence.
The thesis concludes that the English examining boards can no longer be deemed
independent and ends with some observations on the significance of this change with
two possible directions suggested for their future.
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5Introduction: Unique Bodies Neglected by the Academy
In 1965, R J Montgomery observed that " ... it is surprising that the broad evolution of
the large examinations system has not been considered more fully elsewhere"
(Montgomery 1965: ix) as he embarked on his own history of the English
examinations system. Although a traditionally-minded historian rather than a radical
sociologist, Montgomery also believed that "Those controlling the examinations
were ...in an exceptionally powerful position in the education system." Yet forty years
on, there has been no serious study of the unique English examining boards that for
nearly 150 years have been administering that unconsidered system. This thesis
begins the process of narrating the evolution of these bodies and evaluating the effects
of the shifts in control which they have experienced over their long existence.
I contend that this is no mere exercise in abstract research. As I write, a heated debate
about the reform of 14-19 education in England is in progress. My research provides
fresh insights into the English awarding bodies which I believe can and should inform
that process. I suggest that overlooking their professional expertise has proved costly
in implementing the recent reform of A levels.
My thesis contends that the English examining boards can no longer be described as
independent agents within the English qualifications system. The questions that have
shaped my research in support of this thesis are:
1 How did the examining boards evolve from their origins accrediting university
matriculation into independent providers of the national qualifications system?
62 How did the successive changes to the examinations structure affect their role?
3 What evidence is there of a shift in control from the examining boards to the
state?
In deference to the view of a writer who suggests that "all histories are motivated,
whether they are grand narratives or small stories ..." (Simpson 2005: 25), I
acknowledge that I have been motivated in this research by my view that these
organisations merit scrutiny, central as they are to the qualifications structure which
so profoundly affects the life chances of the nation's young people.
My interest in the English examining boards can be traced back to the 1970s, when I
began teaching in the English secondary system. My initial response was incredulity
(the typical reaction of those who arrive from abroad) at the eccentricity of a national
qualifications system provided by a group of independent and competing boards. This
interest developed after I became a teacher representative on one examining board,
progressing through a variety of roles for over twenty years. Research for a Master's
dissertation (Sturgis 2000) revealed the paucity of attention the Boards I had received
from the academic community, and suggested the area as one worthy of further
investigation.
During my long connection with one examining board, my views about the system
were gradually altering from initial suspicion to a reluctant acknowledgement of its
merits. At the same time I was aware of the increasing restrictions being imposed on
the Board by central regulation. Eventually this gradual and almost surreptitious
change presented a natural focus for my research. Had I been aware at the outset of
the risks inherent in embarking on a doctoral thesis in such an under-researched field,
I might have sought a more well-trodden path. Certainly during the course of my work
7I have felt the absence of other research against which to locate my own. However, I
have pursued my interest with a view to providing at least some insight into what I
found to be an obscure corner of the educational world.
While education history may for the most part have overlooked the examining boards,
education sociology is clear that there can be no question that examinations play a
significant role in what Pierre Bourdieu described as the reproduction of cultural
advantage. (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) Sociologists from Durkheim to Bernstein
have consistently identified the significant role of examinations - and, I infer, their
providers - in determining the distribution of power in a society. Emil Durkheim
noted in 1956 that in the nineteenth century, competitive examinations with rewarding
consequences for those who succeeded became widespread in schools, thereby
"reinforcing the individualisation that has become characteristic of industrial
society ...." (Quoted in Eggleston 1990: 57) In 1971, Basil Bernstein's often-cited
statement would also suggest a primary role in the social power structure for
examination providers as assessors of public knowledge:
How a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the
educational knowledge it considers to be public, rejlects both the distribution of
power and the principles ofsocial control.
(Bernstein 1971: 59)
Bourdieu, whom Bernstein in his study Class, codes and control described as "the
critical theorist" (Bernstein 1990: 69), certainly included examinations as one of the
mechanisms which facilitate the maintenance of cultural advantage. In fact his
account of the objective of sociological analysis could well describe the objective of
this study:
...de porter au jour les structures les plus profondement enfouis des differents
rnondes et aussi les mecanismes qui tendent aen assurer la reproduction au la
transformation.
(Bourdieu 1989: 7)
8I believe that these sociologists' consensus on the significance of examinations
supports my case for the importance of a study of the unique constellation of English
examining boards as the providers of those examinations which carry such influence.
Michael Young, in his 1971 reflections on the lack of sociological analysis of the
curriculum, noted that the Boards - regularly accused of controlling the curriculum -
had also been overlooked:
The 'guiding interests' of the examining boards have so far remained outside
the field ofsociological enquiry.
(Young 1971: 21)
I suggest that the neglect of the Boards in academic research is linked to that which
Young identified regarding the curriculum:
Perhaps the organization ofknowledge implicit in our own curricula is so much
part of our taken-for-granted world that we are unable to conceive of
alternatives.
(Young 1971: 40-41)
A similar passive acceptance of the examining boards, which were long perceived to
control the secondary curriculum through their examination syllabuses, may have
quenched academic inquiry into the whole area. Yet when, following James
Callaghan's 1976 speech at Ruskin College, the curriculum became the focus of
intense interest, that interest did not spill over to include the Boards. They continued
to function outside any serious analysis.
Although unconsidered within the academy, they have featured increasingly in the
nation's media. When an examination-related problem arises, as in January 2002, it is
not only the Secretary of State for Education - "Minister's fury at exam board's
blunder in maths paper" (The Guardian, 21 January 2002), but the Prime Minister-
"Blair slams 'sloppy' exam board error" (Evening Standard 22, January 2002) - who
join the accusing media chorus directed at the qualification providers. Many similar
9episodes indicate that when a scapegoat is required for problems in the system, the
Boards are very central indeed in the nation's consciousness. This could be interpreted
as evidence that they are taken for granted until they make a mistake. Yet the nation's
evident reliance on their performance makes their absence from serious analysis
puzzling.
As well as being taken for granted, the Boards may have suffered from the low level
of awareness of the exceptional nature of the English structure. In other countries,
examinations are either an integral function of the state apparatus as in China and
France - as well as Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland - or an aspect of teachers'
professional repertoire as in Germany. The provision of national qualifications by
independent and competing organisations has no duplicate internationally. The former
chief executive of the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) has
acknowledged this, and said, "1 have regularly described our system as unique"
(QCAl, 2000). It is perhaps this unique nature of the English system that may have
contributed to its neglect.
These findings firstly support my case for the value of a study of the English
examining boards as providers of the examinations which wield undoubted influence.
Secondly they have affected the methodology of the thesis. In place of an orthodox
literature review, my first chapter is more a survey of a literature which reveals my
subject to be at best a peripheral presence.
In the second chapter I establish the theoretical framework within which my research
is located and the resulting methodological approach I have adopted.
With the study thus grounded, I provide evidence for my case in three central
chapters. Chapter three uses historical data to narrate the development of the boards
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until the end of the 1980s. Then chapter four focuses on the external and internal
stresses the boards experienced during the 1990s, presenting supporting data from a
series of interviews with principal actors from the Boards and their Regulators. For
the purposes of this analysis I consider 'the 1990s' as stretching from 1988 to 2002,
following the example of Eric Hobsbawn, who defines the 19th century as the period
from 1789 to 1914 (Quoted by Jonathan Friedland in The Guardian 31 August 2005).
The fifth chapter turns to the only major crisis the boards have experienced: the
dispute over A-level grades in September 2002, which I suggest was a direct result of
the boards' loss of professional control following the changes made during the 1990s.
A concluding chapter summarises the detailed conclusions of the study, with a brief
section on the implications that my findings might suggest for the future of the
English examining boards.
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Chapter 1 Location of the Thesis in Relation to the
Literature
Identifying an Absence: A survey of the literature reveals the Boards
as peripheral
As I embarked on my research, I began with a search which revealed my subject to
have remained virtually absent across the spectrum of education literature. In
following up the usual paths of references cited in bibliographies, sifting through
journals, interrogating electronic databases and discussing with other researchers, I
succeeded in opening up the terrain but found my particular interest had been
overlooked. While the process has fulfilled its purpose in training me in research
skills, the results have been less than fruitful in shedding the light of other research on
the examining boards. Therefore this section covers the range of literature I have
consulted in acquiring a grasp of my field of inquiry, and serves to underline the need
for the research I have carried out.
I began my search by reading general overviews of the terrain of English education.
For example, when in the year 2000 James Tooley wrote his manifesto for a return to
conservative values in education, he identified four authors as "millennia]" thinkers in
the field - although in my view their work tends toward the journalistic (Tooley 2000:
2). These individuals, evidently selected because in the late 1990s they shared
Tooley's assumption that there was a crisis in education, were:
• Michael Barber with The Learning Game
• Tom Bentley with Learning Beyond the Classroom
• Melanie Phillips with All Must Have Prizes
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• George Walden with We Should Know Better
Such populist works on education - while providing a flavour of the live issues at a
particular time - do not credit the Boards with the influence they have been popularly
rumoured to exert. Not one of these commentators made any reference to the
examining boards despite their stress on the importance of examinations in
determining the life chances of young people.
Still with popular overviews of education, Stuart Maclure, editor of the journal
Education from 1954 to 1969 and of The Times Educational Supplement from 1969 to
1989, has written a very readable insider's version of policy developments from the
HMI perspective in The Inspectors' Calling (Maclure 2000). His account, using
evidence provided by the personal accounts of some 200 members of the Inspectorate,
throws light on rather murky episodes like the production of the unpublished Yellow
Book prior to James Callaghan's 1976 Ruskin speech. Yet in his account of "the
evolution of the education system in England and Wales in the second half of the
twentieth century" (Maclure 2000: vii), the Boards and their examinations, which in
his role as TES editor he covered so regularly, do not feature.
More curiously still, the Boards have failed to interest academic analysts. Although
their stock in trade is the finer points of assessment, the Boards do not feature in
research into technical measurement. (See for example Goldstein and Heath 2000)
Studies of the social (Lowe 1988) or administrative (Gosden 1983) history of
education treat them as a given part of the landscape. Their absence, although
surprising, I proffer as a principal justification for my research. Therefore it is
essential to discuss in detail the search I have conducted of the literatures of the three
disciplines at whose conjunction I had set out to locate this study.
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The most fruitful by far was education history, and this has determined the focus of
my thesis. Together with that history, the literature of assessment has clarified the
technical issues which I believe have been an unacknowledged factor in the recent
concerns over the Boards. Then policy papers and critiques of those policies have
been of fundamental importance. My major disappointment was the discovery that
education sociology has not seriously addressed the examinations system, still less its
providers. Despite the signals of Bourdieu, Bernstein and Young referred to above,
education sociologists regularly cite examination results as indicators of, for example,
social exclusion, but I have not been able to find a significant body of work that has
delved more deeply into the structures which produce them. This has been a
disappointment and has meant that my planned triangulation of
historical/political/sociological analysis has had to be adjusted and has instead
become essentially a historical-political account.
1 The History of English Secondary Education and its Examinations
To create the necessary overview of the English examining boards, I needed to
construct a historical framework which placed them within the development of
English secondary education and its examinations, which they administered.
(a) Primary Sources
In researching that history, three early pnmary sources - the Taunton Report
(Commission 1868), the Clarendon Report (Schools 1864) and the Bryce Report
(Education 1895) - respectively provide valuable insight into Victorian thinking on
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secondary education, the new notion of examinations and the role of the public
schools.
The value of primary sources is particularly evident when they are written with the
clarity and elegant prose of the 1911 Dyke Acland Report. This investigation into the
plethora of university and professional examinations faced by young people
recommended a system of national qualifications which resulted in the creation of the
School Certificate and Higher School Certificate examinations. The report is
admirably concise. With a transparent table of contents, it provides a clear rationale
for its recommendations, and includes full transcripts of the evidence provided by the
many witnesses whom the Committee heard. However, while these early reports have
provided valuable insights into how the current system developed, they throw no light
on the early years of the examining boards.
Unfortunately, as the century proceeded and the number of reports, circulars, green
and white papers burgeoned, their language became increasingly influenced by the
tendency to bland obscurity which now characterises official documents. Despite the
greatly increased ease of printing and reproduction, today reports like that of Sir Ron
Dearing in 1996 (Dearing 1996) merely list the organisations (rarely individuals) who
gave evidence but provide not even the gist of their views, still less the entire
transcript. As a result it has become increasingly difficult to gather anything more
than a superficial impression of the thinking behind such sources.
Given such limitations, sources such as the Norwood Report (SSEC 1943), and the
later series of qualification-related government reports and consultation papers such
as Education and Trainingfor the zr' Century (DES, Employment 1991), Dearing's
Review of Qualifications for 16-19 Year Olds (Dearing 1996), Guaranteeing
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Standards (DfliE 1997a), and Qualifying for Success (DillE 1997b) have been
invaluable for gaining an insight into the motivation behind the changes that were part
of the qualifications culture of the 1990s. The examining boards feature only in the
Dearing Review and in Guaranteeing Standards, but even here they are treated rather
as a problem requiring a solution - in the latter case, merger - than as acknowledged
pillars of the examinations system.
(b) Education Histories
The student of the history of education can begin to construct an analytical framework
by reading some excellent secondary sources of which Green's Education and State
Formation (Green 1990) is a fine example, from an essentially sociological
standpoint. His placing of English developments within a European!American
comparative model stresses the voluntarist nature of provision in this country. Green
bestows on Margaret Archer the accolade of "the most powerful comparative
framework that has yet been provided' (Green 1990:73) for her Weberian account of
The Social Origins ofEducational Systems (Archer 1984). With these works framing
the field overall, one can locate the perspective of the limited number of accounts of
the origins and early growth of the examining system.
Two historians have provided useful accounts of the development of examinations in
England which are an essential resource in understanding how the curious structure of
the English boards came into being. John Roach's Public Examinations in England
1850-1900 (Roach 1971) is a social history which provides a nicely balanced contrast
to Robert Montgomery's Examinations and their Use as an Administrative Device in
England (Montgomery 1965). Montgomery's account is firmly based in a Cambridge
viewpoint, and gives the flavour of the endless debates over trivial issues such as the
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titles of the first qualification. Roach paints with a broader brush, and identifies the
themes which formed a constant in early English education policy formation: the
dominance of an Oxbridge-centred network of influential men, the hierarchy of class,
the mistrust of state interference and the clash between the established Church and
Dissent. Roach's account of the beginnings of English examinations was augmented
by his authoritative narrative of the faltering development of the nation's secondary
education in the 19th century (Roach 1986). Apart from these two accounts which
touch on the emergence of the examining boards, they virtually disappear from view
except for what could be termed 'insider' histories of particular Boards by their own
loyal servants, who make no claim to objectivity.
The most useful of these is that produced by James Petch (Petch 1953). His Fifty
Years of Examining: The JMB from 1903 to 1953 is a first-hand and very personal
account of one major Board's history written just at the point when the first tightening
of the grip of central control was being felt. By contrast, H G Earnshaw's little
booklet The Associated Examining Board for the General Certificate of Education:
Origin and History (Earnshaw 1974) tends towards hagiography, but nonetheless does
give an account of the early days of the only board to be created independent of a
university. J L Brereton's 1944 The Case for Examinations (Brereton 1944) was
presumably written as a contribution from the perspective of the Cambridge board to
the debate that produced the 1944 Education Act. It may have been published too late
(there is no indication as to the actual date of its publication in 1944) to affect the Act,
passed in July of 1944. Certainly none of its ideas was incorporated in the Butler Act.
A recent edition in this category is AQA's Setting the Standard (AQA 2003c),
published to mark "a century ofpublic examining". Various contributors from AQA's
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two parent Boards have called on their years of examining to provide an outline of the
landmarks over the 100 years since the founding of the JMB and 50 years since the
creation of the AEB - the organisations now merged as AQA
Once these resources have yielded their insights, the Boards' development must be
traced through the terrain of histories of secondary education and its related
qualifications, the area where they operated, albeit unacknowledged for the most part.
The pre-eminent figure in providing an overview of English educational history is
Brian Simon - described posthumously as "the leading and best known historian of
education ever produced in this country" (McCulloch 2004: 3). Simon combined the
seemingly contradictory positions of a communist party member and a major figure
within the 'education establishment'. His passionate commitment to comprehensive
education was the motivating force in his historical writing, which is based in the
struggle played out between the forces of conservatism and the challenge of a growing
socialist movement. Of particular value is his volume on the rarely considered years
between the first and second world wars: The Politics of Educational Reform 1920-
1940 (Simon 1974). Simon makes it clear that it was the dominance of traditional
views within the education department during this period that influenced the 1944
Education Act. However, his analysis touches only tangentially on developments
within the field of examinations and not at all on the Boards that provide them. He
seemed to see them as a given part of the terrain but by no means a principal factor in
his concern with the wider issue of the structure of secondary education.
Harry Judge is another champion of the comprehensive school who has chronicled his
practical experience in A Generation ofSchooling: English Secondary Schools since
1944 (Judge 1984). As a head teacher in Banbury he created an all-ability school from
18
the existing schools in the town. Judge's book provides much period detail to flesh
out his account of the early days of comprehensive schools. A neighbour of both
Anthony Crosland when Labour Secretary of State for Education and Angus Maude, a
prominent Conservative, Judge moved in influential circles and noted the continuing
influence on education policy of Oxford men like Crosland, Denis Healey and Tony
Benn, Yet his wide-ranging study deals with the examining system in cryptic terms.
He portrayed it as originally ensuring "doctrines of a balanced curriculum and a
broad, general education. It has, of course [1984], long ceased to do so" (Judge
1984:102). No explanation is offered as to the reasons for the last statement.
The 1944 Education Act as a seminal period in English secondary education has
continued for half a century to intrigue historians. Gary McCulloch has suggested that
comparing the work of four fellow writers on the 1944 Education Act could serve as
an object lesson in differing approaches to the same issue. Doing so proved to be an
illuminating exercise in viewing the period from the differing standpoints of
McCulloch himself (McCulloch 1994), Michael Barber (Barber 1994), Kevin Jeffreys
(Jeffreys 1986), Brian Simon (Simon 1991) and Peter Gosden (Gosden 1983). Each
writer constructs his own valid analysis of the influence on and effects of this critical
development in English secondary education. However - although certainly providing
an invaluable model for the student researcher - the exercise revealed that none of
these analysts had dealt with the post-1944 complete restructuring of the examinations
system in anything more than a fleeting manner.
Despite the absence of the Boards from these accounts, it is of course through
overlaying the approach of different writers on this post-war period that one builds the
necessary multi-faceted understanding of the people and issues that shaped
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developments. The meticulous research of Peter Gosden, an authority on Sir William
Alexander and the Association of Education Committees, has provided an
authoritative and non-partisan account of the administrative complexities of creating a
new secondary system (Gosden 1976). One might expect that his serving for some
time as Chairman of the Joint Matriculation Board might have led him to include
some insights into that Board's view of the process, but not so.
Roy Lowe, the social historian of mid-20th century education as was Roach of the
19th, has written of the social issues surrounding the changes brought about by the
1944 Act (Lowe 1988). Despite the acknowledged social influence of examinations,
the Boards and their work do not feature in his analysis. Then from the right of the
political spectrum comes Corelli Barnett's censorious analysis of the post-war
"ragbag of politicians and civil servants, almost all of them Oxbridge humanists"
whose idealistic preoccupations he labelled "the new Jerusalem". (Barnett 1986:
passim) He blamed their lofty notions of education for their failure to consider the
needs of industry following the war. For him, the 1944 Act was a disaster in ignoring
the importance of technical expertise. Yet he did not follow the logic of his position to
engage in a discussion of the qualifications available to the new schools structure, still
less to consider their providers.
Finally, a millennial volume edited by Richard Aldrich recruited the expertise of
academics from around the country to look back on A Century ofEducation (Aldrich
2002). Alison Wolf's admirably clear and lively chapter on 'Qualifications and
assessment' provides a concise overview of this field, and benefits from her wealth of
research both in Britain and internationally. Professor Wolf has a foot in both the
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historical and assessment camps, but it is within the latter that her expertise is most
relevant to this study.
2 Assessment as the focus
Although the Boards may not have been the subject of academic attention, their
central activity certainly has. Researchers began to focus on assessment issues in the
early 1980s, when the growth of comprehensive schools meant increasing pressure for
a more egalitarian examination system. A major contributor to this developing body
of research literature in England was Desmond Nuttall, who seemed to be alone in
genuinely grasping the issues involved in the debates around norm and criterion
referencing in assessment. The pamphlet he wrote with Lea Orr in 1983 (Orr and
Nuttall 1983) provided a clear exposition of the inevitable interconnection of the two
approaches, and his article 'Doomsday or a New Dawn?' (Nuttall 1984) was a
balanced analysis of the potential and pitfalls of the single 16+ examination. Perhaps
the fact that it was published by the moribund Schools Council explains its failure to
penetrate the collective understanding; had it been more widely understood, the
annual outcry about examinations standards might have been mitigated.
A decade after Orr and Nuttall, Alison Wolfs occasional paper for the Further
Education Unit ably demonstrates the flaws in expecting criterion-referenced
assessment to avoid the need for assessors to exercise judgement (Wolf 1993).
Addressing the technical aspects of ensuring fair assessment, Professor Harvey
Goldstein's work on multi-level modelling III assessment is recognised
internationally. His approach stimulates thinking about the theory behind assessment
but - apart from the volume cited above - is not for the faintly numerate.
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An accessible but comprehensive analysis of the issues to be considered in
constructing a theory of educational assessment is Caroline Gipps' Beyond Testing:
Towards a Theory ofEducational Assessment (Gipps 1994). This clear exposition of
the complexities of issues like reliability, validity and the criterion/norm referencing
debate should be required reading for policy makers and regulators who are tempted
to meddle with the system.
Contributing significantly to illuminating the technical aspects of assessment are the
journals:
• Assessment in Education
• Research Papers in Education
A useful insight into one aspect of assessment is provided in Margaret Mathieson's
article in the Oxford Review ofEducation. She presents a close scrutiny of the series
of failed attempts to reform the A-level examinations and predicts - correctly, as it
happens- that using 'core skills' to bridge the academic/vocational divide would end
in yet another failure (Mathieson 1992).
A more general consideration of assessment related to the maintaining of standards in
the final decade of the zo" century is provided by the contributors to Educational
Standards (Goldstein 2000). In a variation on the usual format of the edited volume,
the role and function of examinations and the definition of standards is discussed in
four papers, to each of which another expert in the field writes a response. Their
theme is the problematic nature of British attempts to maintain standards over time
while leaning toward criterion referencing rather than the more internationally
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accepted normative assessment. Astute and stimulating, these papers do address some
of the ideological issues underlying assessment.
3 Education Policy and its Critiques
The stream of policy papers emerging from the education department, together with
various reports, has been a major source for this research. The 1991 White Paper
(DES 1991), the 1996 Dearing Report (Dearing 1996) and the 1997 consultation on
the awarding bodies (Dff'E 1997a) were, of course of fundamental importance in
understanding the changes to post-16 education and the examining boards during the
1990s. Critiques on these policy papers have come from analysts working broadly in
the field of post-16 education and qualifications. The work of Michael Young,
initially as an individual (Young 1971) then as a mentor for researchers within the
Post-16 Centre at the Institute of Education (See for example Spours, Young 1998),
has provided an informed critique of post -16 education for the last quarter of the zo"
century. In such critiques, the edited volume can provide an overview of a subject
with a range of expertise from particular fields. Such a volume is the analysis of the
recommendations of the Dearing Report edited by Ann Hodgson and Ken Spours
(Hodgson and Spours 1997). From their position as advocates of a modular
qualifications framework rather than the three parallel tracks espoused by the 1996
Dearing Report, their contributors are firmly grounded in the field and provide
valuable detail for the researcher. The issues they address are those that preoccupied
teachers in schools and colleges in 1997. Later research by the same team into New
Labour's Educational Agenda (Hodgson and Spours J999) and then into how
institutions were responding to the reforms introduced by Curriculum 2000 (Hodgson
and Spours 2003) have offered a critique of developing policy. A recent sign that new
researchers may be starting to investigate the effects of policy on the examining
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system is detected in William Blacklock's 2003 doctoral thesis (Blacklock 2003). His
work on the theory of examination regulation, using QCA as a case study, provides
invaluable insights into the phenomenon of the increasing number of such quasi-
independent "Non-departmental bodies" and the centralising influence they wield.
4 The Social Impact of Examinations
As I indicated above, education sociologists have shown a growing interest in the
social effects of examinations, if not in the organisations that provide them. In my
quest for a sociological perspective, I consulted firstly what Richard Pring rated as the
four leading educational journals: (Pring 1998)
• The British Journal of Educational Studies (co-edited by Pring and David
Halpin)
• The Oxford Review ofEducation;
• The British Journal ofthe Sociology ofEducation;
• The British Educational Research Journal
Of the qualitative studies, by far the majority in these journals, some focus on the
growing power of examinations over young people's life chances. They address issues
of access and the opening of higher education to a wider range of students. With more
attention devoted to primary education and national curriculum testing, I found
disappointingly little on examinations per se and nothing on the examining boards.
The article by Mathieson cited above was an exception, but was not a sociological
study.
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A rare focus on the role of the examining boards is that of Geoff Whitty in his 1985
post-Bernstein/Young work on the sociology of education. Devoting a full chapter to
'The politics of public examinations', he castigates the Boards as undermining the
experimental Mode 3 syllabuses teachers were devising (Whitty 1985). While in my
view his analysis does not acknowledge the Boards' responsibility for assuring the
reliability of the qualifications they accredited, it is a welcome recognition of their
influence. However, more recent sociology has not followed his example. Even
Whitty'S own later writing moved into more general policy analysis (Whitty 2002)
which, while presenting an important broad critique, does not apply the methods of
sociological analysis to the examinations system and its providers.
I shall cite the work of David Gillbom as representing the mainstream of educational
sociology. He has produced a major body of research into Exclusions from School
1996), Educational inequality (2000), Inclusive schooling (2001) and Education and
institutional racism (2002) which consistently cites examination results as indicators.
For example, in the book Rationing education policy, practice, reform and equity,
written with Deborah Youdell, they coined the phrase "the A-C economy" to describe
how the use of GCSE grades brought about the exclusion from educational
opportunity of many young people because of their social circumstances (Gillbom and
Youdell 2000: 12). Defining themselves as reflexive researchers writing from the
standpoint of critical theory, their analysis uses public examinations as markers of
success and failure within the education system (Gillbom 2000: 4) but does not delve
beneath those data to reflect on the role of the Boards in the process.
Another volume with contributions from a group of education sociologists at the
Institute of Education - Education in deprived areas: outcomes, inputs and processes
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(Power, Simon 2002) - similarly uses the attainment of five GCSE grades at C or
above as an indicator but none of the authors addresses the power of the bodies
providing these data.
As I said above, my search of the literature of educational sociology has meant that I
have had to reconsider my original structure, and construct what is essentially a
historical/political account.
5 Additional sources
(a) The Boards' Own Research: A hidden resource
Often with little recognition in the research community, the researchers employed by
the examining boards have long been producing a stream of papers investigating both
technical and social aspects of assessment. While some of their work has reached the
public forum through presentations at national and international conferences, much
has been restricted because of issues of confidentiality or commercial sensitivity.
In recent years Board trustees have relaxed to some extent their definition of
sensitivity and more of this work is becoming accessible. For example, a research
paper on A-level standards produced confidentially for the Associated Examining
Board's Research Committee was eventually published in Ted Wragg's journal
Research Papers in Education as the article 'Would the real gold standard please step
forward?' (Baird, Cresswell 2000).
Two Boards have now produced summaries of such research. The first is Robert
Wood's 1991 survey of research commissioned by the University of Cambridge Local
Examinations Syndicate (Wood 1991). A collection of abstracts from papers produced
by the Associated Examining Board's Research and Statistics Group was published in
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2000 (Cresswell 2000) prior to their merger with the Northern Examinations and
Assessment Board to form the Assessment and Qualifications Alliance (AQA). Such
research has been most helpful in clarifying my grasp of technical issues like
norm/criterion referencing (Cresswell 1997) or comparability of qualifications (Jones
2000) and provides important insights into the complexities of the assessment process.
This study has benefited from access to these papers, both those now generally
accessible and to those whose circulation was limited to members of the AQA
Research Committee, of which I was for some years a member.
(b) The Media as Data Sources: Press, Broadcast and Internet
In view of both the lack of data on my subject in the range of academic sources and
my focus on very recent events, I have relied on media sources more than might
usually be advisable for serious research. The weekly coverage of the education scene
in the Times Educational Supplement and Guardian Education have been invaluable
in providing an overview of the field and of the succession of reports which have
informed my research - pointing out sites on the internet which provide greater detail
on topics they cover in broad terms. I am indebted to my supervisor for access to his
copy of the weighty publication containing media coverage of the autumn 2002 A-
level grades crisis (QCA 2002b). Comprising copies of articles collected by QCA
staff from a wide variety of national and regional newspapers and the BBC website, it
was circulated to selected members of the Authority. It has proved an invaluable
source of data regarding that interesting time.
Occasional radio and television broadcasts have also provided information I have
found useful in illuminating aspects of this territory.
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(c) Confidential Papers from AQA
Finally, in my role as a Trustee of the Associated Examining Board (until March
2000) and then of the Assessment and Qualifications Alliance (until March 2003), I
have had access to papers issued under confidential cover. These have been of
particular help with aspects of the financial pressures on that Board, which I identify
as a very significant factor leading to the crisis over results in September 2002.
I want now to take a long look at the English examining boards and bring them from
the periphery of academic enquiry where they have so long existed to the central
focus of this study - and to locate them as an essential factor in the English system.
This survey of the literatures where the examining boards might have featured but did
not has determined the thesis methodology. If the current situation of the examining
boards is to be the focus of my analysis, I must begin by establishing how they
reached that situation.
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Chapter 2 Finding a theoretical framework, and
constructing a methodology
Researching a subject whose terrain variously involves education history, policy,
technical aspects of assessment and sociological impact has complicated the process
of finding a relevant perspective. On the other hand, I have found it intellectually
rewarding to explore a wide range of thinkers - and certainly the most broadening
aspect of my research.
A guiding principle has been a variation on Scott and Usher's warning that" ... those
who carry out educational research need to realise that they are not engaging in a
neutral activity but rather in a politics of knowing and being known where power is
never absent" (Scott and Usher 1996:180). While, like virtually all such handbooks on
education research, they were referring broadly to research into education practice,
there is no question that power and its movement is at the centre of this research. A
second and reassuring statement they make is that "Educational research is embedded
within disparate discourses and traditions; hence there is no single correct practice and
no superordinate methodology" (Scott 1996:178). What is important is that the
researcher takes a clear position from which to construct an appropriate methodology.
1 Finding a conceptual perspective
I had expected to construct the theoretical framework for this study on a tripartite
basis in three related disciplines: a need for analysis of this subject is identified by
education sociologists; its initial boundaries are grounded in education history and its
central focus is on the effects of education policy upon the bodies providing
examination assessment. Despite my findings of the limited attention education
29
sociology has devoted to my subject, sociology has contributed to my theoretical
framework.
The sociological terrain
As McCulloch and Richardson point out, it is especially French thinkers, like
Durkheim, Althusser, Bourdieu and Foucault who have emphasized "the social
relationships within education and how these are in a dynamic with changing
contemporary concerns" (McCulloch and Richardson 2000: 55). One can extrapolate
from the work of any or all of those thinkers that those who control examinations hold
significant power in a society. It therefore follows that the examining boards who
have long held that power in England merit close study. The examining boards could
be included as among Althusser's "tideological state apparatuses' designed...to
perpetuate ...cultural domination '." (Quoted in McCulloch 2000: 55) Michel Foucault
would undoubtedly place the English boards among the" 'capillary' levels ofthe body
politic" which perpetuate the humanist discourse (Windschuttle 1996: 139,141). As
cited above, Pierre Bourdieu, included examinations as instrumental in the
reproduction of cultural advantage.
The English examining boards can therefore be be included as one of the mechanisms
involved in the reproduction of cultural advantage. The providers of academic
qualifications are themselves, like teachers, successful products of the society's
education system and are assigned the role of measuring and duplicating the standards
which reproduce their cultural advantage. In fact, Bourdieu's reference to "the
examiners" being "generally obliged' to maintain standards of linguistic manipulation
that advantage the higher social classes (Bourdieu 1977: 73) could perhaps be said to
cast the English examining boards as the bankers of scholastic capital.
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Therefore, the sociological influence in this research is the endeavour to analyse one
fundamental component of the structure of the English education system's "processes
of transmission and acquisition"(Bernstein 1996:5) and the shift in power from the
'capillary level' to central control.
Seeking a historical position: entering the historiographical debate
With sociology having established the power function of the examining boards, their
development within English educational history must be located if their current
position is to be effectively analysed. This aspect of the research project comes within
what McCulloch and Richardson designate as "a contextualising study before
focusing in depth on a contemporary problem" (McCulloch 2000: 128). However,
seeking a theoretical position within education history means that one must venture
into what Richard Aldrich has described as "a contested and changing terrain"
(Aldrich 2000a: 63). Aldrich's description is more than justified; history in general
and education history in particular have been the scene of a serious theoretical debate.
I was fortunate in that, as I struggled to grasp the issues of that debate, Roy Lowe
published his 4-volume History of Education: Major themes (Lowe 2000). This
collection of selections from the work of the principal participants in the
historiographical wars proved invaluable in elucidating the issues at stake, and inform
the following summary which I include as background to my decisions about a
theoretical framework.
Following the spread of compulsory schooling in 19th-century western nations, the
study of education history was confined to teacher training institutions. In both North
America and Britain the subject formed an essential component in the preparation of
teachers for their role in the upward climb of society, as elucidated in the whiggish
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views of writers such as the American Ellwood Patterson Cubberley. Then in the last
quarter of the zo" century, teacher training in specialist colleges evolved into teacher
education within universities. Once opened to the wider intellectual community,
education history attracted severe criticism.
In America, Bernard Bai1yn attacked - in elegant but devastating prose - the work of
earlier education historians as tainted with "presentism", which he defined as "seeing
the past as the present writ small" (Bai1yn, 1960 quoted in Lowe 2000: vol 1, 3).
Bai1yn's moderate revisionism was followed by Michael Katz's radical critique,
focused on the flawed analysis of high school attendance in 19th-century Boston,
which omitted to mention "the non-presence ofrural pupils or urban immigrants ...at
high schools paid for by taxes on all" (Katz 1970: 31). In England, Harold Silver
articulated similar concerns with education historiography:
...the great majority of what had been written about popular education in the
Victorian period offered few or no real clues as to relationships in schools ....
The canon ofpublished literature ...recognized only limited areas of 'education'
as being suitable for investigation.
(Silver 1977: 198)
There had been no development of a theoretical position to justify a particular focus.
This is no longer acceptable within serious scholarship. Two decades on, the debate
had cooled to the point where Carl F Kaestle was able to contend that most historians'
involvement with theory was not as producers but as users, ranging in type from the
systematic through the eclectic to the incidental or heuristic. (Kaestle 1992: 116)
Nevertheless, the criticisms have tainted the reputation of much early education
history, relegating it to the status of a 'field of study' rather than a fully-fledged
discipline.
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This dismissive attitude is stoutly challenged by Richard Aldrich (Aldrich 2000b) and
acknowledged by Gary McCulloch. (McCulloch 2000) The latter advocates returning
to what he terms the 'public past' as exemplified by R H Tawney's many
contributions in the Manchester Guardian, in place of the 'official past' as presented
in reports from Hadow to Crowther, and the 'private past' in the form of school-day
memories as summoned up by James Callaghan, Kenneth Baker and Margaret
Thatcher among others. In his 1994 analysis of the legacy of the 1944 Education Act,
McCulloch also defended education history against other critiques:
Sometimes, it appears that ...history is despised or overshadowed because it
represents the 'problem; whereas the future represents the 'solution '. In these
circumstances, it is especially crucial to develop a greater awareness of the
relevance ofthe historical dimension in understanding contemporary dilemmas.
(McCulloch 1994: 3)
In a more recent work, he sees the role of the education historian as communicating to
"the public domain at large", and providing "independent and informed critiques
which will challenge received orthodoxies and stimulate debate" (McCulloch 2000:
16). This last position is the one this study has attempted to adopt. McCulloch does
not see such analyses as neutral:
To view such processes at work must raise worrying questions about the
detachment ofeven the most refined historical scholarship. But it underlines the
importance of acknowledging and grappling with the importance of history in
education policy; for if we do not, its influence, unremarked, will be insidious
and unchallenged. (McCulloch 1994: 68)
In attempting to establish the public past of the examining boards, it will be useful to
bear in mind the advice of two historians who have adopted the very public medium
of television history. David Cannadine, echoing Bernard Bailyn's earlier critique,
warned against "temporal parochialism" and the notion that "the only time is now"
(Cannadine 2002). Simon Schama defended "the unfolding of a story" as the
appropriate method of presenting history - as opposed to Will Hutton's preference for
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what Schama termed the "in the meantime philosophy ofnarration"(Schama 2002). I
recognise that in terms of current academic research, the term 'narrative' is frequently
used to dismiss work that is deemed insufficiently analytical. The risk as described by
Herbert Butterfield in his classic volume The Whig Interpretation ofHistory (Quoted
in Collini 2005: 24) is falling prey to "the elisions and superficialities ofnarrative or
synoptic history." There also lurk the perils of what in The Guardian of 11 July 2005
Tristram Hunt described as "the terrible consequences of state-sanctioned national
narratives - with their attendant myths of victimhood, ethnic cohesion or divine
mission ...." Having considered this litany of warnings, I remain convinced, with
McCulloch, "of the relevance of the historical dimension" in a study such as this. I
hope to avoid as far as possible the various perils and present a story that has not been
told while at the same time attempting to maintain a critical distance. My view has
been endorsed more recently by Eric Hobsbawm, the pre-eminent Marxist historian:
"History needs to be defended against those who deny its capacity to help us
understand the world...." (The Guardian 15 January 2002)
In order to structure the narrative effectively, it will be constructed in accord with
Antonio Gramsci's concept - admittedly created in a mega dialectical context - of
"periods oforganic crisis" (Gramsci 1957: 174). The crises I shall be considering are
not endogenous, but the result of external policy, the third aspect of the theoretical
framework.
Focus on policy analysis: engaging with the "managerial state"
Within the broad spectrum of education policy analysis, while developing a historical
narrative to compensate for lacunae in the literature, the shape of that narrative will be
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structured around the policy shifts which altered the balance in control of the
examining boards. This will involve an analysis based on the third element of this
theoretical framework: policy formation. Once again, this is complex territory,
involving the "messy realities of influence, pressure, dogma, expediency, conflict,
compromise, intransigence, resistance, error, opposition and pragmatism" that
characterise education policy in the UK (Ball 1990: 9).
From their origins as independent bodies devised in the 19th century to regularise the
selection process for universities, the examining boards have experienced a series of
policy changes that materially affected them as organisations: a process described by
one writer as "the progressive nationalization ofassessment and examination policy"
(Wolf 2002a: 221). Using the policy changes as the fundamental structuring
mechanism of the study provides a lens through which to examine the process as it
gathered momentum. However, as with education history, education policy analysis is
a contested area.
In a sermnar at the Institute of Education focussed on researching policy, Ann
Hodgson spoke of the difficulty of understanding "how education policy is created,
enacted and implemented and where power and influence reside." (loE, 29
November, 2001) The tri-partite balance between government, Local Education
Authorities and teachers has long gone. Yet the expansion of educational quangos,
increased autonomy for providers within an education market, devolution in Scotland
and Wales and a "veritable flood of different types ofpolicy documents" clouds the
policy-making process. (Hodgson 2003: 6)
It has been the case that writers avoid the issue through the use of terms like 'the
educational establishment' which has frequently served as a form of shorthand to
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describe the various groups or individuals who influence English educational policy.
In attempting to be more specific, Stephen Ball's concept of what he terms "the
educational state" is helpful: "the conglomeration of sites and agencies concerned
with the regulation of the education system" which "contain and represent contesting
interests in policy formation and policy debate" (Ball 1990: 20). This definition
enables an examination of strands of influence which can be more precise than the
currently popular, but undefined, term 'policy makers'. In fact, Ball specifically
includes examining boards as one of the agencies which form a part of the educational
state: "some system regulation and system management in education are actually
carried out by quangos, appointed bodies, intermediary agencies and even, in the
case of examinations, by quasi-commercial organisations" (Ball 1990: 20). This
thesis will challenge Ball's implication that the boards are agencies which regulate the
system: in fact quite the reverse. They are now recipients of regulation rather than
actors in its formation despite their undoubted role within the "educational state".
I have found that the most apt conceptual framework for the power shift from
agencies within the "education state" to central control is Clarke and Newman's
notion of "the managerial state". (Clarke and Newman 1997) Their purpose is to
explore:
...a range of structural and institutional realignments: the
introduction of markets, the rise of contracting, the changing
balance of power between central government and local and
regional agencies ofgovernance ....
(Clarke 1997: ix)
While Clarke and Newman are concerned principally with changes in policy which
affect the welfare state and in particular the National Health Service, I believe their
approach is equally appropriate for considering the series of changes to the
relationship between central agencies and the examining boards. In their case, the
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"changing relationships mediated through structural and institutional realignments"
have certainly involved shifts in power "between 'old' professionals and
administrators and 'new' managerial roles" (Clarke 1997: xiii) at the centre.
Their concept of the "managerial state" is congruent with Anthony Sampson's meta-
analysis of the changed role of members of parliament who formulate the policies
which drive that state. Returning forty years after writing his Anatomy of Britain to
discover whether and how power had altered, Sampson documents a major shift from
amateurism: "Forty years ago most members [of parliament] saw [politics] as only
part oftheir activity" - to professionalism: "In the twenty-first century nearly all MPs
are full-time politicians who have left their previous jobs" (Sampson 2004:8, 10). It
follows that professional politicians are predisposed to be highly involved in the detail
of policy-making, quite the reverse of their Victorian predecessors who abhorred
direct involvement. Sampson's argument is that their closed existence within the
'Westminster Village' keeps them less aware of the views of ordinary electors than
they once were. I propose that another result of their full personal investment in a
political career is that politicians are now more than ever keen to make a clear
difference in whatever field they hold office. Change is therefore accelerated, as time
is more than ever of the essence. The change imposed on the examining boards
provide a classic example of how political influence on such change can have
unintended consequences. In their case, I contend that increasing regulation which
weakened their professional autonomy led to a crisis in September 2002.
With this theoretical position framing my research, I turn to the methodological
structure which will attempt to answer my research questions and support my thesis.
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2 Constructing a methodology
The basic methodology is a qualitative one. In attempting to support the thesis that the
English examining boards are no longer independent agents within the English
qualifications system, I have investigated the following questions:
1 How did the examining boards evolve from their origins accrediting university
matriculation into independent providers of the unique national qualifications
system?
2 How did the successive changes to the examinations structure affect their role?
3 Is there evidence of a shift in control from the Boards to the State?
In usmg the adjective 'independent' to describe the exammmg boards, I should
explain that I have interpreted a variety of functions as indicators of independence.
The original function was a Board's professional freedom to design syllabuses and the
examinations which assess them. However, I have also used the term in relation to
administrative independence as regards organisational structures and financial
independence regarding examination fees.
The above questions are answered through empirical data gathered from:
• A variety of written sources from academic articles and historical accounts to
policy papers and reports, with more use of the media than is customary;
• A series of interviews with "key actors, participants in the policy process"
(Ball 1990: 2).
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Written sources to locate the examining boards
A historical narrative, periodised by the major changes experienced by the Boards,
locates them as organisations within the English secondary education system and
identifies some of the deeply embedded social and political strands which lie behind
those changes. The underlying issue is that of control: identifying the shifts that
occurred almost surreptitiously.
The first historical section follows the relatively late development of a secondary
education system in England and documents the origins of the examinations which
developed to accredit the products of that system and to select them for higher
education.
The next period focuses on the major changes to both the secondary system and the
examinations structure resulting from the 1944 Education Act, which with relatively
little further change, continued until the last decade of the zo" century which, as
stated above, I treat as the period from 1988 to 2002.
The sources of the data for these sections are principally the education histories
mentioned above, as well as the various official reports and government circulars
which detailed the policies and the regulations which would enact them.
Because the focus of a significant body of the research is on very recent events, I have
frequently had to rely on media sources. The Times Educational Supplement has often
proved to be the only source which reports on attitudes within the educational world
to the various events I have been researching. I recognise that this is a definite
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limitation which I have attempted to couterbalance through the use of interviews with
participants in those events.
When moving to the central analysis of the major changes experienced by the
examining boards during the 1990s, one has as a major resource the considerable
number of reports and white papers produced during that decade. Once again,
however, despite the central focus on post-16 qualifications and the bodies that award
them in that literature, very little of their content addresses the boards directly. An
advantage I had as an 'insider', a role whose other implications are discussed below,
was access to confidential papers of the examining board of which I was a trustee. I
have requested and received permission to use any data derived from those papers. On
rare occasions I have used my own diaries to verify dates or issues discussed.
Interviews with major actors
The other principal source of my empirical data was a series of interviews. Because
this phase of my research closely approximates what Yin describes as investigating "a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context" (Yin 1994:13), other tenets of
Yin's approach to case study seemed appropriate in constructing this aspect of my
study. Certainly his injunction that "You should bring your own prior expert
knowledge ..." (Yin 1994:123) seemed to apply to this study, where my prior
knowledge of the field was an important factor. For contextualising some aspects of
the changes in post-16 education, I would be drawing on my experience as a teacher
living through the events I was considering. In designing the interview schedule (See
Appendix for a list of the interviews), I would be relying on my active involvement
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as an examining board trustee in order to gain access to what has always been an area
concealed behind the confidential nature of the examining business.
Gewirtz and Ozga acknowledge a similar advantage: "Access was considerably eased
by the fact that one of us has worked closely with a former Deputy Permanent
secretary, who was invaluable in directing us to his colleagues and friends, and who
gained their co-operation by describing us as 'perfectly harmless" (Gewirtz and
Ozgan 1994: 193). Geoffrey Walford, in his editorial 'Reflections on researching the
powerful' suggests that:
It would seem that access is more likely to be granted if the researchers appear
to be .,. 'perfectly harmless '. In our sexist society, where it is men who hold most
of the powerful positions, female researchers may be at an advantage in being
perceived as being 'harmless', especially if they are young and not in senior
positions within their own organizations.
(Walford 1994: 223)
In my case, although not young and having been in a relatively influential position, I
believe I was seen not as "harmless" but as trustworthy because I was known to most
of the individuals I was interviewing. This was I think not 'a' but 'the' essential
advantage in my gaining access. The fact that my interviews were in the interest of
academic research rather than, for example, journalism, was also a factor in
facilitating access to a publicity-shy segment of the educational world.
In explaining the methodology of this research, it is important to make clear the
potential hazards inherent in my dual role as a researcher on the outside seeking data,
and an insider who gains access to that data because of a privileged position. The
methodological concerns one faces were described by Susan Semel:
... Writing the history ofa school in which one has been so intimately involved
poses significant methodological concerns.
I am cognizant that many of the problems of participant observation ...are
applicable to my research.
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'" The problem of 'going native' presented an interesting dilemma. (Semel
1994: 208)
Certainly my position was not one of a participant observer - a sort of examining
board ethnographer whose account could be described as "subjective, biased,
impressionistic [and] idiomatic" (Cohen and Manion 1994: 110) Yet my approach is
too linear to conform to post-structuralist preferences for "the particularity of
historical experience, the material hereness and nowness ... " (Quoted in Windschuttle
1996: 102) where subjectivity is assumed. Instead, I have seen my role as a variation
on the Levi-Strauss notion of a bricoleuse: "a constructivist who interrogates the
materials ...to discover what each could signify" (Crotty 1998: 50). I have tried to
assume the role not of 'critical friend' but of dispassionate interpreter of the
examining boards. I recognise that at times this role may appear to verge on advocacy,
but I have made every effort to avoid slipping over that line. Also, although from the
outside I might appear to fit the pattern of 'insider', within the Board my position as a
teachers' union nominee meant that my allegiance was not viewed as an
unquestioning one.
I believe that, with my status clarified, this dual role has been a strength in both my
grasp of the issues I have been analysing and my ability to access material normally
not open to public scrutiny. Certainly, as I said above, my being known to nearly all
the individuals I approached for interviews enabled me to gain access to people who
do not normally speak openly. In 1981, Michael F D Young commented that: "It is
not without significance that the dominant tradition ofeducational research has never
conceived ofinvestigations into the practice ofthe powerful" (Young 1981: 38). Since
that date, a growing body of qualitative research theory addresses the importance of
such interviews and considers aspects of their design which have influenced my
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planning. In relation to this study, much of the data which interested me could be
uncovered only through such interviews. The major English work for students of
educational research methodology advises that:
... the more one wishes to acquire unique, non-standardised,
personalised information about how individuals view the world, the
more one veers toward qualitative, open-ended unstructured
interviewing.
(Cohen, Manion 2000)
While the insights of the powerful are significant, Stephen Ball points out pitfalls in
what he describes as "elite interviews": "interviewees do not produce simple, guileless
descriptions ofevents; they are sophisticated interpreters ofevents" (Ball 1994: 112).
A related warning of Ball's, considered by Ecc1estone when assessing her interview
data, is the risk of accepting individuals' justifications of policy as "simple realism"
(Quoted in Ecc1estone 2002: 175). My approach to avoiding that pitfall was to
interrogate the accounts of the same issues as provided by a number of individuals in
order to identify common strands.
Certainly it is no guileless description that I was seeking. On the contrary, it is the
sophisticated interpretation which can, I believe, throw an informed light on issues
which have remained in obscurity because of the inherent caution and the culture of
confidentiality which have always formed part of the examining boards' culture. My
reading of the literature around the major changes to the examinations structure in
1911, 1944 and 1986 revealed that what was written about those changes had been
based for the most part on documents, without the insight that informed participants
can provide. I strongly believed that the perceptions of those most directly involved
could provide invaluable evidence not generally available. To obtain the best data
from such interviews, Maurice Kogan, whose early experience co-writing a book with
Edward Boyle and Anthony Crosland lends credibility to his advice, suggests that:
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It is in the nature of political or organisational studies that
interlocutors with distinguished records and minds of their own are
not likely to accept too much control over the questions they answer.
Indeed it is precisely because one wants to capture their individual
construction of events and relationships that it often proves best to
explain what one is after and let them structure the answer.
(Kogan 1994: 91)
In more recent research, Kathryn Ecclestone carried out 25 interviews with major
actors in her study of Learning Autonomy in Post-16 Education. Her objective was to
analyse the policy debates around outcome-based assessment models. Certain of the
advantages she cited from Walford's Researching the Powerful in Education which
apply to her case study can apply equally to the interviews planned for this research:
It enables researchers to people policy' with personalities, beliefs,
values and dilemmas, gain data unavailable elsewhere, confirm or
adjust publicly available accounts ofpolicy and identify networks of
individuals and agencies.
(Quoted in Ecclestone 2002:47)
These experienced researchers established the value of interviewing major actors and
their advice determined the design of the interviews. They would be unstructured and
open ended so as to allow the subjects to speak freely.
My definition of a 'major actor' in relation to an examining board was its Chief
Executive; in relation to the regulatory body, the highest-ranking civil servants
involved in regulating qualifications; from the education department the individual
responsible for secondary qualifications. These were the people who had participated
in the discussions which interested me. I maintain that the limited sample of my
interviewees is balanced by the valuable insights they can provide into what
Ecclestone described as the "organisational and normative perspectives swirling
around debates in assessment ...alongside some acculturation into unfamiliar
organisational cultures" (Ecclestone 2002: 174) which researchers need if they are to
acquire a genuine grasp on the complexities of the policy process.
44
Weighing the risks of a limited sample of interviewees
I acknowledge that relying so heavily on interviews for my data risks an imbalance in
the data so obtained. The risk is further heightened by the limited sample of
individuals who fit my criteria of 'elite' figures within the examining world. From
each of what had been reduced to just three awarding bodies, I planned to interview
only the individual who had been Chief Executive during the 1990s. From the
regulatory bodies, I planned to interview only the individual who had led the
academic qualifications section throughout the 1990s and one who had been
instrumental in the vocational section during the creation of GNVQs. My plan to
complete the triangulation by interviewing the individual who had been in the
dominant role related to qualifications within the Department for Education and Skills
as it had become, was thwarted by the movement of civil servants into different areas
of responsibility and their resulting unwillingness to speak about their past roles.
There may also have been a degree of reluctance due to the established confidential
status of civil servants.
Nevertheless I decided to proceed with my plan. I took the view that in no other way
could I acquire a range of data on the issues I was investigating. My search of the
literature had confirmed that to date the examining boards had avoided close analysis.
If this closed world were to be investigated, I was convinced that it was essential to
begin the process - which I hope others will continue - by speaking to those most
intimately involved during the period I was investigating.
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For two reasons, I did not attempt to interview a wider range of individuals. The
principal one was that I believe the genuine insights I was seeking would come only
from those involved at the highest level of the relevant bodies. Previous experience of
data collection from various levels within one organisation (Sturgis 2000) had
produced limited data, and responses determined largely by the skill with which the
questionnaire prompts had been constructed. The second was that I wanted to have the
opportunity of collecting data which involved the variety of significant actors'
perceptions, generalisations and uncertainties in order to discern patterns and
relationships - or the lack of them, and to produce what Priscilla Anderson describes
as "rich, thick" reports (Anderson 2002). Ecclestone's research demonstrated both the
difficulty "for researchers and other constituencies to delve into the messy obscurity
ofpolicy processes" together with their need to "understand more about the diverse
constituencies and individuals that influence policy" (Ecclestone 2002: 174). I
contend that my small but influential sample of interviewees could enable me to
"delve" effectively.
Finally, I must address the matter of interviewees' motivation and the reliance one can
place on accounts that may involve "records to set straight, scores to settle,
reputations to defend, perhaps a career to rationalise" (Ecclestone 2002: 175). While
my intervewees were undoubtedly subject to such motives, the issues I was asking
them to reflect on were, I suggest, sufficiently distanced from their direct individual
responsibility to elicit as dispassionate an account as one can ever expect to receive.
My methodological approach to analysing the evidence from this limited sample of
interviews would seek to identify common strands and shared interpretations in order
to avoid taking a particular account at face value. The reader should similarly treat the
46
accounts as inevitably coloured by their source - assisted, I hope, by my identifying
them with reference to their organisational origin.
Conducting the interviews
I carried out the central set of interviews between October 2003 and March 2004. I
have also included some data from interviews carried out in 2000 for previous
research. Although none of the interviewees requested anonymity, I have anonymised
all interviewees but two: Lord Dearing and Professor Peter Gosden. Both Lord
Dearing and Professor Gosden were speaking as informed individuals, whereas all the
other subjects were speaking as holders of a professional role rather than in an
individual capacity. [See Appendix for a list of the interviewees]
The timing of the interviews was not opportunistic, but rather an important factor in
the methodology. I wanted to approach the interviews in possession of a body of
evidence which the interviews would either support or dispute. In this way I hoped to
achieve that triangulation of evidence which Robson suggests "is particularly
valuable in the analysis of qualitative data where the trustworthiness of the data is
always a worry" (Robson 1993: 383).
Once I had completed the background research on the 1990s, I drew up the interview
schedule with the objective of obtaining interviews with the Chief Executives of the
three unitary awarding bodies and at least one high-level official from the regulatory
body, and one of similar status at the Department for Education and Skills. In each
case I wrote to request an interview, explained the nature of my research, and offered
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to provide a transcript of the interview, which would be tape recorded, so that the
subjects could withdraw any material deemed sensitive.
All requests were successful with the exception of those to one individual formerly at
the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority and two who had been at the Department
for Education and Skills; one individual involved during the 1990s had moved out of
the education department and another could not spare the time to be interviewed. It is,
I think, significant that I was known to virtually all those who agreed to be
interviewed. The ability of civil servants to elude investigations into their involvement
in policy-making remains a major obstacle , one which I have not succeeded in
overcommg.
For each interview, I met the subject in his/her office or a place of his/her choosing. I
began by restating what I had explained in my letter, that my interest was in the
pressures on the examining boards during the 1990s. I asked each subject to begin by
recalling that period, and talking about their perceptions. When they had reached the
end ofthat 'stream of consciousness', I asked them to comment on a list of issues my
research had suggested as important. [See Figure 2.1]
Each interview lasted approximately one hour. Two subjects requested to see
transcripts, but none placed any restriction on my use of the data.
Lord Dearing agreed to be interviewed at the House of Lords, but in deference to his
age, I followed a different procedure. Rather than ask him about particular factors,
during the 1990s, I simply asked about thinking at the time of his 1996 Report.
Technical problems meant that the interview was not fully recorded, and I had only
post-interview notes rather than a verbatim transcript. I interviewed Professor Gosden
in the Archives Department of Leeds University.
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In the last stage of my work, I carried out two additional interviews. The first, in June
2005, was with the newly appointed Director General and his Deputy at AQA; the
second, in September 2005, was with the Chief Executive Officer and President of
Pearson Assessments & Testing now leading Edexcel. I felt that I needed current
views on the ever-changing qualifications scene to validate my conclusions. Because
Figure 2-lInterview Prompts
Factors 1991-2002 which destabilised the Boards
A External Factors
- The 'Standards Debate': norm referencing v. criterion referencing
- Marketisation and Competition
- The changing Regulator and increasing regulation
- Mergers (from 1997) and the management of change
B Internal Factors
- Personnel issues: increases in appeals, decline of markers
- Keeping up with technology
- Financial issues resulting from all these
these interviews were focused more on the future than the past, I wanted the subjects
to speak freely rather than be bound by particular issues I might raise. Therefore I did
not record them, but took notes of what was really an open-ended conversation in
response to my request for their views on 'possible ways forward for the examining
boards'. In neither case was any restriction placed on my using anything that was said
during the interview.
Analysing the interviews and incorporating the evidence
I decided against the use of software such as NVivo or NUDIST for analysing the
interviews. I admit to a certain prejudice here, but despite receiving training in their
effective use, I could not overcome my perception that such software, while eminently
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suitable for large-scale analysis, is not sufficiently developed for the nuances which I
was seeking in my subjects' responses. Instead, I transcribed the interviews myself, an
important first step in ensuring a familiarity with the content. Then I went through the
transcripts using the interview headings to structure the analysis, making notes on
each individual's unstructured responses, and comparing these with their subsequent
responses to my prompts. These data I have woven into the relevant sections as
evidence to support or counter the point I was pursuing. I have included quite lengthy
excerpts in order to provide the full flavour of the interview. I was aware of the risks
in lifting brief citations out of context.
3 Constructing a coherent chapter structure
I have outlined above the rationale for the structure of the first part of the thesis: an
introduction, a survey of the literature and an exposition of my theoretical framework
and methodology, followed by a chapter which locates the examining boards
historically and analyses the changes they experienced up to 1988.
The central section comprises a very long chapter focused on the stresses the boards
experienced during the 1990s. Although I emphasise the inter-related nature of the
events of the 1990s, for the sake of coherence I have broken them down into
'external' and 'internal' stresses.
The grades crisis of September 2002 was, of course, unforeseen as I began my
research. However, I felt that it must be included as a sort of dramatic proof of my
claim that the boards had essentially lost professional control of the qualifications
they were administering. The interviews confirmed that all these principal actors saw
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the episode as clear evidence of the shift in control to the regulator. Therefore, chapter
five portrays those events through that lens and leads to my concluding section.
My final chapter details the conclusions I have reached based on the evidence I have
produced to answer my research questions and interrogates those conclusions. I end
with a sort of epilogue based on my revised conclusions which outlines two possible
future directions for the English examining boards.
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Chapter 3 Locating the English Examining Boards in
Education History
Before embarking on the narrative which traces the origins and development of the
English examining boards, I believe it is important first to establish the strong strands
in the nation's educational attitudes which have influenced the shape of that curious
constellation. I shall then be able to make reference to these factors as I proceed
without pausing to clarify their particular derivation.
Prologue on the English Educational Mindset
I have identified four dominant attitudes and what might be described as a 'fifth
column' influence, using a broad spectrum of supporting evidence:
• Learners as conforming to a platonic, three-level pattern - reflecting their
social class - with abstract learning as the highest level and the only valued
style;
• Voluntarism as the preferred means of bringing about educational change;
• Inter-denominational suspicions as obstacles to change;
• Private schools as inhabiting a separate sector but with powerful influence;
• The covert but powerful influence of civil servants ill the education
department.
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Learners as a platonic hierarchy
In a nation where the dominant class was educated in the classical tradition of two
ancient universities, it is unsurprising that Plato's division of the human race into an
intellectual hierarchy should have strongly influenced the views of Victorian policy
makers. It is more difficult to understand why it is still such a powerful element in
English attitudes. This prejudice against the practical may survive within other
countries, but in less explicit form. For example in Germany, applied education has
been regarded as an invaluable accessory to academic qualifications within the Dual
System which many countries have attempted, without conspicuous success, to
imitate. Green typifies this and some Scandinavian systems as a "North European"
model in contrast to the "Anglo-Saxon" profile of a labour force with low incentives
to achieve Level 2 and 3 qualifications. (Green 2000) In France, despite entrenched
resistance from teaching unions, the Bac Pro has earned its place as an alternative
route for a significant tranche of French students. (Prost 2000: 22) Yet in England, of
the four strands I have identified, this belief has had - and continues to have - the
greatest influence on the structure of English examinations, with their treatment of
academic and vocational skills as quite distinct.
An early expreSSIOn of this VIew can be found in the Taunton Report of 1868.
Established to address concerns about the nation's skills levels after the Great
Exhibition of 1851 revealed that competitor nations were overtaking the begetter of
the Industrial Revolution, the Schools Inquiry Commission, its official title,
commended a pattern for secondary education:
First-grade schools were to be those which prepared their pupils for university
entry at nineteen years of ages, teaching Greek and Latin. Second-grade
schools were intendedfor those likely to enter the professions, leaving school at
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the age ofsixteen. The third-grade schools were intendedfor the yeoman class,
leavingfor work at the age offourteen ....
(Montgomery 1965: 51)
This platonic notion of the tri-partite division of learners at secondary level has
survived through the years. Although establishing a national structure of the most
basic secondary provision had to wait until the Balfour Act of 1902, the Taunton
concept of the learning population survived to reappear in the Hadow Report of 1925,
the Spens Report of 1938 and was the base of the first full secondary structure
established by Butler's Education Act of 1944. The proposals of the Dearing Report
of 1996 confirmed the concept to be alive and well in its hopeful recommendation of
a three-track structure which would "make explicit the equal standing of academic,
applied and vocational qualifications" (Dearing 1996: 12), despite the fact that they
had resolutely remained a hierarchy.
The close connection between this hierarchy of learners and their social class was
embodied at an early stage in the gradual development of post-elementary schools
around the country. As the 19th century progressed, three types of school were taking
shape to serve three distinct social groups well before any national system was
established. In his 1990 book Education and State Formation, Andy Green described
this pattern:
...the Anglican schools, which are dominated by the gentry and integrated with
the conservative state apparatus; the middle-class schools which are articulated
with industry; and independent working-class schools arising in tandem with
working-class political organisations and institutions ofself-help.
(Green 1990: 70)
These social divisions in the system were still evident to R H Tawney in 1931. In one
of his thunderous editorials in The Manchester Guardian he claimed that "The
hereditary curse ofEnglish education is its organization along lines ofsocial class."
(Quoted in Green 1990: 307)
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An inevitable corollary of the elevated regard for those capable of abstraction has
been a corresponding lack of status for applied or vocational education. Until the
Dearing Report of 1996 recommended a limited rapprochement of vocational and
academic qualifications, the two fields had developed quite separately in England. A
vehement critic of this division has been the military historian Carelli Barnett. He
named Cardinal Newman as the model of the influential Victorian who exemplified
"the lack of interest in industry and industrial success displayed by the dominant
British educational establishment" (Barnett 1986: 238). However, he saved his
bitterest criticism for what he labelled the "New Jerusalem attitudes" of Labour party
reformers after the Second World War. He castigated their complete failure to
consider the requirements of British industry when implementing the reform of
secondary education. Certainly this attitude has profoundly affected the nation's
examination system.
Voluntarism rather than central direction
In his comparison of the development of state education systems, Andy Green cited
English reluctance to impose any form of national system to be the factor which
differentiated English (although he saw it as 'British') practice from that of Prussia,
France or America. As the 19th century proceeded, " ... the overwhelmingly dominant
values of the Victorian era were those of individualism, enterprise and laissez-faire
liberalism" (Green 1990: 228). He illustrated his point by quoting John Stuart Mill,
who in On Liberty scornfully dismissed the need for a national education system: "A
general state education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like
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one another ..." (Quoted in Green 1990: 254). This attitude inevitably shaped the
nation's educational provision:
...The most distinctive feature of British education has been its voluntary
character. Both in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this voluntary
approach was held to be morally, and educationally, superior to compulsory
schooling schemes in continental Europe. These were associated with despotism
and subservience, in contrast to the freedoms enjoyed by British citizens, which
were seen as being essential to the British character. Voluntarism ...meant
freedom for pupils from compulsory attendance, and freedom for schools from
state interference.
(Green 1990: 70)
The preference for voluntarism has remained a strong strand in English educational
reforms. From the Forster Act of 1870, which endorsed the existing patchwork of
elementary provision rather than establishing a uniform national system, through to
the introduction of comprehensive education in the 1960s, change has been suggested
rather than imposed.
When the 1944 Education Act finally established a free, national, secondary education
system up to age 15, the new Minister, 'Red' Ellen Wilkinson, approved the Ministry
Circular 73 "commending the tripartite secondary organisation to local authorities ..."
(Maclure 2000: 54). Even such a passionate supporter of educational opportunity for
all did not go so far as to 'require'. The result was that the intended system was never
fully realised; the technical schools flickered into existence in some areas, then faded
into comprehensive schools, while the 'modem' schools attended by the vast majority
of pupils were frequently housed in poorly adapted elementary schools. Expecting
rather than demanding meant also that change was slow: the school leaving age was
not raised to 16 until 1972, and the last all-age elementary school was not reorganised
until 1971. (Barber 1996: 49)
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When in 1965 Antony Crosland as Labour's Secretary of State for Education issued
Circular 10/65, it eschewed compulsion in favour of a request to local authorities to
submit plans for comprehensive reorganisation. This low-key approach was a great
disappointment to comprehensive advocates like Brian Simon, who saw the voluntary,
and non-funded, tone of the Circular as "hardly reflecting a serious determination to
bring about fundamental change in the structure of secondary education" (Simon
1991:281).
This avoidance of diktat has often been considered positive evidence of the nation's
democratic credentials. For example, in 1895 the Liberal Party, then in opposition, set
up the Bryce Commission to report on secondary provision in England and
commended its "freedom, variety and elasticity". Green, like Simon, comments that
other constructions could be put on those qualities:
...Elasticity had meant ad hoc and unplanned; variety had meant class
differentiation and freedom meant the unchecked authority of the powerful to
provide education solely in their own interests.
(Green 1990: 307)
Voluntarism was closely connected to and regularly resulted from the third factor in
the national culture: the religious denominational divide which to a considerable
degree followed the fault-lines of social class.
Inter-denominational rivalries as a brake on reform
For the better part of a century, the suspicion that existed between the two principal
denominational groups obstructed change. The entrenched opposition between the
Anglican establishment and Dissenters nurtured mutual suspicion. Both opposed any
education plans which might benefit the other. Margaret Archer's perceptive
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comment, referring to the fudged settlement of 1870, sums up the situation that
prevailed for so long:
Non-decision-making was of paramount significance, for the party political
defence of vested interests had militated against the introduction of a single
national system ofeducation.
(Archer 1984: 76)
The 1861 report of the Newcastle Royal Commission, charged with investigating
"The State ofPopular [elementary] Education in England", advocated some form of
local distribution of funding, but "the idea ofapplying local rates did not survive the
denominational antagonism of the times" (Montgomery 1965: 40). In this instance,
the source of the antagonism was the distrust of the many parents and teachers from a
lower middle-class dissenting background for public funding of the National Schools
which provided specific Anglican teaching (Roach 1986: 48). Confirming the
negative influence of this division was the view of Charles Dickens, who maintained
"that religious sectarianism, even more than the national indifference and inertia,
was responsible for the many postponements ofa state system" (Quoted in Collins and
Philip 1963: 74).
When a limited form of secondary education was introduced by the Balfour Act of
1902, there was a major outcry that this meant 'religion on the rates' because state
funding would go to existing church schools - who were equally forthright about their
right to continue within a state-funded system.
The historian Roy Lowe, in assessing the contribution of R A Butler to the 1944
Education Act, recognised Butler's skill in managing at least partially to resolve the
thorny problem of church involvement in state education which had dogged English
education policy for the better part of a century. "Butler's patient and skilful
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negotiation of the church school issue was his great contribution to what became
known as the Butler Act" (Lowe 1988: 73).
Both its supporters - Anglicans and Roman Catholics, who controlled about one-third
of existing schools - and its opponents - nonconformists who provided few schools
but many Labour MPs - felt passionately about the existing 'dual system'. Butler
managed, by proposing what today seems the curious system of aided and controlled
schools, to win the support of Archbishop Temple, yet simultaneously to avoid
ruffling nonconformist feathers. The legacy of this divided system can be detected in
current debates over 'faith schools'. Although this issue has no direct connection with
the examining boards, its influence has had the effect of strengthening social class
divisions and the hierarchical view of learners referred to above which the examining
system reflects. The final factor in the English mindset is, again, one where social
class is central: the separate existence of the private school sector.
The lasting influence of the private schools
In 1864, the Clarendon Commission - established to investigate public school
standards because their products were proving unreliable as administrators of empire
- reported that classics should remain as the core curriculum. This centrality of
classics served to set the private sector apart from state schools for the better part of a
century. As the education historian Brian Simon put it, the Clarendon Commission
"created an efficient and entirely segregated system of education for the governing
class - one that had no parallel in any other country" (Simon 1974: 318). In another
historian's view, it was the very prestige of the public schools, faults and all, which
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"made it seem less important that the state should create a general system of
secondary educationfor the whole country" (Roach 1986: 238). This parallel universe
outside the state sector has continued to exist and to exert an influence - certainly on
examinations, as will be seen later - disproportionate to its size, which hovers at about
7% of the school population.
The private sector asked for and received its own exammmg board, and was
completely omitted from the remit of the 1944 Education Act. A closer look at this
omission neatly illustrates how these strands in English thinking are inter-related. The
failure to include the public schools when planning the reform of secondary education
appeared extraordinary to at least one cosmopolitan observer. Sir Fred Clarke, newly
returned from a distinguished career in education "in the dominions" [ie in Canada
and South Africa] to lead London's Institute of Education, was struck by the absence
of any reference to the public schools in the Norwood Report, on which the Act was
based. He pointed out that "the leading secondary schools ofthe country are nowhere
discussed within its pages ..." and suggested that:
We can hardly continue to contemplate an England where the mass of the
people coming on one educational path are to be governed for the most part by
a minority advancing along quite a separate and more favoured path.
(Clarke 1940: 44)
Similar objections were voiced by G T Giles of the National Union of Teachers.
While supportive of the Norwood Report's general aims, he too called attention to its
omissions, particularly "its failure to address the issue of the public schools"
(McCulloch 1994: 52).
In fact, Butler had not overlooked the public school issues, but had made a tactical
decision to preclude its discussion by the Norwood Committee and instead to allocate
the matter to a separate committee chaired by Lord Fleming. The committee having
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been asked to "inquire into how to bring the public schools into a closer association
with the general system, ...the outcome was disappointing" (McCulloch 2004: 61).
The Fleming Report was published two months after Butler's education bill, so losing
any implication that the two were related. This manipulation of events suggest great
skill on the part of either Butler or his civil servants in managing to avoid yet again
coming to grips with England's divided educational structure. Fleming recommended,
in the favoured English manner, "the voluntary association with the general
educational system of all Public Schools" (McCulloch 2004: 61). Thus the English
reliance on voluntarism maintained class divisions and the separate private sector.
The hidden influence of educational eminences grises
I have tried to establish that the four factors outlined above have formed - and to a
degree still form - an essential part of English educational attitudes. However, I shall
also suggest that their survival through changes both in government and in other
national attitudes is strongly related to the influence of civil servants in the
department of education. Evidence for this statement is, naturally, difficult to unearth,
but I have found repeated instances where those who have acquired expert knowledge
of a particular area of education have detected such influence.
Perhaps the best known and most widely acknowledged of influential civil servants is
Sir Robert Morant. In his role as Permanent Secretary of the Board of Education,
Morant drafted the bill that became the 1902 Balfour Education Act. The first in a
long line of influential civil servants in the education department, Sir Robert was "a
controversial but outstanding figure" (Sharp 2002: 99). His admirers acknowledge a
certain high-handedness in his approach, but praise his achievement in shaping
Edwardian secondary education as:
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...a ladder to universities for the poor boy and girl ofparts, a reservoir for the
10,000 teachers needed for state elementary schools and well-grounded
entrants for the professions.... Sir Robert Morant provided the people of
England with the possibility ofwhat he held they ought to want.
(Petch 1953: 51)
Despite his undoubted achievements, in hindsight he can be portrayed as:
...a destructive force ... [who] played an important part in the deliberate
destruction both of the system of school boards ...and of the cardinal ideas on
which it was based.
(Sharp 2002: 99)
Certainly Brian Simon was of the latter opinion. He felt that by replacing the local
School Boards with Local Education Authorities in the 1902 Act, the Government -
prompted by Morant - effectively ended popular influence in state secondary schools.
This policy decision ensured both the survival of church schools and the continued
autonomy of the private sector, those enduring stands in the educational fabric.
(Simon 1974: 21) Similar criticism of Sir Robert's influence came from a critic of a
different political persuasion:
The outstanding figure in this regard [ignoring the importance of technical
education in favour of a public-school, classics bias] is Sir Robert Morant, the
civil servant who was largely responsible for preparing and implementing the
1902 Education Act, the most important single piece of legislation in the field
before the Butler Act of 1944. Hardly surprisingly [due to his background of
Winchester, then Classics, Hebrew and Christian Union at Oxford], he was to
set out in office not to provide England with education for capability [either
general or technical] that could match that of her rivals, but to demolish what
little had been gradually built up by his time.
(Barnett 1986: 223)
In view of the entrenched nature of the attitudes that Morant personified, it is difficult
to sustain the view that this one individual should be held responsible for the English
aversion to applied learning as a legitimate pursuit. It is a thread that runs constantly
through the fabric of the nation's educational attitudes, and is still seen as problematic
in the Tomlinson Report of 2004. However, no one disputes that this civil servant
rather than any politician was responsible for drafting the Act.
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The outstanding historian of education administration, Peter Gosden, has recorded
such influence to be a clear aim of education department officials in the middle of the
20th century. He quotes R S Wood, Deputy Secretary of the Board of Education as
suggesting in November 1940 [referring to the education problems that would be
faced when the war ended] that, "1 think this is a matter where the Board should lead
rather thanfollow" (Gosden 1976: 238). Although I see this ambition as a step toward
the eventual dominance of education by the department, it is important to note that at
the time the motivation was - at least in the view of Peter Gosden - less based on a
desire for power than on the need to ensure fairness across the nation:
This emphasis on the need for the Board to assert itself and to offer active
leadership corresponded exactly to the increasingly widespread view that the
disparity of provision between the various local authorities was no longer
acceptable and that far more emphasis needed to be placed on national policy;
only greater centralization could undo the inequity between children ofdifferent
districts which became so apparent during the evacuation and could ensure that
there would be more purposeful national planning in education.
(Gosden 1976: 240)
Such claims to be acting in the interests of fairness for all can, of course, always serve
as a justification for increasing central control.
Later in the century, Denis Lawton cited events following the 1944 Education Act as
evidence for his claims regarding the ambitions of civil servants in the education
department. Referring to the Labour Minister Ellen Wilkinson's being persuaded to
endorse Circular 103, drawn up under the Conservative R A Butler's term at the
Board of Education and meeting fierce opposition at the Labour Party conference in
the autumn of 1945, Lawton suggests:
This is just one example ofministers being persuaded by civil servants to carry
on with a policy laid down either by a previous administration of a different
political complexion or by the civil servants themselves.
(Lawton 1980: 30)
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Evidence of the unusual power of civil servants in the DES comes also from a
politician who had experience of ministerial briefs in several departments. When he
came to Education as Secretary of State in May 1986, Kenneth Baker commented on
the "formidable intellectual bullying" (Quoted in Jenkins 1996: 117) of Walter Ulrich,
head of the Schools Branch. Baker felt that Ulrich had held Sir Keith Joseph and his
Junior Minister, Chris Patten, under the spell of his ''fine Wykehamist mine!'. Both
ministers had tended to "concede the intellectual point rather than persist with the
political argument" (Jenkins 1996: 117).
In exactly the same manner 40 years later, the proposals in the consultation paper
Guaranteeing Standards regarding changes to the examining boards and issued by
Conservative Gillian Shephard were enacted unaltered by Labour's Tessa Blackstone,
evidently persuaded by civil servants of the merits of the policy they had drafted. The
involvement of a particular civil servant in ensuring his - or at least the department's
- desired outcome in this instance was mentioned spontaneously by two different
examining board officials in the interviews I conducted in the course of this research:
I can remember when [a named senior official], DjES - or DjEE, rather - came
into a room ...to tell us about what was going on and [said], 'There'll be three
[awarding bodies] '. It was in the basement of Sanctuary Buildings ...and he
made this statement. We'd had a meeting with him, and this was right at the
end.
(OCR2 2003)
A second recollection of the same meeting was equally precise:
And I do recall, and I even recall the date on this: the twelfth of December
1997, sorry 1996, a meeting in the Department where [the same named official]
really made it clear that the expectation would be that there would be only three
unitary awarding bodies.
(AQA22003)
This covert civil service influence is significant for this study, which posits the growth
of such influence in the form of the modem "managerial state" (Clarke and Newman
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1997) as a motive force in the shift of power from the Boards to the centre. Yet, apart
from occasional glimpses like those cited, one cannot pierce the blanket of obscurity
provided by anonymity in order to distinguish between the influence of civil servants
and the politicians they advise. Therefore, I have decided to include both within the
concept of the "managerial state". The analysis as to the exact source of various
policy decisions will have to await a more transparent age than the current one. This
concludes my 'prologue'. With what might be described as the English educational
map's essential philosophical features in place, I shall now proceed to the narrative
which details the origins and growth of the examining boards.
A The Origins and Development ofthe Independent English
Examining Boards
The unusual structure of England's independent examining boards came into being
well before a national secondary school system existed. They emerged as a classic
Victorian solution to a problem: devised by products of the ancient universities and
quite outside any government involvement. The problem was the unreliable standard
of the products of post-elementary education. Whether proceeding to imperial
administration or to university education, the young men emerging from the range of
educational institutions were difficult to evaluate as suitable for their chosen direction.
It was unfortunate, in view of how the initial structure has survived, that from the
outset the essential difference between accreditation and selection was not recognised
and has survived to bedevil examinations to this day. However, as a solution to an
immediate problem, the Boards created to solve it were so well suited to the society
they served that they could fit a slightly edited version of R H Tawney's description,
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III an editorial in The Manchester Guardian of 17 August 1937, of the equally
exceptional English public schools:
...the very term .,.caused 'perpetual astonishment to foreign observers '. Yet to
most Englishmen the system they form appears a feature ofthe social landscape
at once so inevitable and so edifying that only impiety or malice will venture to
challenge it.
It is still the case that these organisations are largely taken for granted as fixtures of
the English secondary system. I believe that this is because they developed as organic
creations of their society and have, until recently, broadly retained their distinctive
character. With the objective of making the case that they have now lost an essential
element of that character, I shall trace their history from their origins until the end of
the 1980s: a history that falls into two broad periods: from their origins to 1944, and
then from 1944 to 1988. The third, most recent period becomes the focus of the fourth
chapter of this study.
Part 1: A Victorian selection device become a national system
One of the distinguished historians of English education began his chronicle of
examinations in 19th century England with the sentence, "Public examinations were
one ofthe great discoveries ofnineteenth-century Englishmen" (Roach 1971: 3). This
sweepingly Eurocentric claim overlooks the major role examinations have played in
China from the time of the ih-century T'ang Dynasty, with merit-based examinations
a continuing selecting device throughout the country's history. (Spence 1990)
Although comparatively late on a global scale, then, certain eminent Victorians
familiar with examinations from their experience at Oxford or Cambridge did indeed
conclude that adapting the notion of the university examination to accredit a wider
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public could serve a useful purpose in society. The competitive aspect of
examinations accorded well with their belief in the character-building effect of sports
like cricket and rugby. The sporting notion of 'a level playing field' was another
attractive feature of examinations as a fair means of selection. However, it was the
problem of administering an empire that led the Victorians to tum to examinations as
a solution.
As the 19th century progressed and imperial responsibilities grew ever more
demanding, it became clear that there was a need for improved methods of selecting
administrators. Established practice, based on gentlemanly status and nepotism, was
delivering people who were proving unsuitable for the imperial responsibilities
required of them. "By J858 the belief in 'competition as against restriction or private
favour' was in the air, for it fitted the ethos of the age" (Roach 1971: 18). It was
natural that in their quest for a fair and effective means of selection the products of the
Cambridge Tripos or Oxford Greats would tum to examinations as the ideal solution.
In order to structure what seemed a senes of random developments, I have
constructed a matrix showing the principal steps in the process of developing an
examining system in England [See Figure 3.1], with summaries of the rationale
which lay behind them and the effects they had. This section will expand on those
steps which by 1918 saw a national system of secondary examinations administered
by eight different university examining boards which dominated the body established
to regulate the system.
It was a teachers' organisation that claimed the credit for first administering
simultaneous examinations to large groups In secondary schools. The College of
Preceptors, comprising mainly the headmasters of the much-criticised 'middle-class
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schools', inaugurated examinations as part of its function of inspecting schools and
accrediting teachers. However, the middle classes who paid for their children to attend
these schools were inclined to despise the "intellectual and social pretensions" of
teachers, risen for the most part from the working class. (Roach, 1971 #1: 49) As well
as being coloured with teachers' low status, the College of Preceptors' impartiality
was suspect: it was seen as a case of teachers assessing themselves. For a time the
time the College sustained a limited following; its influence peaked at the end of the
nineteenth century, when it examined 17 000 candidates in 1893 (Montgomery 1965:
64). However, probably because of the impartiality factor, its qualifications were
refused recognition by the Board of Education after its creation in 1899. The Board
accredited only the qualifications of the university examining boards, so the College
of Preceptors declined to the status of a fringe organisation, still extant as the College
of Teachers.
The process of convincing Victorian society of the value of competitive examinations
as a selection device seemed to begin with Robert Lowe's introduction of competitive
examination for the Indian Civil Service through the India bill of 1853. Then Charles
Trevelyan's positive experience of those examinations in India enabled him to
convince powerful Englishmen to support the idea for the Home Civil Service.
Trevelyan could be described as the role model for generations of civil servants
whose legacy was concealed behind the politicians they served. C E Trevelyan trained
at the East India Company's college at Haileybury, and served very successfully in
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India. On his return he married Hannah Macaulay, sister of the great historian.
Through this link, he acquired a network of powerful friends within the universities.
These connections strengthened his position when he moved to the Treasury to work
with Gladstone, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. When Gladstone became Prime
Minister and was considering civil service reform, it was natural that he should turn to
Trevelyan. It was equally natural that Trevelyan should apply to an English problem
the lessons he had learned in the laboratory of Indian administration (Roach 1971:
23).
Although Lord Northcote's name took precedence over Trevelyan's in the title of the
report when it was published, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853 was certainly
the product of Trevelyan's thinking. With his powerful connections made explicit, it
becomes clearer how the selection proposals in the report won significant support
when many earlier attempts to introduce an element of competition into appointments
had failed. In proposing examinations for competitive entry to the higher levels of the
civil service, the report served as an early skirmish in a long campaign. Convincing
the public of the wisdom of such a radical change was a challenging task despite its
eminent champions.
Gladstone attempted to soothe the doubts of Queen Victoria, who worried over the
prospect of appointing someone who was "first in ability" but might otherwise be
"very ineligible" - perhaps her way of questioning the suitability of those whom the
English have come to label as 'too clever by half. He assured her that:
Experience at the universities and public schools ofthis country has shown that
in a large majority ofcases the test ofopen examination is also an effectual test
of character; as, except in very remarkable cases, the previous industry and
self-denial, which proficiency evinces, are rarely separated from general habits
ofvirtue.
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(Quoted in Roach 1971: 31)
Gladstone did not share with his monarch the less than democratic views that he had
expressed to Lord John Russell a few days earlier in 1854:
I do not hesitate to say that one ofthe great recommendations ofthe change [to
open competition] in my eyes would be its tendency to strengthen and multiply
the ties between the higher class and the possession ofadministrative power ....
I have a strong impression that the aristocracy ofthis country are even superior
in natural gifts, on the average, to the mass .... This applies in its degree to all
those who may be called gentlemen by birth and training.
(Quoted in Roach 1971: 193)
Despite his strong support for selection by examination, it was not until 1870 that
Gladstone managed to introduce open competition by examination to the English civil
service. Yet the fact that the issue of examinations was a matter of keen public debate
by the great men of the day enhanced the possibility of introducing the idea at an
earlier stage of education:
Just as the administrative reformers saw public examination as a remedy for
political corruption and a test of personal competence, so the educational
reformers saw it as a remedy against local pressures on the teacher and as a
means ofraising professional standards.
(Roach 1971: 55)
It was progressive educationists concerned about the above-mentioned middle-class
schools who were to succeed in introducing examinations as a means of what would
now be termed 'quality assurance'; their selection function, which has become their
overriding purpose, was not initially the major objective.
A brief snapshot of mid-Victorian secondary education reveals the causes of concern
over the middle tranche of what provision there was. The upper classes felt
themselves to be well served by the public schools which could educate their
(younger) sons to proceed to the ancient universities of Oxford or Cambridge. This
powerful group therefore had no reason to seek change. The emerging middle class
aspired to an upper-class education in a public school for their offspring should their
71
fortunes improve, but meanwhile were determined to maintain their distance from the
stratum below them in the social order. They were suspicious of state interference.
Including "gentlemen of small incomes ..., trades people, the farmers, the merchants
and the superior class of mechanics (Quoted in Roach 1971: 43), these people were
determined to remain distinct from their social inferiors by paying for their children to
be educated. Therefore, unless their sons qualified for the limited number of
'grammar' schools, these solid citizens sent them to 'lower private schools' - as a
result often called 'middle class schools' (Roach 1986: 61). These institutions were
often of a dubious standard and were famously parodied in Dickens' "Dotheboys
Hall".
The great majority at the bottom of the social pyramid, who might have seen
education as a means of advancement, had to depend for any education either on the
Church in the form of Sunday Schools or on other charitable bodies or individuals.
Since in English thinking the educational needs of the labouring classes were limited,
this group was not a major source of Victorian concern. It was the middle-class
schools that were the first focus of reformers.
In his book Public Examinations in England 1850-1900, John Roach has documented
several successive "efforts ofprivate individuals to achieve reforms" (Roach 1971:
44). In Sussex, Nathaniel Woodard established three schools - Lancing,
Hurstpierpoint and Ardingly - which still survive, although his differentiation of the
original client groups into a hierarchy of three social classes has faded. However it
was J L Brereton in the West Country whose ''plans give a definite place to public
examinations as a means to effecting improvements" (Roach 1971: 43) and is
therefore of most interest here.
72
A product of Matthew Arnold's regime at Rugby, Brereton aimed to achieve
improvements in agricultural practice through the education of young farmers. He
advocated a structure of schools similar to that adopted by Woodard in Sussex, but
with the added factor of an annual county examination for the awarding of prizes and
scholarships. His ambitious plans for a "County Education" system, published in
1856, proposed a structure of schools for boys and girls between 12 and 15, then a
college for boys from 15 to 17, all supported by a combination of fees and the pupils'
labour on an attached farm. "The keystone oj the whole system would be an annual
county examination ...at which youths between sixteen and twenty-Jour...might sit for
a 'County Degree '" (Roach 1971: 52). This idea was the genesis of the first Oxford
Local Examinations in 1857. One of history's many ironies is that the English
examining system which in 2006 has yet to incorporate successfully the assessment of
applied skills grew out of a scheme for agricultural improvement.
Brereton's west country schools won the support of Lord Ebrington, an influential
landowner and Whig supporter of social reform, who "offered a prize oj£20 for the
best examination passed by a young man between eighteen and twenty-three years
old, the son or relative of a Devonshire Jarmer" (Roach 1971: 50). Members of the
Bath and West Society agreed to help organise the project, and the examination took
place at Exeter in Easter week of 1856.
The scheme caught the attention of T D Acland, already involved in the National
Schools movement. He recognised in such an examination a means of building in
standards in the vexed area of the middle-class schools. He convened a committee
which proposed in January 1857 the creation of a wider system of examinations and
prizes based on the Exeter model. Through his status as an Oxford double first and
73
fellow of All Souls, he won the support of Frederick Temple - fellow of Balliol, then
chaplain to Queen Victoria, next to be Headmaster of Rugby and eventual Archbishop
of Canterbury. Temple in tum wrote to the Master of Balliol to enlist Oxford's
examining experience in setting up the project. Temple's letter of 25 February 1857
provides a blueprint of the eventual English secondary schools examinations system:
...The University should appoint a competent Board of Examiners; that these
examiners should be prepared to examine all boys between certain ages
presented to them under certain regulations; ...that the expenses of the
examination should be covered by a small fee from every candidate.
If Oxford began, Cambridge would soon follow. In this way the universities
would give guidance to those schools which is sadly needed.
(Roach 1971: 69)
Oxford accepted the plan - although there followed the inevitable arguments about
issues such as the title to be assigned to the qualification. Associate of Arts (AA) had
been proposed, but provoked opposition because it would devalue the Bachelor of
Arts (RA) which cost graduates' parents £100. In what seems from the perspective
of modem timescales a very short time, the University of Oxford Delegacy of Local
Examinations came into being and held its first examination in June 1857. It
continued to fulfil that function until 'absorbed' by the Cambridge Syndicate in 1996.
This prototype of the English examining board was the model that other universities
followed subsequently with virtually no variation on Temple's brief outline.
As Temple had predicted, the University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate
(UCLES) held its first series of examinations in December of 1857. The following
year both universities decided to hold their examinations in June, the practice that has
been followed since that date. At the outset, a move to a single series of examinations
for the whole country was a definite possibility. Suggestions that the two universities
should combine forces and offer a single series of examinations led to joint
discussions. However by 1860 they had been unable to agree on the ever-vexed
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question of a qualification title and opted to proceed separately. A direct result of that
relatively minor quibble was the unique English structure of independent university
examining boards providing a national qualifications system. One is reminded of the
nursery rhyme:
For want ofa battle
The Kingdom was lost,
And all for the want
Ofa horse shoe nail.
In this instance, the possibility of a single national examination provision was lost for
want of an agreed title for the qualification.
The creation also in 1858 of the London Matriculation1 ensured the availability of a
university entrance examination for a wider segment of society, because University
College, the original institution of the University of London, was the first to drop a
Church of England affiliation from its entry requirements.i The almost coincidental
creation of the first three examining boards had occurred not through a particular
policy decision but, in the preferred English manner, from voluntary initiatives.
The reputation of the new examinations was initially coloured by their connection
with the middle-class schools. Grammar schools that already had an established link
with a university were not at first tempted to use the new examinations. They elicited
strong objections from the College of Preceptors, who perceived the university
examinations to be invading their territory, as indeed they were. They claimed that
"Oxford examiners [were] not at all well suited to examine the studies ofmiddle-class
schools" (Roach 1971: 90). However, because of the low esteem in which the College
was held, this protest may well have had the opposite effect from that intended.
Gradually the examinations began to prove their worth.
75
Incontrovertible evidence that they were becoming well regarded was the appeal from
the newly-established Headmasters' Conference to the old universities to offer a
separate examining body for their pupils in the private sector. They had overcome
their instinctive antagonisms to form their organisation in 1870 because of their alarm
at the 1868 Taunton Report. As well as proposing a three-level system of secondary
schools, the report had recommended as a method of regulating these schools the
creation of a system of state-controlled examinations. Countering Matthew Arnold,
who supported the Taunton proposals, "Goldwyn Smith, the Professor of Modern
History at Oxford, came out strongly against the continental practice of placing
authority for inspection or examination at the centre ofpower" (Montgomery 1965:
53). Goldwyn Smith's stance prevailed, and the 1870 Forster Act omitted any
recommendations regarding either secondary education or examinations.
Instead, the great majority of English children received only an elementary education
until after the Second World War. Had the Forster Act included the Taunton
recommendations regarding secondary education, the course of English educational
history - and the related examinations system - might have been very different. The
historian who has made a study of this period concluded that the failure to act on the
wider recommendations of the Taunton Report " ...can be regarded as a major
disaster for English education" (Roach 1986: 110).
In place of a central national system, university examining boards proliferated. The
result of the Headmasters' Conference request was the establishment in 1873 of the
fourth examining board: the Oxford and Cambridge Joint Board, which throughout its
existence served the private sector. Critics who felt that even this would cramp the
independent schools' freedom were assured by the headmaster of Winchester that the
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universities' examinations were "likely to be more flexible and less subject to the
whims ofcranks or bureaucrats than anything controlled by the government" (Roach
1971: 235). In view of the Byzantine organisational structure of the Joint Board,
touched on in Chapter Four, it was hardly likely to be a flexible body. Worries about
government control were well in advance of their time, but indicative of the prevailing
suspicion of central direction in English educational circles.
In the north of England, a parallel structure was forming. The three colleges
Liverpool, Owens in Manchester and Yorkshire in Leeds federated in the l880s under
the umbrella title of Victoria University. They had gained the allegiance of local
grammar schools through their provision of effective standards of inspection of those
schools and then of examining their pupils. As the colleges moved towards
independence as separate universities, they wished to retain some measure of
cooperation. To this end they formed the Joint Matriculation Board (JMB) in 1903.
Sheffield University was admitted to the JMB in 1905 and Birmingham University in
1916.3 This board formed a powerful counterpoise in the north to the
Oxbridge/London influence in the south. The JMB was considered by J L Brereton of
the Cambridge Syndicate to be more realistic than was London in its planning of
examinations and less affected by those interested only in university teaching.
"Perhaps this was due to the great advantage which the Board possessed in having
among its twenty-two members two headmasters and two headmistresses" (Brereton
1944: 101). This generous assessment of what in modem marketised thinking was a
competitor is indicative of the spirit that prevailed among the Boards - certainly prior
to the advent of GCE and the first major change to their tranquil world. The JMB,
which "soon became by far the largest" (Brereton 1944: 101), retained this strong
element of practitioners' representation throughout its history, and passed on that
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tradition to its successor bodies the Northern Examinations and Assessment Board
(1993) and the Assessment and Qualifications Alliance (2000). It is this factor which
has characterised this board with a strong public service ethos, an important aspect of
how it responded to the pressures of the 1990s.
The universities of Durham and Bristol eventually each formed their own examining
boards. This brought to seven the number of English boards, with the Welsh Board
the arbiter for university entrance in the Principality. At the outset, they concentrated
on providing examinations to select students for the particular universities of which
they formed a part. Gradually the universities came to accept each others'
qualifications, although it was far from an automatic process. The Charities
Commission granted them charitable status, which they have retained. This structure
of seven English university examining boards became an accepted part of the
educational landscape and adapted effortlessly to the establishment of a national
qualification structure in 1911.
Part 2: Rationalising examinations: the move to national School
Certificates
Once examinations had proved their effectiveness in university selection, their
popularity spread rapidly. Before the end of the 19th century, most professional bodies
required applicants to sit their particular entrance examinations. The result was that
young people faced the prospect of sitting numerous selection tests as they sought
future pathways. This proliferation concerned the Board of Education, established in
1899, and led it to set up the Consultative Committee on Examinations in Secondary
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Schools. Its report, published in 1911 and known as the Dyke Ac1and Report,
advocated a more uniform examining system.
The immediate result was that in 1912 the university boards cooperated in creating
England's first national structure of 'School Certificates'. These were what is now
termed 'grouped' qualifications; candidates were examined in specified subjects
within a narrow range of specialisms while also completing papers in general
subjects. Each examining board offered its own version of this scheme, and schools
were free to enter candidates with any board. Theoretically, then, the Boards were in
competition, although in practice the small number of grammar schools tended to
have connections with one or other of the university boards.
It is important for this study to note that the design and implementation of the new
scheme was entrusted to the Boards with no involvement from the Board of
Education. Because the war intervened, it was not until 1917 that the Board of
Education set up a 'light touch' regulatory body in the form of the Secondary Schools
Examinations Council (SSEC). This body of 21 members represented the university
boards (l0), local authorities (5) and teachers (6). Its link to the Board of Education
was through its Chairman and Secretary, whom the Board nominated (Brereton 1944:
95). There was no question that the examining boards' role was that of the
professionals on the Council. The power balance was spelled out by an official of the
Cambridge board: "The Board [of Education] holds the ultimate power of control
through the examination fees, but has expressed its intention of being advised by the
Council in all matters concerning examinations." (Brereton 1944: 95) This is almost
the exact reverse of the present-day relationship between the Boards and their
regulator: all matters concerning examinations are advised by the regulator, while the
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Boards must decide how to pitch their fees so as to remain solvent but not imperil
their market. An official of a modem-day Board was well aware of the contrast: "If
you look at Boards at that time, ..,they clearly were independent bodies, accountable
to [their respective] universities" (AQA1 2000).
However, their independent status did not mean that they were isolated from the
schools they served. An important factor in ensuring the success of the School
Certificates was the system of consultation with the teaching profession that the
Boards developed:
All the examining bodies (except the Oxford and Cambridge Joint Board which
had a special problem since it dealt mainly with public schools) ...devised
machinery for consultation with official representatives of the four Secondary
Teachers' Associations and the Independent Schools Association.
(Brereton 1944: 100)
Looking back on this early period, Brereton could detect that this involvement with
teachers, perhaps even more than the move to a national examination structure,
changed the Boards significantly:
During a period ofabout fifteen years the examining bodies were transformed
from a set ofuniversity bodies considering themselves set apart from and above
the schools, to the present state in which they all included teachers and local
education officers among their members.
(Brereton 1944: 101)
This lesson is one that has been forgotten and will be returned to in my concluding
chapter. The role of teachers is an important one, for it became their decision as to
which Board's syllabus suited their particular students. The assumption that teachers
have a right to select from a 'menu' of versions of national examinations is another of
the strands that has taken deep root in English educational terrain. No other country
offers its teachers and their students such a choice. It therefore seems important to
include their professional perspective within the structure - a concept which has been
lost sight of in the current practice of the "managerial state".
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The School Certificates came to be widely accepted and continued to accredit the
fortunate few of the population who by virtue of either their parents' prosperity or
their own ability managed to find a place in a secondary school. There developed an
undercurrent of criticism that the importance of the Certificates meant that the
examining boards virtually determined the upper secondary curriculum. This view
was articulated by the historian G M Trevelyan. He spoke for some education
practitioners in his claim that when examinations were created in Victorian times "the
evils ofthe examination system, especially its effect on school education, were not yet
realized, nor were they as great as they have since become" (Trevelyan 1944: 568).
However because this negative opinion appeared in a book published in the USA in
1942 but, due to wartime paper restrictions, not available in England until the summer
of 1944, it did not influence discussions around the Education Act of that year.
The examination boards continued to administer the system of School Certificates for
forty years virtually free of the external interference which was to dominate the last
years of the century. The system's survival was very likely due less to its lack of
flaws than to its limited impact on the population at large. The issues of widening
access to and selection for secondary education were of much greater importance
between the two world wars. During that time, England experienced a period of
social, political and economic turmoil which meant that virtually none of the hoped-
for reforms of the 1918 Education Act was implemented. The leaving age was raised
to 14 from 1921, but there was not an appropriate curriculum for pupils staying on in
elementary schools. Employers anxious to retain a supply of low-cost labour had no
enthusiasm for reform. Simon's history of education between the wars suggests that
the leaders of industry objected:
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...to any material improvement in the education of the working class which
required public expenditure; or which removed the pool of cheap labour
provided by the 14 to 16 age groups which, excludedfrom insurance safeguards
and wages agreements no less than schools, were on call for unskilled work in
industry and dead-end jobs in the distributive trades.
(Simon 1974: 64)
Despite such opposition, in the 1920s and again m the 1930s, committees were
established to suggested solutions to the acknowledged limitations on access to
English secondary education. Although neither of the resulting reports was
implemented, they are important because both fed into the thinking of the Norwood
Report which shaped the major changes brought about in the 1944 Education Act.
In December 1925, the Hadow Committee reported on its investigations into the
glaring weaknesses in the education of the majority of children over the age of 11.
However, as with the Forster Act of 1870 and the Balfour Act of 1902, Hadow did not
grasp the nettle and recommend full-scale reform. Board of Education officials had
framed the committee's terms of reference so as to exclude consideration of
secondary education for all and to retain the existing selective secondary sector as a
separate track.
Therefore, despite its being perceived in its day as a progressive way forward, the
Hadow Report reinforced the notion of education as a preparation for life in a
stratified society. The few would begin to climb the ladder at 11 through selective
tests, while the other 75% remained on a bottom rung in what Hadow termed
"modern" schools - to be added to existing elementary provision - until they left at
14. Simon identifies the Hadow Report's recommendation of "selection by
differentiation" as part of the official ideology of the Board of Education. "This was
to be the key function of the education system, to which educational considerations
were subordinated over many years to come" (Simon 1974: 146). Lowe was even
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more specific in identifying the role one individual played in ensuring the survival of
the three-level system in England:
As the twentieth century progressed and the Board of Education committed
itself increasingly to a tripartite organization of secondary education, other
civil servants devised, in official reports, an account of the history of English
education which emphasized the appropriateness of a divided system. R.
Fitzgibbon Young was perhaps the most notable, as the author of the historical
sections ofthe 1926 Hadow Report and the 1938 Spens Report. Young served as
secretary ofa number of influential Consultative Committee reports during the
inter-war years and repeatedly offered accounts of the development of English
education which reflected favourably upon Board of Education policies,
showing them as the natural outcome ofgradual and almost inexorable policies.
(Lowe 1983: 27)
Throughout the zo" century, there has existed this close connection between
education policy and individuals within the Board of Education in its successive
forms. In the 215t century the connection has if anything become closer, and the
impulse for government to take greater control over education has accelerated, as will
be shown in the following chapter.
To return to the reports, the thinking behind the Hadow Report can be discerned in the
Spens Report that followed a decade later. The Consultative Committee on Secondary
Education, chaired by Sir Will Spens, published its report at the end of 1938. It
carried forward broadly the structure advocated in the Hadow Report. It did include a
proposal that "the curriculum of the existing grammar schools should be broadened
but also recommended that junior technical schools should be upgraded to secondary
school status to become 'technical high schools" (McCulloch 1994: 74). In regard to
examinations, the report was judged from an examining board perspective to have
"failed to disclose the real trouble, which was that the simple School Certificate
Examination did not differentiate sufficiently between the better and the average
students" (Brereton 1944: 106). However, that particular trouble still remains to be
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disclosed. Sixty years later an official of the same board made virtually the same
observation in an interview:
The key thing that we've got to get to grips with is, 'Is what he [Tomlinson] is
talking about the education and training of our youngsters and representing
what they've achieved or is it about university selection? And please don't
pretend you can use one for another without it distorting one or the other.
(OCR22003)
The inopportune timing of the Spens Report's publication just before the outbreak of
war meant it was shelved in the same way as the Hadow Report had been by the
economic depression. However Spens' proposals were dusted down in 1941 and
offered to the Norwood Committee as a basis for its deliberations. The Norwood
Report's recommendations opened the doors of secondary education to all young
people through the 1944 Education Act. An indirect outcome of this reform was the
first of the series of inroads into the examining boards' independence in favour of
growing central control. The Victorian distaste for government involvement III
educational matters was becoming a distant memory in post-war England.
Part 3: The slow shift to central control of the examining boards 1944-1988
Among the major changes to English secondary education resulting from the 1944
Education Act was an apparently minor adjustment to the membership of the
Secondary Schools Examinations Council. This particular regulation significantly
affected the examining boards, but was of little interest in the wider world. However
this proved to be the first move in a gradually accelerating process of tightening
central control over the independent examining boards. This section will narrate the
process of change that led to that shift in control, once again mapped by a matrix [See
Figure 3.2] detailing the series of changes both to examinations and to their
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regulatory body during this period. As indicated in the matrix, the period will be
considered in three phases:
• 1944: Education Act, GCEs and SSEC without the Boards;
• 1964: Schools Council, 'golden age' and ineffectual examination reform;
• 1983: shift to central control as the price of GCSE
An appreciation of the wider issues determining the direction of change will explain
how policies that had a major impact on the examining boards were devised with
other objectives as their aim.
A The 1944 Act and the birth of the GeE
On 18 September 2003, in a Radio 4 retrospective assessment of the achievements of
the post-war Labour government, Will Hutton suggested that "If health is the great
success, education is the great failure of the Atlee government." He was referring to
Labour's failure to address the dichotomy of state and private schools. This
judgement would fit the category of what Gary McCulloch sees as a revisionist view
of the 1944 Act "predicated on the notion of something akin to an Establishment
conspiracy, dedicated to the maintenance of social inequality through tripartite
divisions in education" (McCulloch 1994: 54). I have indicated at the outset of this
chapter that the acceptance of a separate path for the private sector is deeply grounded
in English thinking. Therefore I tend toward David Cannadine' s term "temporal
parochialism" (Cannadine 2002) for this form of distorting the past through the lens
of the present. In order to avoid either revisionism or temporal parochialism, it is
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instructive to separate as far as possible the notions that subsequent generations have
grafted on with hindsight from the principal issues in the air at the time. Looking back
at the 1944 Act after half a century, McCulloch assessed these issues astutely:
On the positive side, it reflected aspirations for equality ofopportunity, political
consensus, and social partnership. Read negatively, it signified the power of
elite groups to manipulate public provision, leading either to entrenched social
divisions and inequality, or to industrial decay and economic atrophy.
(McCulloch 1994: 68)
Certainly the thinking behind the Act came from what could fairly be termed elite
groups. Its philosophical ancestry stems directly from the platonic notion of three
types of learner described in the Taunton Report of 1868, the Hadow (1925) and
Spens (1938) Reports and yet again in the Norwood Report of 1943, its closest
relation. In attempting to follow Ecclestone's advice about "the importance of
understanding more about individuals that influence policy" (Ecclestone 2002: 174),
it is informative to trace the ideas of Sir Will Spens and Sir Cyril Norwood as they
affected the policy which bears Butler's name.
Date Development Rationale Primary Effects Indirect Effects
1944 Butler Education Act To offer free secondary Three-level system with Confirms platonic view of
education to all to age 15; to examinations for top 20%; learners; first sign of central
reduce influence of exam boards ejected from control over boards
examinations on curriculum SSEC
1951 & Launch of General Certificate To replace rigid grouped Single subject exams Demand for accreditation of
1953 of Education at Ordinary and qualification with single-subject established specialisation and wider range of pupils
Advanced levels examinations choice
1953 Associated Examining Board To accredit attainment of 'new' A non-university examining Comparability begins to be an
created technical and further education board offers new subjects issue; AEB gradually loses
college. students its distinctive quality
1964 Schools Council replaces To involve teachers & LEAs in Series of proposals for post-16 Confirmed reform as
SSEC (exam boards not curriculum and examinations exam reforms; none succeeded voluntary and exclusion of
included) boards from exam design
1965 Certificate of Secondary To accredit attainment of 40% Creation of 13 regional CSE Sheep/goats effect built in to
Education introduced of pupils below 0 level boards; financial stability for examination structure
'old' boards
1970 Schools Council authorises To respond to pressure from Pilot schemes succeed; Schools Council's approach
pilot schemes for single 16+ comprehensive schools to governments will not endorse a increasingly ineffectual
examination replace 0 level/CSE divide single system
1983 Sir Keith Joseph agrees to a To respond to pressure from Increases in attainment year on Pressure increases for
single examination at 16+ schools year widening 6th_fonn provision
1984 Secondary Examinations To replace an ineffectual body: Exam regulation becomes an A major shift in control from
Council replaces Schools quarrelling unions, LEAs no issue for central involvement boards to government-
Council longer interested appointed regulator
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Spens, Norwood and Butler: Following the same hymn sheet
McCulloch's close analysis of the Spens and Norwood committees and their
respective chairmen detects some important differences between the two men despite
their broad agreement on a three-level structure for secondary education. These
differences range from their derivation - Sir Will Spens from the Board of
Education's Consultative Committee and Sir Cyril Norwood from the Secondary
Schools Examinations Committee - to their respective views on the purpose of
secondary education. McCulloch describes Spens as having "more materialistic,
individualistic, scientific concerns" and focussing on the "ordinary secondary
school", whereas Norwood's stance was "moral, community-spirited' and centred on
the grammar school (McCulloch 1994:122). One might now characterise them as
respectively modem and traditional. Their philosophy of education had a direct effect
on their beliefs about the secondary curriculum. For Spens it should comprise" 'the
English subjects' [comprehension, oral and written expression] together with History,
Geography, English Literature and Scripture"; each subject should have parity within
a balanced curriculum, with an emphasis on their utility for the less able pupils,
Norwood, in contrast, criticised the notion of separate subjects because they resulted
in "extreme specialisation and neglect of common ground" (McCulloch 1994: 123)
For him the objective of secondary education was the training of grammar-school
pupils in clear thinking and the use of English. He set out his opposition to single
subject examinations in a pamphlet:
And there is also the anxiety, the incessant drive which comes from the
knowledge that business houses will use the number of credits more and more
as a test of comparative merit, so that education becomes more and more a
struggle for a five or six credit certificate, is thought ofin terms ofseparate and
unrelated subjects, and is less and less thought ofas the training ofa complete
person, physically, mentally and morally, for the chances and changes of the
modern life and for the carrying out in an intelligent and responsible manner of
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the duties ofcitizenship which will, as we are at present governed, infallibly fall
upon everyone ofthese boys and girls within a few years.
(Norwood undated: 4)
In regard to external examinations, Norwood had very strong VIews. He was
conscious of "the sort of harm that the examinations system is doing, since the
questions which is asked in not how best to equip for life and the demands oflife, but
how best to pass the examination" (Norwood undated: 4). He was an advocate of
what is now termed 'formative assessment'. Norwood's argument "stressed two
central issues: the guidance ofthe child, and the freedom ofthe teacher" (McCulloch
1994: 138) The Norwood report implies that it was this concern for pupils' best
interests that lay behind his antipathy to what he saw as the negative influence of the
university examining boards on the grammar-school curriculum.
McCulloch feel that Norwood's model:
Certainly
...asserted in the strongest terms teachers' own professional responsibility in
the domain of examinations and assessment, against what was later to emerge
as the 'market' view ofthe accountability ofteachers and schools to 'the public'
for the outcomes ofpublic examinations.
(McCulloch 1994: 138)
During an interview, Peter Gosden suggested other motives. He believes that
Norwood saw an opportunity to extricate private school pupils from what he saw as
the stranglehold of the Boards' School Certificates. Gosden described Norwood's
attitude as, "Why should 'our people' have the same certificates as everyone else?"
(Gosden 2000) Presumably Norwood recognised the value that the 'branding' of a
private school would provide to school-produced assessments. Whatever his motives,
and despite his role as chairman of the SSEC implying support for examinations,
Norwood's report recommended the phasing out of external examinations, except for
university entrance, over seven years. Instead, schools would produce what might be
termed a 'profile' of pupils which would provide a more individual version of an
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individual's attainment. Examinations in individual subjects would serve as a short-
term measure to allow time for the new internal assessment system to take shape. It
was by this means that a central objective of the well-known Norwood report was
definitively lost as examinations flourished as never before, while the largely
forgotten Spens' promotion of examinations in single subjects has become an
essential feature of English education. The single-subject structure of English
qualifications, now deeply embedded, sets them apart from virtually all other
comparable national systems. This could well be the most significant, though
unintended, result of the Norwood Report and the 1944 Act.
Neither report had touched on the issue of private schools. Norwood, as a former
headmaster of Harrow, had a keen interest in the matter, but had agreed with Butler's
request to restrict his committee's focus to "the scope of Grammar Schools in the
wider field of Secondary Education" (McCulloch 1994: 120). This concession on
Norwood's part "ensured that discussion would continue to be framed generally in
terms of grammar, technical and modern schools: that is in a tripartite pattern of
[state] provision" (McCulloch 1994: 120).
It was in 1941 that R A Butler became President of the Board of Education in
Churchill's coalition Government and set in motion his plan to bring about the long-
delayed reform of secondary education. To head the committee which would produce
a report on which to base a bill, Butler appointed Sir Cyril Norwood, a long-serving
headmaster4 and chairman of the Secondary Schools Examinations Council, from
which most other members of the committee were also drawn (McCulloch 1994:
119). This choice of what was effectively a sub-committee of the SSEC led the
examining boards as the dominant group in that body to expect to receive the eventual
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report. When in the event they were completely bypassed, their consternation was
understandable.
The Norwood committee was not given carte blanche, but - prompted by his
parliamentary secretary, the educationist Chuter Ede, a Labour MP - Butler tabled the
1938 Spens Report as a starting point. This is a clear indication that there existed a
form of political consensus around the three-level structure. After deliberating for two
years, the Norwood committee completed its report in 1943 and sent it directly to
Butler as President of the Board of Education, circumventing any input from the
SSEC on the proposals which had major significance for the examinations they
controlled. An official from the Cambridge board suggested that a reason for this
slight might be that " ...the complete cessation of the activities of the Secondary
Schools Examinations Council during the war may be an indication of its
unsatisfactory constitution" (Brereton 1944: 170). He did not elucidate the nature of
this unsatisfactoriness. A later suggestion was that "the boards were seen as too
defensive, so their bypassing by Norwood was not all that surprising" (Gosden 2000).
No such anodyne explanations for this inexcusable treatment came from the Joint
Matriculation Board. In his history of that organisation written after time might have
cooled his emotions, James Petch described the bypassing of the Boards as "official
chicanery" (Petch 1953: 165). However it might be said that this pique at a perceived
insult was misdirected, for the report effectively recommended their eventual demise:
the Norwood report recommended the phasing out of external examinations.
The Norwood Report and the subsequent Butler Education Act have regularly been
blamed for their elitist restriction of examinations to pupils in grammar schools. In
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fact, although their chairman might have felt differently, their motives were based on
concern for those pupils of a weaker academic standard:
The majority of members of the SSEC certainly wished modern and technical
schools to remain free from any external examinations because of the
constraints which these placed on the curricula of schools. So far as the LEAs
were concerned, this feeling was reinforced by the apparent jealousy which
some of them had shown between the wars towards the influence of university
examining bodies on the curricula of 'their' secondary schools.
(Gosden 1983: 63)
Certainly Sir Cyril felt that the curricular constraints imposed by the School
Certificates should not be allowed to blight the new technical and modem schools,
and his report recommended that examinations should become " ...entirely internal,
that is to say, conducted by the teachers at the school on syllabuses and papers
framed by themselves" (SSEC 1943: 140). This was to be virtually the precise design
of the Certificate of Secondary Education which was introduced in 1965, but it won
no support in 1944. The Boards were, naturally, opposed to this recommendation for
their gradual disappearance. One of their number felt that implementing it could prove
to be "...a step which I believe would allow arbitrariness, favouritism and patronage
to raise their ugly heads again ..." (Brereton 1944: 187). In fact, Brereton included in
his 1944 Case for Examinations, perhaps too late to have any influence, an
enlightened proposal for a move to a regional system in which:
...the existing examination bodies should pool their resources more completely
with the agreed object of making it easy for schools to transfer from one
examination to another nearer at hand [with aj. ..Curriculum and Examinations
Council to co-ordinate the examinations ...and act as a link between these
[regional examining} bodies and the Board ofEducation.
(Brereton 1944: 189)
However, as has always been the case, the Boards' thinking was not taken into
account. While they have been trusted to administer the system and the qualifications
they provide have become deeply rooted in the educational structure, their experience
has not been deemed relevant when reforms are being designed: another feature of
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English practice which this study contends has had and continues to have serious
consequences.
Having examined contemporary issues of the Times Educational Supplement, I have
found no evidence of any concern about the proposed abolition of examinations. This
lack of reaction is likely due not to support for the idea but to greater concern at the
time over a more immediate issue: the omission of any mention of the public schools,
as discussed in the prologue to this chapter. With that aspect of "the contestation that
underlay the settlement of1944" (McCulloch 1994: 116) safely sidelined, Butler had
to deal with the knotty problem of interdenominational sensitivities which had stalled
previous attempts at reform. As discussed above, he managed to reassure both sides of
the debate by inventing a hybrid system of state and church secondary schools.
A last look at the Norwood Report reveals that its unintended consequences were far
more lasting than any of its principal recommendations. The three-level secondary
structure gradually gave way to a comprehensive system from the mid-1960s. Yet by
conceding that the grouped School Certificates be replaced with single-subject
examinations, Sir Cyril achieved exactly the reverse of his objective. English students
now regard it as their fundamental right to select the subjects that they will study.
Attempts to encourage a broad post-16 curriculum with a wider element of general
education have proved singularly unsuccessful. Above all, far from withering away as
Norwood had intended, external examinations have become embedded in the structure
of English education, and continue to exert a powerful influence over young people's
future pathways.
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The Act, the Minister and a first move towards central control of the
Boards
Whatever its faults, the Butler Education Act at least introduced free secondary
education in England for all pupils to age 15 in one of three types of school. It also
resolved at least partially the thorny problem of church involvement in state
education. Its sweeping changes meant that drawing up the necessary regulations took
civil servants some months. By the time they had produced Circular 103 containing
the principal regulations, a general election had brought in Atlee's Labour
Government with Ellen Wilkinson as Minister of Education - for the Board had been
upgraded to a full-fledged Ministry, with its Minister a member of the Cabinet. Yet
this change in political complexion did not affect the implementation of the Education
Act.
The new Minister defended the proposals at the Labour Party conference in the
autumn of 1945 and Circular 103 came into effect in May 1946. This episode was
cited by Denis Lawton, as mentioned above, as evidence for his claim of the growing
power of civil servants in the education department. Ellen Wilkinson has suffered
much posthumous criticism for her failure to introduce a comprehensive system and
for restricting examinations to grammar-school pupils. Such claims overlook the
issues that were in the foreground at the time. As has been stressed, when analysing
policy developments with hindsight, it is important to be aware of the pressures at the
time which might have obscured issues that loom larger at a later date. In Wilkinson's
case, her overriding objective was to ensure the establishment of free secondary
education for all and to raise the leaving age to 15. Any flaws in the proposed triple-
94
track system were of less consequence. Even the historian who has deplored the
failure of the Atlee government to move to a fully comprehensive system has
acknowledged that a key issue prior to the 1944 Act was:
'" the fight for a single or common code of regulations for all schools catering
for children over the age of eleven. It is, perhaps, difficult to recognise the
significance of this demand today since it is now, after nearly fifty years, so
much taken for granted.
(Simon 1991: 76)
As an able child of the Manchester working class, Wilkinson was well aware of the
opportunities her grammar school education had opened for her. Privately, she did
indeed have reservations about the divided system:
Although she eventually approved the Ministry Circular (73) commending the
tripartite secondary organisation to local authorities, she railed against it in
her diary. What it meant was: 'give the real stuff to 25 percent, steer the 75
percent away from the humanities, pure science, even history. ,
(Quoted in Vernon 1982: 222-3)
While Ellen Wilkinson was constrained by political realities, she was not alone in
concentrating on one issue while neglecting other effects of the 1944 Act. The
teaching world was very exercised over two aspects of Regulation 103 concerning
examinations, and seemed to overlook what was the highly significant shift from a
grouped to a single-subject system. Many years later, Denis Lawton commented:
It is interesting to note that most of the controversy about the new structure
concerned the age limit rather than the major departure from the traditional
group certificate.
(Lawton 1980: 96)
The controversial Regulation prevented pupils other than those at grammar schools
from entering examinations before age 17. The new scheme thus at a stroke excluded
all those in the new 'modem' schools, who left at 15. Brian Simon, for one,
interpreted this as yet another instance of:
...the highly systematic and determined approach by ministry officials....By
erecting this barrier [to equal status for all three types of school] in this manner
95
and at this particular point in time, the government perpetuated in a new form
the old separation between elementary and secondary schools.
(Simon 1991: 115)
While that may have been the effect, it was not, as has been shown above, necessarily
the objective. The other issue stirred by the new Regulations was the concern among
grammar schools over a perceived threat to their pupils' pass rates. The new
examination was to have a 'pass' set at the standard of a School Certificate 'credit';
this meant that many would fail the new examination. The issue was the subject of
widespread debate. The Times Educational Supplement claimed that "it was a
political and not an educational argument" (Quoted in Simon 1991: 114). This
distinction strikes an unexpected note from the perspective of the 21st century, where
all educational arguments have become political.
Because of these concerns, it seemed that virtually no one except the exammmg
boards took particular note of the final clause of Circular 113, issued in June 1946.
This announced that the Minister was assuming full responsibility ''for the direction of
policy and general arrangements in regard to school examinations". Because of "new
statutory duties imposed on her under the Education Act, 1944, the Minister is no
longer justified in limiting her functions to those of a Co-ordinating Authority"
(Quoted in Simon 1991: 112). This signalled a significant shift in the balance of
power from the Boards to the centre, yet there was virtually no contemporary
comment on the development. Thirty years later, Gosden's analysis detected
indications of a climate fostering such a shift within the ranks of Board of Education
staff prior to the 1944 Act:
The acceptance by the senior staff of the Board of the idea of leading rather
than merely advising and watching was both a reversion to the attitude adopted
in the early years of the century at the time of Morant, and a harbinger of the
greatly increased powers to be conferred on the minister ofeducation in the Act
of1944.
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(Gosden 1976: 238)
Certainly the examining boards interpreted the change as the flexing of muscles by
the newly promoted Ministry. James Petch observed that:
When working on the 1918 scheme [School & Higher School Certificates}, the
Board ofEducation had asked the existing university examining bodies for their
help and had benefited from their experience. The prestige of the universities
and their examining bodies was then needed by Whitehall. In deciding what the
1951 scheme was to be the Ministry ofEducation chose to pay little attention to
the universities and to ignore completely the examining bodies.
(Petch 1953: 163)
While James Petch can in no way be considered an objective witness, he had been
long involved in the management of the Joint Matriculation Board, so his perceptions
are based on experience. He was unequivocal in his view that the shift in control was
far from being purely symbolic:
The outstanding difference between the new examination and its predecessors is
the amount ofcontrol over it which is being exercisedfrom the centre. Circular
113 announced the Ministerial intention of taking charge and charge has been
taken.
(Petch 1953: 163)
As well as wounded pride, the Boards had professional reasons for objecting to their
exclusion in designing the new examinations. Their experience had taught them that:
" .the precipitate changes in the nature of school examinations did not allow
sufficient time to consider the adequacy for the new purpose of the measuring
device hitherto used. A separate subject examination calls for greater precision
ofmeasurement than was satisfactory for a certificate examination ....
(Petch 1953: 213)
This was the first indication of what was to be a corollary of the shift to central
control: a failure to appreciate the intricacies of the assessment devices which the
Boards had developed.
Ellen Wilkinson did not have the opportunity to exercise her new authority because
she died suddenly just eight months after the publication of Regulation 113.
Nevertheless, the shift in control proceeded. It was effected through a restructuring of
97
the Secondary Schools Examinations Council. Where previously the Board of
Education had provided only the Council's chairman and secretary, the Ministry
would now nominate five of its own representatives as participating members. Local
Authority representation was also increased. However the ten representatives of the
examining boards were replaced by five representatives from universities rather than
from their examining boards. [See Figure 3.3] This new configuration was
responsible for drawing up plans for the new examination that would replace the
School Certificates; the professionals had been dismissed and the design was left to
the amateurs. This failure to appreciate the expertise the examining boards had
developed has persisted and was, I shall suggest, a contributory factor in the crisis
over grades in September 2002, to be considered in Chapter Five. Although the
Boards have subsequently been held responsible for flaws in the new examinations,
they had no part in their overall design. "Like the other seven approved examining
boards, the Board [JMB] had no part in designing the Examinations for the GeE'
(Petch 1953: 177). This information casts rather a different light on McCulloch's
charge that the examining boards "succeeded in their propaganda war to the extent
that they helped to undermine the reputation of the Report, and ofNorwood himself,
in the years following the war"(McCulloch 1994: 141).
Figure 3-3 Post-1946 Changes to SSEC
SSEC 1918-1946 SSEC from June 1946
10 from University Examining Boards 6 from Universities (not necessarily
Boards)
10 from Local Authorities 8 from Local Authorities
10 teachers 11 teachers
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5 from the Ministry
1 from Wales
Such a judgement seems harsh in view of the Boards' treatment firstly by Norwood
and then by the Ministry.
The General Certificate of Education: not general and not for all
In her deft survey of qualifications and assessment in the zo" century, Alison Wolf
described the General Certificate of Education (GCE) as "designed entirely by the
Secondary School Examinations Council and delivered to the examination boards
(and universities) as a fait accompli" (Wolf 2002a: 214). The term 'design' flatters
what was produced in September 1947 by the newly reconstituted Secondary Schools
Examinations Council. Brian Simon described it thus:
This turned out to be a curt and extremely unrevealing document, defining the
character of the proposed new examination - the General Certificate of
Education (GCE).
(Simon 1991: 112)
Although excluded from the design stage of the new examination, the Boards were
left to cope with some of the flaws in that design. A major one of these was the
introduction of powerful subject panels with specialist knowledge. Contrary to
popular belief, knowing a subject does not always translate into understanding
effective means of assessing that subject. The specialists were frequently experienced
at university level rather than at the secondary level of the examinations they were
considering. Writing just after the new system had taken shape, James Petch
articulated the Boards' frustration at yet another instance of their expertise being
overlooked:
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In its subject panels the s.s.E. C. has devised an arrangement which allows the
group of three or four individuals which deals with each subject to indicate ex
cathedra their disapproval of syllabuses, question-papers and methods of
marking. Inevitably their criticisms are founded on a narrower experience than
that out ofwhich have grown the syllabuses, question-papers and methods they
criticise, and much energy is devoted to attempts to enforce an undesirable
uniformity of detail. What may have still more serious repercussions is that
subject panels can be stamping grounds for individualistic specialists where
each 'subject' is considered without much regard to its place in the curriculum
as a whole.
(Petch 1953: 174)
This observation could well have been written in the mid-1980s, when a virtually
identical process took place during the creation of the General Certificate of
Secondary Education (GCSE) which replaced the GCE Ordinary level. Despite their
long years of successful performance, the Boards are not trusted when it comes to
planning change.
The new examination was rolled out in successive stages: the Ordinary level for 16-
year-olds in 1951 and the Advanced level for 18-year-olds in 1953. As mentioned
above, entry to the examinations was restricted to the 20 per cent of pupils selected
for the grammar schools. Yet with secondary education now open to all, post-war
English society expected the attainments of all to be accredited. Pressure for change
began almost immediately.
An early attempt to respond to this pressure was to widen access to examination
success by creating a different type of examining board. This was the idea not of the
established university-based Boards, but of the East Midlands Union, one of four
regional bodies which accredited attainment in technical subjects. They proposed to
the Secondary Schools Examinations Council that, with technical schools now
forming a substantial segment of the new secondary structure, "it would be beneficial
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to have at least one examining body which was not directly coupled with a
university"(Earnshaw 1974: 1)
The idea developed and was eventually discussed at the Ministry of Education in
March 1949. Among those in attendance were " ...four members of the Secondary
Schools Examinations Council, ...as well as the Ministry officers and the Union
representatives" (Earnshaw 1974: 2). Not included was any representative from an
existing examining board. Once again in English educational policy making, the only
people with real experience of examining were not involved at an early stage.
Although this might be explained by the focus in this case being on examinations in
technical and commercial subjects where the existing Boards were not experienced, it
soon became clear that the proposed new Board was to have a wider remit:
The SSEC and the Ministry representatives thought that if a ninth examining
body was set up, it should not be restricted to technical subjects, but should
provide syllabuses and examinations in general subjects also designed for
Secondary Technical pupils, part-time students, and later for County College
[Further Education] students.
(Earnshaw 1974: 2)
Here was clear evidence that the Ministry, with its new influence within the SSEC,
was minded to take an active role in developments within the examining world.
A working party was set up to develop the idea. This comprised representatives of the
regional technical bodies, augmented by the City & Guilds Institute, the Royal
Society of Arts and the London Chamber of Commerce - all with an established
interest in assessment of applied skills. After discussions over the course of a year, the
SSEC recommended to the Minister of Education on 16 March 1950 that a ninth
examining body be approved in principle. It was not until April that "the Council sent
out a letter to the eight university boards asking for their concurrence, co-operation
in this project, and their comments on the draft statement ..." (Earnshaw 1974: 4).
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When one considers that at that point the Boards were fully occupied in managing the
final series of the School Certificate examinations while simultaneously working on
drawing up the new GCE to whose design they had not been invited to contribute,
their lukewarm response to the news of a government-endorsed competitor is not
surpnsmg.
Earnshaw listed their various objections. The London board raised the question of the
acceptability of the proposed new body's results for university entrance; Durham
feared that the new Board would "cause the GeE to be sharply split into two types
depending not on ability ...but on the place of origin oj the candidate viz., Grammar
School or Secondary Technical School." Cambridge felt that "cooperation among
existing boards and the technical examining bodies provided a more promising
approach" (Earnshaw 1974: 4-5). Innocent at that time of the realities of the market,
the Boards did not explicitly raise the real problem with an additional Board: the
number of candidates was fixed, and there was no way that they could, to use the
modem idiom 'grow their business'. This issue lay dormant, hidden by the increasing
numbers of students that schools were entering for examination, until the 1980s, when
the limited size of the market translated into financial pressure on some Boards.
Meanwhile the momentum for a new Board continued. City & Guilds agreed to
finance and service the 'ninth board', and on 8 May 1952 the Joint Examinations
Board for the General Certificate of Education came into being. The Ministry
immediately insisted on a name change as there were already two 'joint' boards;
instead it became the Associated Examining Board (AEB).
This was to be the only adjustment to the structure of qualification providers, with no
corresponding change in those qualifications, following the entry of a huge new
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population of young people into secondary education. Even widening the ability range
accredited by examination had to wait a further 15 years.
At the outset, the new Board did provide a less traditional approach to examining for
the technical sector for which it had been created. A long-serving official of that
Board recalls:
...in the very early years ofthe AEB 's existence, ie 1955 onwards for about ten
years, AEB GCE's were fairly popular in the secondary technical schools.
...And there is no doubt that the AEB was very successful in developing (i)
syllabuses in traditional subjects but with a vocational bias, and (ii) syllabuses
in new technical subjects which had not been included in the GCE subject range
hitherto (eg Plastering, Surveying, Carpentry & Joinery, Craftwork: Wood or
Metal and so on).
(AEB, 2004)
Although full data from the early years are not accessible, some information does
exist about the profile of candidate in 1955, the AEB's first year of operation:
2 409 candidates from 151 centres:
- 60 FE and Technical Colleges
- 43 Secondary Modern Schools
- 37 Secondary Technical Schools
Most popular subjects after English Language & Mathematics:
Geometrical Drawing (233 candidates)
Art (192 candidates)
Building Construction (186 candidates)
(AEB, 2004)
Certainly some schools appreciated the appropriate syllabuses and examinations that
an innovative examining board was able to provide for their pupils. The same AEB
official recalls in particular the " ...head-teacher ofPortsmouth Secondary Technical
School during the 1960s emphasising to me that the AEB's particular mix of
academic and technical approaches had proved a real lifeline for the technical
schools while they lasted." Then the head-teacher of Holland Park, one of London's
showpiece comprehensive schools, "used to say that one ofthe real bright spots in life
was the marvellous suitability of many of the AEB's new syllabuses for his less
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academic pupils." Further Education colleges were the mam beneficiaries of the
AEB's non-traditional syllabuses, "a partnership which was to strengthen rapidly and
indeed last till the present day" (AEB, 2004)
However, the technical schools never became firmly established on a national basis -
partly because of post-war financial stringency, partly because of the English distaste
for applied education and partly because of the growing movement for comprehensive
schools. The new examining board grew increasingly indistinguishable from the
others. Yet at the same time there was growing pressure for more young people to be
accredited through external examinations. The Norwood Committee's expectation
that external examinations would wither had misjudged completely the national trend.
In fact the opposite had happened, and schools which entered pupils for external
examinations were seen to:
'" 'derive substantial public esteem as a result, and indeed the teaching staff in
such schools tend to argue that the examinations are desirable rather than
undesirable. '; from a Memorandum of observations for submission to the
Minister ofEducation, 22 December 1955.
(Quoted in Gosden 1983: 68)
Instead, qualifications were becoming increasingly important currency in English
society. One writer commenting on this aspect of the English social climate refers to:
'" the power of 'credentialism ' - the expectation that what pupils learnt at
school would be authenticated by some external certification, and that this,
whether relevant or not, could then be used as a discriminatory instrument for
recruitment.
(Maclure 2000: 56)
Certainly teachers were increasingly uncomfortable in following a syllabus designed
to select the potential academic elite and simply watered down in secondary modem
schools. Before the end of the new examinations' first decade, the Central Advisory
Council for Education (England), which was primarily interested in secondary school
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organisation, produced 15-18 (The Crowther Report) in 1959. It found that, although
a large section of the school population was "missing out on any suitable provision"
(Bush 1993: 11), the Advanced level examinations were fit for purpose because "able
students were 'subject minded '" (Quoted in Young and Leney 1997: 46). The
Crowther Report confirmed that the pressure point in the system was felt most acutely
at 16+. It was the growing demand from schools for some form of validation for the
attainment of those l6-year-olds who were missing out that led to a series of steps
towards widening access. In the first of these, the examining boards were to have only
an administrative role in a new qualification which grew out of newly recognised
teacher power.
B A golden age for educationists but notfor pupils
The 1960s and early 1970s are widely viewed as a golden age in English education:
Peter Gosden, Desmond Nuttall, Denis Lawton, Stuart Maclure and Gary McCulloch
have all described this period as gilded in one way or another. Lawton, who saw the
gilt in teacher control of the curriculum, cites also the view of Maurice Kogan, in
1978 a civil servant at the Department of Education and Science working in the
Curriculum Study Group. Kogan attributed nostalgia for the period between 1944 and
the beginning of the 1960s to the fact that it was "the period of optimism and
consensus in education: both political parties (Labour and Conservative) were
committed to educational expansion ..." (Quoted in Lawton 1980: 22). This has led to
the period sometimes being derided as 'butskillism' because so little separated the
policies of the Conservative R A Butler and Labour's Hugh Gaitskill. Future analysts
may detect a similar blurring of party lines in these early years of the 215t century,
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when increasing the powers of the "managerial state" has been at the basis of policy
for both major parties.
While the 1960s and 70s saw teacher unions and local authorities in the ascendant,
with freedom for teachers to experiment, it was certainly not a shining example in
opening opportunities to a wider range of young people. Although a series of
qualification reforms was proposed, only the Certificate of Secondary Education
(CSE), the first of them, came to fruition - and that one merely accredited attainment.
It never achieved the recognition needed to open progression routes. Educationists
who look back to the 'golden age' overlook the fact that for the majority of English
young people it was a time when they were written off by a qualifications system
designed for the top 20%.
For the examining boards, it may seem in retrospect to have been a sort of golden age
because they were largely left to proceed with business as usual. An opposing view
could see it as a period of stagnation, when they ticked over without producing any
creative solutions to the problem of opening access to a significantly wider range of
young people. This may not have been entirely because of their complacency. In the
series of reforms that were designed to address the post-16 qualification problem, the
Boards were never involved in the process. Their status as an essential element within
the "education state" which was not valued for professional expertise continued as
before despite the democratic nature of this golden age.
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The Certificate of Secondary Education: New Boards as quality control
The first step in opening English qualifications to a wider range of young people
occurred almost 'beneath the radar' of the examining boards. The new qualification's
design, administration and assessment was in the hands of teachers and local
education authorities.
Pressure for wider access to accreditation through public examinations came from
cc outside sources' - parents, some schools, some teachers, employers - and in the
face ofstrong opposition from the Ministry and the Inspectorate" (Gosden 1983: 75).
One man recognised that addressing this demand could provide the perfect
opportunity for local education authorities and teachers to win some control over the
curriculum from the examining boards. Sir William Alexander was chairman of and
the moving spirit behind the Association of [Local Authority] Education Committees.
As one of their representatives on the Secondary Schools Examinations Council, he
suggested Surrey's Chief Education Officer, Robert Beloe, to head the sub-committee
which the SSEC was setting up to advise on a possible way of widening access to
accreditation of attainment at 16. As Alexander had planned, the Beloe Committee
recommended the creation of a new Certificate of Secondary Education (CSE) to
accredit the attainment of the tranche of 40% of pupils for whom the GCE Ordinary
Level was out of reach. In March 1961, the SSEC advised Edward Boyle, the
Conservative Education Minister, to accept the Beloe Report's proposal. Gosden
suggests that this 'U-turn' resulted from a recognition that:
'" examinations, provided by independent examining bodies, had, despite
official discouragement, grown so rapidly that there was serious danger of the
curriculum and teaching in the schools coming under external control and that
after another five years the minister would probably find himselffaced with a
situation much more dif]icult to remedy.
(Gosden 1983: 72)
107
The new qualification was introduced in 1965. Responsibility for creating the courses
and assessing them lay with Local Education Authorities and their teachers through a
network of 14 Regional Examining Boards defined by geographical area, funded by
the LEA and under the broad supervision of a CSE Committee of the Schools
Council. The established examining boards were not involved. They were initially
worried that this new qualification would threaten their existing provision. The
Associated Examining Board was particularly vulnerable in this respect because a
large part of its entry carne from the non-selective schools who would eagerly take up
CSEs. However such early fears were soon relieved because the GCE 0 level retained
its allure: "For pupils, parents and employers GCE was more readily accepted as a
qualification than CSE' (Earnshaw 1974: 30). In fact, those pupils who attained good
results at CSE often joined the sixth form for a year to try to upgrade to 0 level. They
were rarely successful, a fact which fuelled the pressure for reform of sixth-form
provision,
Not only did CSE fail to threaten the providers of GCE; it enabled the established
Boards to consolidate their financial position. As the least financially secure, the
Associated Examining Board was able at last to acquire financial stability after the
introduction of CSE:
The CSE Boards decided on a scale of fees considerably higher than those
charged by GCE Boards whilst inevitably providing at this early stage in their
development a restricted range ofsyllabuses. By comparison GCE examinations
offered very good value indeed, and the Board were able to raise their fees
appreciably without incurring opposition. In the case ofthe AEB the rise in fees
and the increase in entries transformed the financial position within one year,
changing an estimated deficit of £11 500 to a surplus of almost £50 000.
(Earnshaw 1974: 30)
This is clear evidence that the Schools Council, like its predecessor the Secondary
Schools Examinations Committee, took no interest in examination fees. All
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examining boards remained entirely independent in this respect. It is at the very least
an anomaly, in an education service which has always been hard-pressed for funds,
that this remains the case (AQA3 2005).
The new qualification did provide significant autonomy for the teachers involved in
devising the internally-assessed Mode 3 syllabuses, and it did endorse the attainment
of many more young people. However, one analyst attributes its failure to achieve
widespread acceptance to the fact that it did not fit:
...the dominant method of examining English school leavers in the twentieth
century [which] had entailed the use of externally devised syllabuses and
unseen examination papers, set and marked by examiners employed by
university-based boards who had no part in teaching the candidates.
(Whitty 1985: 128)
Certainly cultural expectations about a qualification are of critical importance.
Whitty's neo-marxist analysis goes on to ascribe the eventual decline of the CSE to
the examining boards' perception of the teacher-controlled qualification as a threat to
their power. Unfortunately, by using the phrase "examining boards" his critique fails
to distinguish between the CSE boards and the GCE boards: the latter did not in fact
exercise significant power over CSE. He sees the Boards as traditional agencies who
"tended to employ administrative devices as a way of restricting the growth of new
and disparate Mode 3 schemes" (Whitty 1985: 127). This could not apply to CSE, as
revealed by an extract from a Schools Council Examinations Bulletin of 1976:
At present the two types of boards have very different degrees of control over
Mode 3. On the one hand the GCE boards are able to control content and
means ofassessment ofa [GCE] Mode 3, with total power to accept or reject a
scheme; on the other hand, the CSE boards have virtually no power to reject a
scheme which is correctly titled and capable ofbeing assessed and moderated.
(Quoted in Spencer 2003: 125)
The Boards' role in restricting the growth of Mode 3 [ie teacher devised] 0 levels can
perhaps be interpreted differently if one takes account of their responsibility for
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ensuring the validity, reliability and comparability of the grades produced through
these disparate schemes. A consequence of the lack of such control over CSE Mode
3s is expressed by an assessment expert who observed in a recent interview that the
freedom of teachers to create exciting new schemes was linked to the qualification's
lack of recognition:
I know people sort of witter on about the golden age of CSE and Mode 3
syllabuses .... I read that, but that was because nobody really cared about CSE
anyway, so you could try any old thing. But - it's the same fate as GNVQ: as
soon as it becomes important you have to tighten up on it, and tighten up means
you lose much ofwhat made it attractive in the first place.
(QCA32004)
Whitty does concede that "there were also doubts about the quality and comparability
of many Mode 3 schemes in relation to Mode Is" (Whitty 1985: 128), but does not
acknowledge that the real chasm in public perception as to validity, reliability and
comparability existed between CSE of whatever mode and 0 level. As well as the
above evidence from the Associated Examining Board that, far from being a threat,
the CSE enhanced the value of GCE qualifications, there are other possible reasons
for the CSE's decline.
Although Whitty's analysis would probably characterise me as an "institutionalized
teacher within the board structure" (Whitty 1985: 128), I suggest an alternative
critique of CSE from the perspective of a teacher attempting to find a motivating yet
attainable goal for the new range of pupils staying on at school following the raising
of the leaving age to 16 in 1974. The initial enthusiastic adoption of the CSE may
have been due less to the professional autonomy it offered than to its answering an
urgent need. I contend that a major element in teachers' eventual disillusionment with
CSE derived from their dissatisfaction with the negative effects of having to divide
pupils aged 14 into 'O-level sheep' and 'CSE goats'. With parental concern that the
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CSE was a second-class qualification of no value in progression either to further
education or to employment, the essential public support was lacking. CSE did not
take root in England's culture. Had it been conceived with the imprimatur of the
established examining boards, its fate might have been different. Certainly, in
response to a similar wish to enhance the status of vocational qualifications during the
1990s, those Boards were seen by Lord Dearing as able to confer such status.
With CSE placing an unprecedented level of control with teachers and local
authorities, a second recommendation of the Beloe Report seemed to counteract the
prevailing democratising trend and met a distinctly hostile reception. The Ministry
agreed with the report's suggestion that the Secondary Schools Examinations Council
"needed the assistance of a small but highly qualified professional team to study in
depth the problems posed by the introduction of a new system of national
examinations" (Gosden 1983: 75). Gosden attributes this development to English
ministers' growing awareness of the international interest in curriculum matters. At
meetings such as those of the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural
Organisation (UNESCO), they "could do little more than incant the doctrine that in
Britain the teacher was a law unto himself' (Gosden 1983: 76).
A new Minister, David Eccles, attempted to reassure teachers and local education
authorities that there would be no threat to existing powers resulting from his proposal
to create within the ministry a Curriculum Study Group. His soothing words had little
effect, for "the response from the education service was almost unanimous
opposition." (Gosden 1983: 76). The Government, still retaining remnants of the view
that curriculum matters were not the business of government despite its growing
interest in what Eccles described as a "secret garden", sidelined the Curriculum Study
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Group to continue quietly within the Department of Education and Science. Then it
replaced the Secondary Schools Examinations Council with an entirely different form
of regulatory body: the Schools Council for Curriculum and Examinations, which first
met in October of 1964. (Barber 1992: 39) The examining boards were not invited to
join.
The Schools Council: Innovative but ineffectual in examination reform
The Schools Council ushered in twenty years of teacher-led innovation in curriculum
and pedagogy but its repeated efforts at examination reform bore no fruit. Like its
predecessor, the SSEC, it did not include in its Councilor any of its numerous
committees any representatives of the examining boards. I believe there was a
connection between these two facts.
Looking back at that period from the current situation of strong central control, it is
difficult to credit statements like that of Michael Young in 1971:
What is significant for the sociology ofeducation is that in spite ofattempts, the
politics of the curriculum has remained outside Westminster. Apart from
compulsory religious instruction, the headmaster or principal's formal
autonomy over the curriculum is not questioned.
(Young 1971: 22)
The succeeding 25 years have seen a revolution in control of education in England - a
revolution that has affected the examining boards in perhaps less obvious ways than it
has the autonomy of head teachers. Young does qualify his statement by pointing to
the de facto limitation on that autonomy due to the universities' domination of "all but
one ofthe examining boards" (Young 1971: 22).
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Certainly the Schools Council did not impinge on anyone's autonomy. The central
principle of its constitution once again makes unusual reading from a vantage point
thirty years on, when the "managerial state" has taken on so many of these
responsibilities:
...each school should have the fullest possible measure ofresponsibility for its
own work, with its own curriculum and teaching methods based on the needs of
its own pupils and evolved by its own staff.
(Quoted in Plaskow 1985: 4)
As regards its links with the examining boards, the Schools Council fulfilled its
responsibilities over examinations in a minimalist form of regulation. A QCA official
who had been a professional officer with the Schools Council recalls the very light
touch it exercised:
Schools Council regulated, of course. It was done through A-level syllabus
approval and scrutiny, wasn't it? And it wasn't done at J6 [O-level] ...simply
because the Council didn't feel it had the resources to do a job of that size. It
was partly that, I think, and if it had to make a choice it would clearly have
gone for A level because A level was more to do with life chances. Yes, A-level
scrutiny in Schools Council days was a voluntary activity. The boards saw it
presumably as in their interest to have an external view ofwhat they did. It was
never really contentious. Actually, there's one thing that isn't there [now] that I
didn't mention earlier and that's the secrecy issue. That was always a private
business between the Schools Council and the boards, when we sent our reports
to the boards alone: nothing public about them. And it was all done in a very ...
what's the non-sexist term? Oh, 'civilised', I suppose - I was going to say
'gentlemanly' - civilised way in that we sent these reports with
recommendations and the boards were sort of trusted to get on with it, weren't
they? There was no really hard-edged follow-up.
(QCA22003)
This long excerpt has been quoted in full to provide a rare insight into the spirit of
regulation in the days of the Schools Council. This will be contrasted with subsequent
shifts to strong central control. There is no question that the regulatory agency in
today's "managerial state" would now tolerate regulation based on 'suggestions' and
'trust'; the regulatory powers now have fully statutory status.
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While I suggest that the omission of any representatives from the examining boards
may have contributed to the failure of Schools Council examination reforms to get off
the ground, another possible contributory factor lies in the procedures of what its
historian describes as "an untidily democratic institution" (Plaskow 1985: 4).
The Schools Council attracted a number of charismatic individuals to lead its
frequently imaginative curriculum projects. However, even its defenders admit that its
procedures were "heavily bureaucratic and arcane", with proposers of papers
sometimes having to endure eighteen months "as papers trundled through
committees". It was not unknown for proposers to appear and argue their case before
six different groups, "all of whom then expressed a view to Programme Committee,
who gave the final verdict" (Plaskow 1985: 4).
Another analyst suggests that, rather than bureaucracy, it is probable that the Schools
Council's principal virtue was also its fatal flaw:
The Schools Council had no power to make any change; it was non-
prescriptive. It could survey the scene, consider the possibilities and make
enquiries into them, make recommendations and seek to persuade people to
adopt them. In this sphere [changing the post-16 curriculum and examinations]
it did all that could be done in each ofthese, but did not succeed in the last.
(Jennings 1985: 26)
An account of the abortive series of imaginative but ineffectual proposals for the
reform of post-16 qualifications illustrates the weakness in the Schools Council's
voluntarist approach. It also serves as relevant motivation for the education
department's growing tendency for increasing central control. It is salutary to
remember that, during the golden age of this "untidily democratic" regulator, nothing
concrete was achieved in the way of qualification reform.
Because of strong teacher representation - thirty-four out of a Council membership of
sixty-four (Gillan 2003: 97) - the Council was aware of the dissatisfaction in sixth
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forms with GCE A levels or repeat 0 levels as the only curriculum option. It
established, together with the Standing Committee for University Entrance (SCUE), a
working party to draw up an alternative scheme. The outcome was a proposal for a
qualifying year (Q) studying five subjects, followed by a further (F) year focusing on
the student's chosen special subjects. At the time, this proposal was generally
considered far too radical. Its basic structure was to re-emerge in the Curriculum 2000
reforms thirty years later. A similar plan in 1973 comprised courses at normal (N) and
further (F) levels which again failed to win support.
In 1972 the Schools Council produced its most ambitious scheme in this area. The
Certificate of Extended Education (CEE) was to provide a qualification at the end of
one year's sixth-form study based on core subjects augmented with content relevant to
the world of work. It seemed a plausible way forward for institutions attempting to
cope with the growing numbers and widening ability range of students staying on in
education after 16. Yet despite its answering an obvious need, it was not perceived as
the right solution to the growing problems post-16 education faced as a result of social
and economic changes.
Firstly, following the raising of the school leaving age to 17 in 1972, schools were
primarily concerned with how to cope with a new population for many of whom there
was little prospect of examination success. Then the 1973 oil crisis brought about an
economic downturn which closed doors to potential employment for these same
young people, leaving them with no option but to stay on at school for another year.
The CEE seemed a utopian answer to a very down-to-earth problem; it was flawed in
that it assumed a higher level of attainment than its potential clientele had achieved.
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Local authorities might have been more enthusiastic supporters for the proposals, but
following local government reorganisation in January 1974, Gosden points out that
they had become politicised as never before. (Gosden 1983: 85) Party political
debates in local education committees were not a friendly environment for thoughtful
responses to new ideas. Despite lukewarm support, the plan for the CEE was
submitted to the Secretary of State in 1976 and received Department of Education and
Science support in the form of concrete proposals for such a qualification in the 1979
Keohane Report. Gosden claims that despite this apparent endorsement of the CEE,
there were misgivings within the Department. When it came to a difference of opinion
between the Department and the Schools Council, there was no question where the
power lay. It seemed that the weakness in the proposal centred on the Schools
Council's failure to involve the examining boards:
...the Department and HMI [Her Majesty's Inspectorate] have misgivings about
its merit [because] ...the Schools Council have not succeeded in demonstrating
that the considerable technical difficulties ofexamining over a wide spectrum of
the ability range have been solved. They have not offered an agreed and
workable plan for the administration of the proposed new examination by the
existing examining bodies.
(Quoted in Gosden 1983: 85)
This rare acknowledgement of the technical difficulties of exarmmng did not,
unfortunately, take deep root within the education department. Had it done so, there
might have been more effective outcomes subsequently in the cases of both GCSE
and Curriculum 2000. One can only speculate as to whether the CEE might have
survived had the examining boards been included - or at least consulted - by the
Schools Council. In the event, the CEE was left to wither on the vine, along with the
reputation of the Schools Council. As its influence waned, the Council persevered
with addressing post-16 problems and suggested an intermediate (I) level examination
between 0 level and A level. (Plaskow 1985: xii) This too proved fruitless. Despite its
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good intentions, the Schools Council achieved nothing by way of post-16 reform.
Both CEE and the Intermediate-level examination were terminally scuppered when in
1979, Mark Carlisle as the new Conservative Secretary of State for Education
announced, together with his opposite number in Wales, that A levels were to remain
unchanged for the foreseeable future.
Although excluded from the Schools Council's schemes, during the 1970s the
examining boards themselves attempted to broaden A-level students' intellectual
horizons by devising a new A level in General Studies. The syllabus required a
knowledge of a range of disciplines, reading comprehension of a foreign language and
some mathematics plus the ability to construct an argument in essay form. The most
popular General Studies syllabus was that of the Joint Matriculation Board. However
even its success was limited because few university admissions tutors apart from the
northern five, of which the JMB was the offspring, recognised the subject. Because
"pupils and teachers had to be highly instrumental in their choice of A levels and
pursuit ofgood grades in specialist subjects" (Mathieson 1992: 191), General Studies
failed to gain a wide take-up in the nation's sixth forms. Mathieson cites General
Studies as evidence of:
...the low level of everyone's commitment to breadth. ...It had little currency
with university admissions tutors, ...little practical support and investment of
resources from heads and heads of subject departments and ...slight recognition
by pupils.
(Mathieson 1992: 191)
This attempt by the Boards to broaden A levels by means of a syllabus proved only
marginally more successful than the School's Council's more ambitious schemes.
As for the Schools Council, by the end of the 1970s, as Plaskow points out, there was
virtually no significant involvement in its work by representatives of either the
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Department of Education and Science or Her Majesty's Inspectorate. (Plaskow 1985:
5) Even early supporters like Sir William Alexander had to acknowledge that Local
Education Authorities had not used it effectively as a platform for locally generated
reforms. (Gosden 2000) The demise of the Association of Education Committees,
which had been Alexander's power base, and the influential LEA voice in the Schools
Council "left the DES seriously weakened in its ability to bring about curriculum
reform through co-operation" (Lowe 1997: 138). As stated above, recognising this
dilemma does go some way to explaining the department's quest for greater control in
the years to come.
In 1981, Mark Carlisle commissioned a report on the Schools Council from Mrs
Nancy Trenaman, Principal of St Anne's College, Oxford. She recommended its
continuation with some structural changes. However in 1982 Carlisle was replaced as
Secretary of State by Sir Keith Joseph. He announced that the Schools Council would
be disbanded. His motives were variously interpreted as a response to the Council's
declining effectiveness or, in the view of a London head teacher who had served on
the Council, from more malign motives:
Spin of the day talked about teacher unions' dissension. Although NAS and
NUT had differences, they were not over the curriculum. It was a determined
attempt by Keith Joseph to kill it.
(NUT 2000)
I would suggest that Sir Keith was very probably advised by his civil servants in the
education department that a stronger role for the regulator was the only way to
achieve real change. Certainly from the perspective of the examining boards, in the
series of regulatory bodies that succeeded the Schools Council, the hand of central
control weighed increasingly heavily.
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The Ruskin speech signals growing government involvement in education
across the political spectrum
Just as the ill-fated CEE could symbolise the end of the so-called golden age, the
beginning of a very different and less consensual one was signalled in a speech
delivered by the Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan at Ruskin College, Oxford,
in October of 1976. Its message was significant, but for the purposes of this study its
derivation was even more so. The Prime Minister had requested a paper on the whole
question of the curriculum followed by schools. The resulting report was produced in
the form of a confidential report popularly known as 'The Yellow Book'. "Its contents
represented a DES view which drew heavily on HMF' (Maclure 2000: 191). Although
the full report was never published, the Times Educational Supplement of 15 October,
1976 published on its first page extracts from a leaked version, describing it bluntly as
"the Department ojEducation and Science's proposal that it should have a greater
say in deciding the curriculum ojBritain's schools."
Although the criticisms in the Yellow Paper of both curriculum and pedagogy in the
nation's schools did not extend to examinations which "had held up very well"
(Quoted in Maclure 2000: 192), this flexing of DES muscles was a signal that the
examining boards' autonomy, together with that of Local Education Authorities and
individual schools, would be further challenged. The essential message of Callaghan's
speech was that the curriculum was not the sole preserve of education professionals
but was a matter of wide concern because England's schools were not adequately
preparing young people for employment. In reality, the wider in interest these matters
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was coming from the education department, with Her Majesty's Inspectorate not far
behind.
The growing ambition of the department was signalled in the final paragraph of the
Yellow Book in the form of "a plea for a more direct mandate to intervene":
It will also be good to get on record from Ministers and in particular from the
Prime Minister an authoritative pronouncement on the division ofresponsibility
for what goes on in school, suggesting that the Department should give a firmer
lead....
(Quoted in Maclure 2000: 194)
Two people writing at the close of the 1970s, Brian Salter and Ted Tapper, suggested
that the DES had become an "ambitious bureaucracy". Their analysis found that:
Throughout the J970s, the DES was engaged on a process ofpolicy enclosure
which effectively re-drew the old tripartite partnership of DES, LEAs and
teachers' trade unions. As policy making was progressively internalized within
the Department's 'rational' planning procedures, the LEAs and teachers'
unions were increasingly made aware that they were subordinate, rather than
equal partners [as had been the concept in the past].
(Salter and Tapper 1981: 34)
This view has been confirmed variously by Peter Gosden, Denis Lawton, Stuart
Maclure and Geoff Whitty and was succinctly summed up by Clive Chitty when
looking back from his perspective in 2004. He was clear about the policy implications
of the Yellow Paper: "It ended with a suggestion that the Department should give a
firmer lead' (Chitty 2004: 42).
A quarter-century later, this ambition has been fulfilled. The "managerial state"
controls and regulates education closely. In the case of the examining boards, they
experienced a second major ratcheting-up of this control, tighter than that following
the 1944 Act, as the price of the long-sought merging of the divided 16+ system of 0
levels and CSE into a single examination.
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A single examination at 16+ with a step-change in control over the Boards
The change to the 16+ examinations structure was a response to the pressure that had
been building up through the gradual change in the structure of the secondary system.
Discontent over the socially divisive nature of the three-track secondary structure
established by the 1944 Education Act grew as technical schools failed to develop and
secondary modems were evidently an inferior option: even their level of funding was
significantly below that of the grammar schools. The all-ability or comprehensive
school was widely seen as the fair way forward, and increasing numbers of Local
Education Authorities began to reorganise their secondary provision on that model.
Finally the Labour government acceded to the groundswell of pro-comprehensive
support and in 1965 Anthony Crosland issued Circular 10/65, which requested -
rather than required - Local Authorities to put forward plans for reorganising their
secondary provision on comprehensive lines. While its voluntarism disappointed
comprehensive advocates, it aroused bitter opposition in some Conservative areas
where popular grammar schools were threatened. This issue was identified by one
analyst as the point at which "the educational debate became politicized and
embittered in a way that it had not been since the religious controversies of60 years
earlier" (Sharp 2002: 106).
The importance of the comprehensive issue here, however, was its impact on the
examination system. The gradual move toward comprehensive schools during the
1970s meant that most children were now making the transition to secondary school
with no test involved. Yet this significant structural change was not reflected by any
corresponding change in the examinations system: the divided secondary structure
was merely replicated within comprehensive schools. The GCE Ordinary level,
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unchanged since its creation in 1951 for the 20% of pupils in grammar schools, was
supplemented from 1965 by the Certificate of Secondary Education, intended for the
next 40%. Virtually no contemporary comment addressed this arithmetic with its non-
recognition of 40% of young people. Adding to the pressure on the secondary system
was the raising of the school-leaving age to 16 in 1974. This long-awaited change
added to the ever-increasing numbers in secondary schools. Gosden observes: "In
1945 there were about half a million pupils in secondary schools. Thirty years later
there were four million" (Gosden 1983: 29).
Schools were given grants for building additional accommodation - of a minimal
standard - to cater for these extra pupils, but no parallel consideration had been given
to a suitably adjusted curriculum and qualification structure. Teachers in
comprehensive schools were faced with the impossible task of trying on the one hand
to build an educational community which included the whole range of abilities while
at the same time dividing the pupils at age 14 into O-level sheep, CSE goats and the
'non-examination' rest. The system still reflected its platonic origins, certainly diluted
on the surface but essentially having the same effect on those going through it.
Pressure from schools for a common examination at 16 built steadily during the
1970s. Following approval in principle by the Schools Council in 1970, " ...there
began one of the largest programmes of feasibility and development studies of a
proposed educational innovation ever mounted in England and Wales" (Nuttall 1984:
167). The examining boards - far from acting, in Whitty's words, as agencies who
"tended to employ administrative devices as a way of restricting growth of new and
disparate Mode 3 schemes" (Whitty 1985: 127) - produced pilot schemes for a
common examination. Their responsibility for ensuring the reliability and validity of
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examinations has regularly been interpreted as an unwillingness to consider change.
This involvement showed them as flexible although aware of the challenge involved
in examining across a wide ability range. The pilot schemes were increasingly popular
in schools, particularly in the north. An examining board official recalls that:
By the time GCSE was introduced in 1987, the proportion ofstudents taking the
'pilot' 16+ examinations through either the JMB or the five CSE Boards
serving northern LEAs was greater than that taking 0 levels and CSEs.
(AQA12000)
Politicians of either complexion were unwilling to respond to the pressure for a single
examination until perhaps the most unlikely of them all yielded. Sir Keith Joseph, a
major guru of Margaret Thatcher, became Secretary of State for Education and made
what seemed an uncharacteristic concession in 1983. However, a closer scrutiny
reveals that there was a sting in the tail of that concession. The Minister agreed to
allow the development of a single examination to replace 0 level and CSE - if the
criteria which underpinned it were "acceptable". It would be a government-appointed
agency, not the Schools Council, which would define acceptability. For the first time
the Boards would have to yield to a central agency in matters which had hitherto
formed an essential aspect of their professional judgement. This was a much more
overt move towards central control over examinations than they had experienced
following the 1944 Act.
The Schools Council was replaced by two bodies, all of whose members would be
appointed "by the Minister": the School Curriculum Development Council (SCDC)
and the Secondary Examinations Council (SEC). The latter was to vet the
acceptability of each syllabus for the new examination submitted by what were to be
known as 'examining groups': four regional consortia [See Figure 3.4] of the former
GCE O-level and CSE boards who would administer the General Certificate of
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Secondary Education (GCSE) as a single 16+ examination. What had been a total of
23 (9 GCE and 14 CSE) boards took various approaches to the restructuring process.
By this time the Bristol board had merged with AEB, the Durham board with JMB
and the Joint Oxford and Cambridge board remained aloof, so the resulting
constellation produced four English GCSE Groups associated with the five remaining
GCE boards in England:
• London and East Anglia Group (LEAG) with the University of London Board;
• Southern Examining Group (SEG) with the University of Oxford Delegacy of
Local Examinations and the Associated Examining board;
• Midland Examining Group (MEG) with the University of Cambridge Local
Examinations Syndicate;
• Northern Examining Authority (NEA) with the Joint Matriculation Board.
While they still controlled their A-level provision, the examining boards which had
grown out of the Victorian culture of a government which remained at a remove from
qualifications were now subject to strong central control. Qualifications had become a
matter of interest to the evolving "managerial state", This major shift was clear to at
least one assessment expert, who observed that GCSE brought in:
...a national syllabus (one would hesitate to call it a curriculum) enforced via
national criteria.... There could hardly be a clearer, or more succinct
illustration of the development of central intervention over the process of
schooling. By designing the product, or outcome, the DES intends to shape the
process.
(Gipps 1986: 16)
In similar vein, Desmond Nuttall, perhaps the leading assessment expert at the time,
identified what he saw as flaws in the new examination:
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(i) ... the fact that those with the greatest vested interest - the boards themselves
- have been given the task of doing all the drafting makes it unlikely that the
new system will adequately meet today 's curricular needs ....
(ii) The DES have taken upon themselves a much more overt role in steering
examination reforms and giving themselves rights (unprecedented since 1945)
over the approval ofthe detailed content ofexamination syllabuses and schemes
ofexamination.
(Nuttall 1984: 174)
While the Boards did indeed have a vested interest in the new examination -
examinations at 16+ comprised the major element of their business - from their
standpoint it was Nuttall's second point that was more cogent. The 'Groups' formed
by the Boards may have been given the task of doing all the drafting, but the drafts
were very closely scrutinised and regularly rejected by officials from the Secondary
Examinations Council. Previously such judgements over syllabus or examination
detail had been the preserve of the Boards; now the power of veto rested with a new
agency. The balance of power had altered. This was certainly the perception of a
leader of one examining board at the time:
What really in my judgement changed the whole thing was GCSE. That gave
government an opportunity to play more than a role of the light touch over the
system as a whole ... [with] national criteria ...acceptable to the government
being a pre-requisite ofthe system. And that brought government much more up
front into the examination system than it had ever been before. And everything
that's happened since has built on that. It's eroded more and more the
independence ofthe boards.
(AQAI2000)
This was control of a quite different order. The Boards' established expertise was
subject to the judgement of others for the first time in their history. More worrying
than the inroads into their independence were questions as to the competence in the
complexities of assessment of those taking on the responsibility for accepting or
rejecting the new syllabuses. However, the process of increasing central control had
only just begun. As the next decade proceeded, governments of both political colours
saw increasing their control over public services as a necessary corollary of their
responsibility for what became known as the 'delivery' of those services. Although,
strictly speaking, the independent examining boards were not public services, this
distinction did not restrict government interest in their activities. The 1990s saw them
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more and more constrained by the requirements of the central control that grew ever
more clearly defined as governments proclaimed a commitment to liberalisation. This
process will be the focus of the next chapter. However first it is time to consider what
had been happening in the parallel world of vocational qualifications.
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Coda: The English problem with vocational education
Because in the next chapter I will suggest that one pressure on the examining boards
resulted from the attempt to unite the divided worlds of academic and vocational
qualifications, I shall here trace briefly the quite separate development of vocational
qualifications and their providers in England. As was established at the outset of this
chapter, English practical education and training have remained quite distinct from
school-based education. I have mapped the developments in the accreditation of
vocational attainment in England [See Figure 3.5]; this section expands on selected
aspects of that matrix.
Since its creation In 1878, the principal English body offering accreditation for
practical training has been the City and Guilds of London Institute for the
Advancement of Technical Education (City & Guilds). The use of the term 'guilds' in
its title was no accident. Gladstone advocated the term because he saw "the
traditional structure of the guilds as a means of making some progress" toward his
aim of improving the nation's technical and vocational training. (Bush 1993: 8) While
City & Guilds has predominated in this field, the Royal Society of Arts (RSA),
created in 1754, established an examining section which began by accrediting those
trained in the Mechanics Institutes which began in the 1820s. The RSA continued to
be a significant provider of commercial qualifications in particular until it sold its
examining section to the Cambridge board in 1995. A third body, created in the
1880s, that has continued to accredit business-related skills is the London Chamber of
Commerce, which as LCCI merged in 2002 with Goal pIc to form Education
Development International.
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By 1911 a range of vocational qualifications validated by 40 different bodies had
developed. Although it was established to consider the many examinations that had
developed, the Dyke-Acland Report of that year made no mention of these vocational
awards; its focus was purely on the academic side. Despite this multiplicity of
providers and their lesser status in relation to academic qualifications, by 1992 around
2 million vocational awards were being made annually. (Mathieson 1992: 195)
In the 1960s, an attempt was made to sort out this multiplicity of qualifications by
establishing Industrial Training Boards to oversee apprenticeship schemes in the
major trades. This system involved structured apprenticeships which included some
general education through day release to local further education colleges. These
training boards proved reasonably effective until in the late 1980s the Thatcher
Government abolished all but that of the construction industry, which was deemed to
have particular needs. Firms did not immediately experience a shortage of skilled
workers because they were able to recruit trained staff from among those made
redundant through the same Government's policy of winding down manufacturing
industries. It was only as those workers neared retirement that the dearth of skilled
artisans became apparent. (Cole 2002) Growing concern over the nation's skills levels
then began to replicate that occasioned by the Great Exhibition of 1850.
Following the loss of their day-release courses, further education colleges turned
increasingly to what were to become the most successful English vocational courses.
They resulted from a 1970s development when, under the aegis of City & Guilds, the
Development Rationale Primary Effects Secondary Effects
1853 Department of Science and Art To address perceived weakness of Established practical training as Signalled academic-vocational
created within Board of Trade English workforce separate from schools divide
1856 RSA provides accreditation for To accredit practical skills Skills attainments recognised Vocational qualifications
regional Mechanics' Institutes unrelated to schools
1878 City & Guilds of London Institute To improve technical and Independent bodies control Voluntarism firmly built into
established vocational training and attainment vocational education vocational education
ca 1903 London Chamber of Commerce To accredit commercial skills Business skills separated from Hierarchy of skills developing
craft skills as providers burgeon
1964 Industrial Training Boards To update and improve National system with day Employers' financial
established apprenticeship release for general education in contribution established
colleges
1969 Haslegrove Report established BEC To regulate college-based New provider challenges 3 Alternative provision to
and TEC vocational courses established awarding bodies apprenticeship system
1976 CGLl established Foundation To address needs of ROSLA pupils Opportunity for 'new' 6' Start of pre-vocational
Courses for FE colleges, schools formers in schools, colleges education and core skills
19805 Industrial Training Boards phased To replace a national system with Apprenticeships virtually end Growing need for effective
out by Thatcher government market forces vocational education
1983 BTEC created by merger of BEC & Consolidation of growing agencies Effective route mainly via FE Competition for 6th forms and
TEC colleges exam boards1985- CPYE accredited by C&G and Need for alternative to academic Flexible course with experiential Concerns about disparities in
BTEC route in post-16 education learning and teacher assessment standards
1986 NCYQ established To regulate the many vocational NVQs created as competence- Sustained bias that applied
qualifications based, criterion referenced learning differs from general
1991 Incorporation of FE & 6'n-form To raise standards through Competition for students taking 3-track system confirmed
colleges competition new GNVQs
1996 QCA absorbs NCYQ To bridge the ac/voc divide at Central statutory regulation over NVQs still outside framework;
regulatory level all qualifications still 'different'
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Department of Education and Science established the Technical Education Council
(TEC) and the Business Education Council (BEC) to oversee the related courses
offered by further education colleges. The two councils merged in 1983 - taking with
them a large slice of their mentor's clientele and staff (CGU 1993: 42) - to form an
awarding body known as BTEC, whose subsequent history will form part of the next
chapter. This organisation created a structure of practical courses with a general
education component and a clear progression pathway: from First Certificate to
Diploma to link with the established Higher National Diploma.
These courses became a major success within further education colleges, and
provided a sorely-needed alternative route through practical education. However the
further education sector has never wielded sufficient political influence to mount a
defence of its successes, and this positive development was to be overtaken by
untested experiments growing out of another national employment crisis and the
lacuna in the post-16 curriculum referred to above.
When during the 1970s youth unemployment had increased staying-on rates and
consequent pressure for change in the sixth-form curriculum, the Department of
Education and Science established the Further Education Unit (FEU) to consider the
problem. The resulting document introduced new thinking about the nature of
learning. A Basis for Choice (1979) identified what the FEU termed 'experiential
learning' as different from the abstractions of the academic approach but an equally
valid route for young people to follow. Their approach won out over the Schools
Council's proposed CEE and was endorsed by the English and Welsh Education
Ministers, Mark Carlisle and Nicholas Edwards in their 1980 consultation paper on
Examinations 16-18.
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This opened the way for such post-16 initiatives as the City & Guilds '365' pre-
vocational courses, the Certificate of Pre-Vocational Education (CPVE) and the pre-
16 curriculum initiatives developed through the Technical and Vocational Education
Initiative (TVEI), a project of the government's Manpower Services Commission, not
the Department of Education and Science.
The rationale for these courses was that young people who were not yet ready for the
specific vocational training of BTEC courses could profit from continuing their
general education within an applied rather than a theoretical framework. This
approach was based on the FEU concept of learning. Richard Pring's analysis
summed up the essence of what he termed "the pre-vocational tradition" as
recognising the importance of relevance for the learner as distinct from the traditional
view of education as concerned solely with the perfection of the intellect. (Pring 1997:
124) Assignment-led and resource-based rather than teacher-centred, the assessment
scheme profiled a range of achievements rather than depending on a single
examination grade. However, it was to be the overly flexible nature of the assessment
of these courses that proved to be their Achilles' heel. Lacking external validation of
the final certificates, the whole pre-vocational movement suffered from a fatal
weakness in a society afflicted with the 'diploma disease'. In 1991 a new 'general
vocational' course structure was devised that proved somewhat more successful. The
examining boards were eventually called in to lend it their assessment gravitas.
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The enduring English attitude to work-based education
Since the time when the Victorian middle classes chose a classically-based education for
their children despite their prospects of a life in trade, Huddleston and Unwin's research
indicates that similar attitudes survive:
... We find that qualifications for both education and work are judged within an
education paradigm and thus arguments about parity of esteem and the
academic/vocational divide are based on the premise that vocational qualifications
must prove themselves against an academic yardstick rather than being properly
valued in their own right.
(Huddleston and Unwin 1997: 146)
They also question the increasing involvement of employers in the planning of work-
based training via the Technical Education Councils (TECs), their successors the
Learning and Skills Councils (LSCs) and presumably the Skills Sector Councils (SSCs)
referred to in the White Paper of February 2005. Despite paying lip-service to improving
vocational training, employers' practice confirms that they " ... reveal in their recruitment
and human resource management behaviour that they value academic qualifications as
highly, and in some cases more highly than vocational ones" (Huddleston 1997: 146).
A similar continuing bias toward academic attainment is identified in Peter Robinson's
evidence from the labour market. His research [See Figure 3.6] indicates that:
Overall ...the evidence is quite clear. There is no parity ofesteem between academic
and vocational qualifications in the labour market, which is almost certainly why
we do not observe parity of esteem in the education system. Young people choose
the route that brings a clear advantage.
(Robinson 1997: 197)
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Figure 3-6 Qualifications: Ea rn ings Data
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Making the same point, Alison Wolf cites an observation made in 1952 by the chancellor
of the University of Chicago that: "In a fluid, industrial, scientific democracy, the more
specific an education is, the less likely it is to achieve the only purpose that it has - to
prepare the student for a particular kind of economic activity" (Wolf 2002b: 85). With
this evidence that academic education is valued both for its status and for its flexibility,
the outlook for work-based education in England is grim.
A similar conclusion was reached in 2002 by the authors analysing the changes to post-16
education that the Learning and Skills Council had brought about from 2000. They
suggest that "the overall prognosis for the latest attempt to produce a high quality work-
based route is not good." They harbour doubts:
...that institutional restructuring, ofitself, will produce fundamental change;
that the failure of earlier re-brandings of work-based training was ...an accident,
and that the latest formulation ...will somehow be difJerent;[and consider} that
there remains a fundamental ambiguity about the future, role, shape and relative
importance of the work-based route vis-a-vis full-time educational provision.
(Evans, Hodkinson 2002: 207)
Their concerns could well apply to the White Paper on 14-19 education - 14-19
Education and Skills - published in February of2005. Despite widespread support for the
restructuring recommended in the previous October's Tomlinson Report, whereby A
Levels and GCSEs would be replaced by an inclusive over-arching diploma to accredit
all attainment, the new Secretary of State for Education, Ruth Kelly, announced that:
GCSEs and A levels are internationally respected. They will be kept as a
cornerstone of 14-19 learning. They will continue to be assessed through rigorous
external examinations ....
In achieving these objectives [recognition of and progression routes through
vocational qualifications], we believe that the Working Group on 14-19 Reform's
proposals for specialised Diplomas in vocational areas are right.
(DillS 2005: 45, 47)
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A nation's attitudes do not change easily. Yet despite this truism, this chapter has shown
that the quest to reform the qualifications system is a continuing one. The 1990s saw the
process continue, with the impetus coming from the centre, and having a major impact on
the examining boards.
The next chapter focuses on the themes of increasing central control and continuing
attempts to improve vocational education combining with other pressures common to all
organisations during the 1990s to place the examining boards under severe pressure while
they were implementing the major changes which continued the process of undermining
their professional independence. Before moving to this next phase, it is important to
reflect on what might be termed, depending on one's choice of metaphor, the forest of
which these trees form a part, the nature of the tectonic plate movements that lie beneath
the story so far or the meta-narrative of which this narrative forms an element.
Looking beneath the narrative: what was really happening?
Returning to my research questions at this point, although they are straightforward and
lack any pretensions to profundity, they have served to unearth a body of data that
enables the deeper analysis that is the real objective of doctoral research.
1 How did the examining boards evolve from their origins accrediting
university matriculation into independent providers of the national
qualifications system?
2 How did the successive changes to the examinations structure affect their
role?
136
3 What evidence is there of a shift in control from the Boards to the State?
They have served their purpose of guiding my research; as I have attempted to answer
them, I have begun to discern certain deeper movements of which the narrative I have
constructed is a manifestation. I have answered the first question in this chapter, and
identified evidence which begins to answer the second and third. The evolution of the
English examining boards has been shown to be less a matter of policy than of
pragmatism. The changes to the system after 1944 and 1983 were accompanied by
greater central control but did not actually affect their role. Clear evidence of a shift in
control to the centre has been identified in 1947, when the Boards were ejected from the
Secondary Schools Examination Committee and excluded from designing the GCE
examinations, and again after 1983, when their GCSE syllabuses and examinations were
subject to government-appointed regulatory approval.
However, I believe that beneath these developments one can detect indicators of a
gradual breakdown in public trust parallel to that which in her Reith Lecture of 2002,
Onora O'Neill identified as apparently lying behind politicians' "quest for greater
accountability" which she locates "over the last fifteen years" or "in the last two
decades" (O'Neill 2002). While not entering the argument as to whether the breakdown
in trust is apparent or actual, I believe the case of the examining boards fits O'Neill's
description of "the new accountability ...distorting the proper aims of professional
practice" (O'Neill 2002) In considering the changes which affected the examining boards
following the Second World War, I have detected from the 1970s early fissures in the
foundation of public trust on which the eccentric structure of qualifications providers
operated.
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While the weakness of the post-war economy delayed wider social change until the 1960s
saw the demise of deference, in terms of education it was not until the 1970s that the
various pressures that were beginning to threaten the social contract began to make
themselves felt. In the 1970s the coinciding of an oil crisis which weakened the labour
market with the raising of the school leaving age in 1974 meant pressure on schools for a
more flexible curriculum just as the reorganisation of local government that same year
had politicised previously consensual metropolitan and county councils as never before.
Commitment to the democratic Schools Council dwindled just when its creative response
was badly needed. In this vacuum of innovation, the Department of Education and
Science stepped up its ambition to take up the slack left by the weakening of the tri-
partite partnership of Local Education Authorities, teacher unions and Department
officials. This ambition lay behind the 'Yellow Paper' which informed James Callaghan's
1976 'Ruskin Speech' - the public rupture of trust in education. As the decade ended
with the breakdown in trust between unions and the Labour Government in the 1978/9
'Winter of Discontent', the nation opted for a change of government that ushered in the
Thatcherite era where trust was replaced by accountability.
When in 1983 Sir Keith Joseph as Secretary of State for Education yielded to the pressure
for a single examination at 16+ but replaced the Schools Council by a centrally appointed
regulator, he was following the path outlined by Onora O'Neill, where "the new
accountability takes the form of detailed control" (O'Neill 2002). The next chapter will
demonstrate how this quest for accountability grew ever more intense, with severe
consequences for the examining boards.
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Chapter 4 The Examining Boards in the 1990s: Under
pressure and losing control
By the beginning of the 1990s, the English examining boards had experienced two
significant shifts in the balance of control over examinations: firstly with Ministry
nominees replacing them on the Secondary Schools Examinations Council after 1944
and then with the creation of the Secondary Examinations Council in 1983. The 1990s
were to see control over examinations continue to move inexorably towards the centre
with a concomitant imposition of changes both to their own organisational structure
and to the qualifications they provide. It is during this decade that one can trace the
effects on the examining boards of the "permanent revolution" that Clarke, Gewirtz
and McLaughlin have identified in their book on the "continuing reconstruction ofthe
welfare state in the United Kingdom" (Clarke, Gewirtz 2000: I). Their analysis finds
the process of modernisation and reform begun by the Conservative Government in
the 1980s to have been carried on with equal enthusiasm by the New Labour
Government after 1997. Although forming an agency of the "educational state" rather
than of the welfare state which is the focus of Clarke, Gewirtz and McLaughlin, the
examining boards in particular and the education world in general experienced the
effects of the general zeal for centrally generated change.
This chapter will analyse how the various changes the Boards experienced during the
1990s brought to them a point where their long-established qualifications were being
questioned. They were losing their status as one of the accepted "conglomeration
of ..agencies" within "the educational state"(Ball 1990:20). I will suggest as the
explanation for this change that by the end of the decade the imperatives of the "new
managerialism" had virtually stripped them of their independence. Greatly increased
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regulatory powers had effectively encroached upon their ability to exercise their
professional judgement. It had been the established quality of their assessment
expertise that had underwritten the reliability of the qualifications they offered. With
their ability to exercise that professional skill severely inhibited by central regulation,
it will be contended, the examining boards are in danger of becoming little more than
outsourcing agencies providing qualifications entirely designed and controlled by a
central, government-appointed body.
As evidence for this position, the chapter will interweave data from the interviews I
have conducted with my analysis of other sources in order to triangulate the evidence
produced to support my contention that the Boards were experiencing a significant
loss of independence. It will open with a summary of the continuing critiques of post-
16 qualifications - both vocational and A level - which led to the two major
qualification reforms of the 1990s: firstly the creation of General Vocational
Qualifications and then Curriculum 2000 which changed the structure of the A levels
which had lasted for half a century.
Then, after a brief consideration of the series of policy papers which reshaped the
world of the examining boards and will be referred to throughout this section, the
analysis will focus on some of the general themes that formed the context for all
English organisations during the 1990s and how their influence impacted specifically
on the Boards, with each factor contributing to the shift to central control. I will argue
that the dynamic interaction of these factors led to a step change in the relationship
between the Boards and their regulator and changed the balance of power irrevocably.
Clearly, the examining boards were not alone in experiencing many of the decade's
stresses: they formed the context within which all English organisations had to
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operate. However, the interaction of these broader factors with particular issues the
Boards faced internally meant they were experiencing continuing strains. These
strains might have gradually eased had it not been for the major upheaval to their core
product resulting from the restructuring of A levels through Curriculum 2000.
What will be characterised as 'external' issues derive from the fundamental change to
the world of education resulting from the introduction of marketisation and
competition with the related expectation of accountability. This was an essential
aspect of what is often termed the neo-liberal agenda. Geoff Whitty summarised this
political stance:
For the neo-liberal politicians who dominated educational policy-making in
Britain and elsewhere in the 1980s and 1990s, social affairs are best organised
according to the 'general principle ofconsumer sovereignty' ....
(Whitty 2002: 79)
Taking the longer historical view of developments since 1944, Gary McCulloch does
include the Boards in his analysis, and confirms the changing relationship between the
Boards and the State:
Exam boards and the State have maintained the uneasy tension over the
management ofpublic exams that emerged from the 1940 settlement, although
with increasing signs of instability in this arrangement. In the contest for
control and authority over secondary school exams in the early 1990s, the State
was again in the process ofasserting itself Whereas in the 1940s it had done so
on behalfofa notion of 'teacher responsibility', however, in the 1990s it was on
behalfofthe very different notion of 'public accountability',
(McCulloch 1994: 144)
Exerting increasing central control in the interests of public accountability formed one
element of the paradox that saw the State simultaneously advocating the liberating
influence of the market while steadily inhibiting public sector independence.
Although technically forming part of the "educational state", the Boards had always
formed a competitive market, if one which avoided strident rivalry. Yet during the
1990s, apparently flying in the face of market theory, increasing central control
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significantly inhibited their ability to compete. This control derived from the reputed
benefits which 'clients' (whether the state or the 'consumers' of examinations) would
earn from unification, regulation and increased accountability.
The first of these orthodoxies was the notion that large units delivering economies of
scale were more efficient market mechanisms than several small organisations. This
popularly accepted objective was at least one of the motives for moves to the uniting
firstly of government agencies and then of the examining bodies. Some hoped initially
that these mergers, which they saw as ''part of a wider movement towards national
organisational unification" .. .signalled a "possibility that they could have a significant
effect on the further reform of qualifications" (Spours 1998: 2). Although
qualification reform did follow with the introduction of Curriculum 2000, it was more
post hoc than propter hoc. The virtues of unification seemed related more to bringing
commercial practice into the public sector than to qualification reform. This was the
revised view of Hodgson and Spours in a later publication, who had come to the view
that: "Part of the national regulatory agenda accompanying marketisation has been
the trend towards the 'unification' of national regulatory agencies" (Hodgson 2003:
8).
A concomitant of the move towards unification was an increase in regulatory control:
another contradictory function of the market. Because government agencies were held
accountable for the 'products' of the system, they felt they ought to ensure that those
products were 'quality controlled'. Again, one analysis suggested that this increase
was a necessary response to "concerns about awarding body entrepreneurism and the
possibility that this could compromise 'standards'" (Spours 1998:12). However, seen
over a longer timescale, it seems less an effect of marketisation than the continuation
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of a long but inexorable process of the ever-tightening central control that began in
1944.
A final effect of viewing the examining boards through a marketised lens was the
requirement that they be accountable to their clients; for the examining boards,
accountability took the form of a vigorous debate about examination standards. Yet
the problem was that the range of the Boards' 'clients' - students, parents, teachers,
higher education, employers and, of course, the Government - did not share the same
perception of those standards. This issue, regularly highlighted in the media, I believe
to be at least partly the result of a complex misunderstanding that has developed in
England about the basis on which grades are awarded. The assessment theories that lie
behind this debate will be analysed to illustrate the pressure that the issue brought to
bear on the examining boards. The standards debate, it will be argued, weakened their
reputation and strengthened the case for increased control over them.
The underlying theme of the chapter is that it was the effect of the interaction of these
external factors with the internal issues dealt with in the following section that
threatened the stability of these longstanding organisations. The various resulting
questions raised over their reputation for producing valid and reliable qualifications
provided the justification for policy decisions that led, in my view, to the effective
loss of their independence.
Before considering the changes the Boards underwent during the 1990s, it is
necessary to clarify the critiques that convinced policy makers that such changes were
necessary.
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Continuing Attempts to Revalue the 'Gold Standard'
The previous chapter dealt with the abortive attempts of the Schools Council to make
changes to the structure of A levels and one initiative by the Boards to broaden their
scope. However, as time passed, their unsuitability as the only qualification available
for those remaining in education after 16 became increasingly evident. The growth of
comprehensive schools, the improved attainment rates following the introduction of
GCSE and shrinking employment opportunities meant an ever-widening range of
young people were staying on after 16. "Between 1987 and 1994, full-time
participation at 16 rose from under 50 per cent [of the age group] to about 70 per
cent" (Hodgson 1997: 6).
There lingered in some quarters the notion of the sixth form as the opportunity for an
able minority to pursue specialist disciplines through their study of A levels, which
Michael Fallon, a Junior Education Minister in 1991, termed 'flagships' and 'gold
standards'. (Quoted in Mathieson 1992: 195) This was less and less a true reflection
of comprehensive sixth forms where, alongside the able majority there were those
who failed A-level examinations at the age of 18 with nothing to show for two years'
work. Before the major reform of 1999 with the introduction of Curriculum 2000,
there were continuing attempts to broaden the education of those studying at advanced
level.
What critics have long identified as a major weakness of A levels is their narrow
specialisation. (Green 1997: 88) There is no national 6th-form curriculum, and
students choose subjects without any requirement to continue their general education
- a circumstance that makes English post-16 education unique. This has led to
complaints from both higher education institutions and employers that many lack the
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numeracy, literacy or linguistic skills expected in a well-rounded education. Chapter
Three touched on the examining boards' attempt to address this problem by devising a
General Studies A level. However, it was to be the regulatory body which replaced
the Schools Council in 1983 which initiated a variation on A levels.
A Committee-Designed Half-A-Level: the AS
The Secondary Examinations Council introduced the idea of 'half A levels' which
they named Advanced Supplementary (AS). Yet, once again, in precisely the same
manner as the Secondary Schools Examinations Council had expected the examining
boards to create A levels with a minimal design brief in the 1940s, the SEC too did
not consult the Boards about the new qualification's design, but expected them to
produce it. In the following excerpt from the SEC's Annual Report of 1985-1986, the
Council conceded that it had not provided adequate criteria for the Boards to follow:
The intention to introduce AS-levels for first examination in 1989 was formally
announced by the Secretary of State in March 1985. In response to this,
Examining Boards are currently developing syllabuses which are expected to
come before the SEC for approval in the autumn and winter of1986.
Council has already noted that the absence of clearly defined criteria for AS-
levels may pose difficulties and that some delicate but essential negotiations
may become necessary during the approvals period.
(SEC 1986: 14)
The slightly coy tone of this citation indicates that this body considered the Boards to
require delicate handling, but felt no obligation to involve them in creating criteria. It
is more reminiscent of the tone in which Virginia Wolf discussed dealing with her
difficult cook than that of a regulator dealing responsibly with experienced agencies.
The inherent weaknesses of the AS qualification soon became apparent. The
Secondary Heads Association pointed out that " ... the current AS syllabuses [were]
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designed only for the present A-level cohort" (Mathieson 1992: 193), so were not
going to fulfil the need to include the widening ability range staying on in sixth forms
and further education following the improving attainment rates achieved with GCSE.
[See Figure 4-1] As for their broadening function, this was limited because most
schools were able to fund only a very limited number of subjects at AS level.
Figure 4-1 Rising GCSE Attainment Rates
Figure 2.3 Pupils attaining five or more higher-grade GCSE passes.
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Source: adapted from data published in Payne (1995) and the Department for Education and
Employment.
(Gillbom 2000: 34)
AS students were routinely co-taught with those taking the full A level but attended
only half the lessons. This practice cast them as lesser versions of the real thing.
Before the limitations of AS levels had become fully apparent, the government in
March 1987 asked Professor Higginson to investigate structural means of widening
students' experience.
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Professor Higginson Proposes More, Leaner and Tougher A levels
In her overview of attempts to reform A levels, Margaret Mathieson identified a shift
in the 1980s behind the drive for reform. She felt that the initiative was becoming
driven less by educationists' advocating breadth than by policymakers' concern about
England's international competitiveness. The brief of the Higginson committee was
to:
...Recommend the principles which should govern GCE A-level syllabuses and
their assessment (with a view to broadening courses of study and thereby
increasing the numbers moving on to higher education).
(Mathieson 1992: 191)
The Higginson Report was published in the summer of 1988 and made a series of
recommendations which commanded widespread support:
1 Five rather than three subjects should be the norm.
2 'Leaner and tougher' syllabuses should be less padded with 'inessential and
inconsequential information.
3 Students should continue to be drawn from high ability groups.
4 More concentration is needed on high level skills such as the ability to think
and act independently and less on memorisedfacts.
5 All subjects should have a compulsory common core to ensure greater
compatibility between boards.
6 There should be far fewer syllabuses. (At present they number in excess of
400.)
7 Criteria-based assessment and reporting should be introduced.
8 Schools and colleges should be accredited to control in-course assessment for
up to 20% ofthe final mark.
(Quoted in Mathieson 1992: 192)
Mathieson reported the "great disappointment" of a wide cross section of supporters
of the Higginson proposals - the Committee of University Vice Chancellors and
Principals (CVCP), the Standing Committee on University Entrance (SCUE), the
teaching unions and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) - when the
Government rejected them (Mathieson 1992: 192). The stated grounds for this
rejection were the number of concurrent changes elsewhere in the system - widely
judged to be a rather lame excuse in view of the fact that they were all changes which
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the Government had instigated. However, the fact that the Headmasters Conference
was not among the supporters of Higginson was believed to weigh heavily in
government thinking - an instance of the continuing influence of the private sector on
the state system.
The shortcomings of their new qualification had become apparent to the Secondary
Examinations and Assessment Council (1988 successor to the SEC). In 1991 one of
its committees proposed another structural change which would mean that a student
might take five or six AS exams in her or his first year in the 6th form and continue
with two or three of the subjects as A-levels in the second year. This virtual reworking
of the Schools Council's 1969 Q & F proposals was to resurface in 1999 as
Curriculum 2000: there is little that is new in English qualification development. But
at the beginning of the decade, just as they had been opposed to Higginson's
recommendations, the Head Masters' Conference - the voice of the private sector -
saw the SEAC proposal as yet again a threat to A levels. That voice was always a
powerful one with the Conservative Government, and "HMC was influential enough
for the proposal to be immediately rejected' (Hodgson 1997: 47). The private sector
retained the influence necessary to sway qualification debates.
A First Attempt at Embedding Core Skills
A final effort to make limited structural changes while retaining the A level in its
1953 format was the plan to embed 'key skills' as an element to be assessed. This was
an attempt to address what had become known as the 'skills deficit'. Regular
complaints from industry about the education system's production of young people
with inadequate levels of literacy and numeracy led John McGregor, Secretary of
State for Education in 1989 to promote what became known as 'core skills'. He
148
requested that the Secondary Examinations and Assessment Committee (SEAC) work
with the National Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ) using the Further
Education Unit's notions ofa core skills curriculum (Green 1997: 91) to identify and
assess the attainment of these skills within A-level study.
Green's account of the core skills concept suggests two reasons for the rejection of the
proposals at A level:
First, the examining boards felt that they would rather use the limited amount of
coursework assessment available for assessing subject knowledge rather than
core skills, and, second, the government feared the inclusion of core skills
would in some way 'distort' A-levels.
(Green 1997: 91)
The core skills episode was seen by other critics as "another half-hearted attempt to
make A-levels more 'relevant '" (Young 1997:48). Core skills were to return as a
major issue after the publication of the 1996 Dearing Report, in that context as one
means of bridging the academic/vocational divide.
The Boards' Positive Alterations to the A-Level Pattern
As well as such attempts at making structural changes to A levels, Young and Leney
identify what they call "incremental changes", by which they mean:
...changes in content ofsubject syllabuses, the introduction ofnew subjects, the
development of new subject cores and new forms of assessment, including the
shift from linear to modular syllabuses. (Young 1997: 48)
It is interesting to note that they attribute these changes, which they view favourably,
as representing:
...efforts on the part of teachers to make A-levels more relevant and accessible
to the wider range ofstudents who were now staying on in sixth forms.
(Young 1997: 48)
No mention is made of the examining boards, which had in fact activated these
changes. Except for the Certificate of Secondary Education (CSE), teachers in
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England have never had the power to alter the syllabus or assessments of external
examinations. Instead they have been able, through their representation on examining
boards and subject committees, to propose new approaches.
An ambitious 'incremental innovation' that won considerable support from 6th forms
in one region was the Associated Examining Board's 'Wessex' project, which
involved linking several subjects into modules around a core syllabus. Bob Rainbow
has chronicled the brief history of this project in his chapter in the 1993 collection on
The Reform ofPost-16 Education and Training in England and Wales. (Richardson,
Woolhouse 1993)
His case history of the Wessex Project explains how this collaboration involving five
adjacent Local Education Authorities working with the Associated Examining Board
began in 1987 from a scheme devised by teachers and advisers. The Secondary
Examinations Advisory Council (SEAC) gave it 'limited pilot status' until July 1993.
(Rainbow 1993: 87) The structure involved both core skills and a specific vocational
focus to ensure the breadth which had always been missing from single A-levels.
The assessment pattern borrowed from the newly-created GCSE the concept of
coursework modules assessed by teachers, with the board's external assessment
comprising 60% of the final award. Rainbow - writing before the end of the pilot
period - feared that " ...the very success ofthis approach [teachers providing students
with feedback during a module] many be the Project 's undoing if critics ofcriterion-
referenced examinations prevail" (Rainbow 1993: 95). He was also concerned that the
success of students, which led to the bunching of results in the upper grade levels,
would be interpreted as evidence of 'grade inflation'. He was proved right when in
July 1993 SEAC's assessors did not authorise the Wessex Project to continue.
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Rainbow reflected ruefully that " ...one of the consequences of the increased
centralisation of education in England and Wales is a reduction in its flexibility"
(Rainbow 1993: 100).
The ending of the Wessex Project was a matter of regret to staff at the AEB who had
been involved in the scheme. They had been learning to adapt to the "shift in
emphasis away from the AEB as an external arbiter to its role as a partner in the
process of assessment" (Rainbow 1993: 99). Ending this positive development
seemed a retrograde step. But once more, it made clear that the power of reform lay
with neither schools nor Boards, but with the Government's regulatory body. If
marketisation had truly been operating, this 'product innovation' should have been a
sign of the commercial health of at least one Board. The Wessex affair can perhaps be
interpreted as the first indication that, wherever else market theory was operating, the
examining boards were experiencing just the opposite.
Of all the attempts to reform A levels, these incremental changes within the
established A-level framework were by far the most successful. Yet the Boards were
not given any credit for their success, and at the end of the decade a radical change
was designed by the regulatory body with the Boards involved only nominally.
Education in the 1990s: The policy generators of change
In the world of English education, the final decade of the 20th century began:
...a period ofreform that is unprecedented since the rise ofmodern schooling in
the nineteenth century, both for its trenchant criticisms of established
institutions and values, and for its concern to change the entire culture of
schooling towards new ends.
(McCulloch 1994: 36)
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The examining boards were undoubtedly established institutions and certainly subject
both to change and to criticism during the 1990s. Stephen Ball's three causal factors
behind these changes would also identify the examining boards as likely targets for
criticism:
(i)...ideological shifts and changing patterns of influence within the
Conservative Party, institutional ambitions of the DES, and...the impact and
commitment of Secretaries of State and their ministers. (ii) Some notion of
'correspondencets)' between education and the economy .... (iii) the role of
discourses (the key concept of Michel Foucault) [wherein the] 'discourse of
derision' acted to debunk and displace not only specific words and meanings -
progressivism and comprehensivism, for example - but also the speakers of
these words, those 'experts', 'specialists' and 'professionals' referred to as the
'educational establishment '. These privileged speakers have been displaced...by
abstract mechanisms and technologies of 'truth' and 'rationality' - parental
choice, the market, efficiency and management.
(Ball 1990: 17-18)
The preceding chapter has shown how, after a first shift to more central control, a
1980s policy decision had made serious inroads into the Boards' independence. This
was Sir Keith Joseph's introduction of the single examination at 16+ in 1986 with the
requirement that all syllabuses for the new courses be vetted by the Secondary
Examinations Council. For the first time in their history, the Boards were not to be the
final arbiters of syllabus and assessment design. A second result of Sir Keith's
decision affected the Boards' established balance. In a statement that was to be
repeated ten years later by Ron Dearing, the policy paper announcing the new
examination "emphasized that, under the old dual system [0 level and CSE], there
were 'too many awarding bodies and too many syllabuses '." (Quoted in Wolf 2002a:
226) The requirement that there be four GCSE examining groups in England
destabilised their previous implicit sharing of the qualifications market and left at
least one board in serious financial difficulty. In the view of one informed observer,
"In a sense there were never really four Groups' worth [in England]. And ...it really
goes way back to 1988 that the Government set up too many GCSE Groups" (OCR2
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2003). Following their creation, these Groups were all to undergo various internal
reorganisations which will be considered below.
The 1988 ERA and the 1991 White Paper
After the 1987 election and the third successive victory for Margaret Thatcher's
Government, "the newly elected government was immediately ready to turn the
piercing Thatcherite eye on education" (Barber 1996: 36). The radical reform
programme embodied in the 1988 Education Reform Act signalled that the market
had entered the world of education. Michael Barber quotes Stephen Ball, "sharp and
critical as ever", in describing this version of what was not so much a free market as a
franchise: "You run the restaurant, we set the menu" (Quoted in Barber 1996: 50).
Ball's more serious analysis typifies the response of the education world to this
legislation:
At the heart of the Act is an attempt to establish the basis of an education
market. The key provisions of the Act replace the principle of equal access to
education for all with the principle of differentiation in the market place
... [through] choice, competition, diversity, funding and organisation. "
(Ball 1990:60)
Clive Chitty, writing at a later date, recalls that the Act:
...attracted more bitter and widespread professional opposition than any piece
oflegislation passed since the introduction ofthe National Health Service in the
second halfofthe J94Os.
To encapsulate its basic purpose, the J988 Act sought to erect (or reinforce) a
hierarchical system of schooling subject both to market forces and to greater
control from the centre.
(Chitty 2004: 51)
His later analysis adds the significant factor of "greater control from the centre"
which has emerged as a clear outcome as time has passed. It seems counter-intuitive
that a move to an education market, with its implied freedom from control, should in
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fact see an inexorable tightening of central power. Chitty posits a three-way control
structure: the DES, HMI - "the organic intellectuals of the DES" - and the Downing
Street Policy Unit. (Chitty 2004: 93) Michael Barber, who was to become an
influential figure in that Policy Unit following the 1997 election, acknowledges that
the 1988 Act was radical, but suggests that he, like other opponents of its reforms:
...had missed two fundamental points ....Firstly, we offered no credible
alternative to what was perceived by the public at large ...to be an inadequate
existing state of affairs. Secondly, we had completely failed to identify a series
ofunderlying social changes which would sooner or later have forced a radical
shift in education policy whether we liked it or not.
(Barber 1996: 37)
His view was that "the partnership model of decision-making, after which many
educationists still foolishly hanker, was demonstrably inadequate by the
1980s"(Barber 1996: 49). He suggests a list of six problems that made what he terms
"a cultural revolution" inevitable: growing social diversity, dissatisfaction with the
high level of failure, concern about national competitiveness, the need to control
public spending, the need for accountability, and the painfully slow rate of decision
making. (Barber 1996: 49) The Thatcher Government's radical combination of market
forces with centralisation was the result of an ideological position; but the status quo
was not an option.
For the examining boards, the centralising tendency had resulted in the complex
process of reorganisation they were required to set in train following the introduction
of the GCSE. This first step in upsetting their established sharing of the market had
left them as organisations ill prepared for yet more externally generated change during
the 1990s. In this sense, then, the changes of the 1990s had to be implemented by
organisations still absorbing the effects of policy decisions made in 1983.
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The policy document which set the tone for post-16 education in the 1990s was the
1991 White Paper Education and Training for the 21st Century. The Government's
objectives were to improve standards and, using the language of the market, make
colleges more responsive to their potential 'client base'. This document had a major
impact on the whole of post-16 education as it, in the words of one analysis:
..formalized a triple-track national qualifications framework based on an
academic track (A-levels), a broad vocational track (GNVQs) and an
occupationally specific track (NVQs) [and moved] towards an education and
training market and the end to local planning of post-16 education with the
incorporation ofFE colleges.
(Hodgson and Spours 1997: 9)
In also endorsing the removal of polytechnics from local authority control and
upgrading them all to university status, the White Paper changed the face of higher
education. This upgrading of the polytechnics did not, as might have been expected,
noticeably reduce the pressure for university places but instead gradually intensified
the demand for differentiated examination grades to assist the selection process. This
became another of the pressures on the examining boards.
For the examining boards the effect of this White Paper and the legislation which it
signalled was more indirect than the earlier introduction of GCSE or the Dearing
Report which followed. However, it altered the terrain of post-16 education by
formalising the education market, with the consequent competition, mergers, and
accountability for products that a market entails. This fundamental philosophical
change prepared the ground for subsequent policies which were to affect the Boards
directly. Before considering these, it is important to consider what had been
happening within one area that had remained outside the focus of government
attention until the 1990s turned the spotlight on them: vocational qualifications.
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In 1992 the Department of Education and Science launched its newly conceived
General National Vocational Qualification (GNVQ) - which, "unlike any ojthe other
public examinations in the UK...was designed Jrom scratch entirely by government
agencies, in this case NCVQ ..."(Wolf 2002a: 220). While I would suggest that what
was virtually a government agency had designed GCSE, there is no question that the
National Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ) controlled the design of this
new qualification. It was to be offered by the three vocational awarding bodies -
BTEC, City & Guilds and RSA - with the NCVQ as their regulator. This new post-16
qualification would be the factor that precipitated the eventual reconfiguring of the
examining boards.
The General National Vocational Qualification
The NCVQ had been established in 1986 to address concerns about both the
multiplicity and the quality of vocational qualification providers in Britain. The
solution was to create a regulatory body modelled on the German system despite the
fact that Germany's "industrial structure, main industries, political organization,
school system and employer-union relations are all so hugely different" from
England's. (Wolf 2002b: 71) The existing vocational qualifications were to be
analysed in terms of levels of 'competences' and rebranded as National Vocational
Qualifications (NVQs). Just as the Secondary Examinations Council and its
successors were empowered with regulating the examining boards, NCVQ was to
bring the vocational awarding bodies and their multitude of qualifications to heel.
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Wolf has provided an entertaining account of the brief history of the NVQ in her book
Does Education Matter? (Wolf 2002b) However, its relevance here is that the NVQ
provided the model for the first government-initiated addition to post-If school-based
qualifications since 1944. The General National Vocational Qualification (GNVQ) in
turn was to precipitate significant structural changes within the examining boards.
This new qualification, based like NVQs on a competence-based assessment structure,
was 'general' rather than occupationally specific and retained a core of general
education in the form of core skills. By a parallel process to that which had produced
GCSEs, the three vocational awarding bodies - City & Guilds, BTEC and RSA -
drew up the detailed specifications with NCVQ vetting their proposals. According to
an official from one of those awarding bodies, the task was complicated by the
frequent changes NCVQ introduced despite the lack of government funding for the
rising development costs:
...it was a nightmare. We had nothing to subsidise it with apart from our
reserves. And to have people sitting in conference rooms and focus groups
talking about what's the appropriate ideal thing to have in terms ofassessment,
and up go the costs. And 'we want rigour' and up go the costs.
(City & Guilds 2000)
After its launch in 1993, the GNVQ proved attractive to young people in 6th forms and
colleges. However it was not long before criticisms began to focus on the undoubtedly
unwieldy assessment system, described as "the most complicated...in the history of
vocational qualifications" (Spours and Young 1997b: 61). The most trenchant of the
critics was Alan Smithers, who chose the unusual but effective medium of television
to launch his attack. (Smithers 1993)
This dissatisfaction with GNVQs together with the ongoing concern about A levels
led the government to commission Ron Dearing to review the whole matter ofpost-16
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qualifications. His 1996 report recommended that the necessary rigour of GNVQ
assessment could best be assured by entrusting the process to the examining boards,
whose experience in providing rigorous assessment was proven. (Dearing 1996: 138)
A wider benefit of this step would be the perennially desirable one of bridging the
academic/vocational divide. It was by this route, then, that a vocational qualification
became a factor in the world of the examining boards in the mid -1990s. It was to have
a profound effect on their organisational structures. It was also incontrovertible
evidence of growing central government involvement in a field previously quite
outside its remit. In her overview of 20th century qualifications and assessment, Wolf
stresses this point: " ... What the history oj GNVQ does demonstrate ...is the
progressive nationalization ojassessment and examination policy, and the direct day
by day involvement ojministers in decisions" (Wolf 2002a: 221).
SCAA, OFSTED and Dearing
In 1993, the examination boards' regulatory body was reorganised agam: the
Secondary Examinations and Assessment Council (SEAC) was merged with the
National Curriculum Council (NCC) to form The Schools Curriculum and
Assessment Authority (SCAA). [See Figure 4.2]. While this move was widely seen as
an educationally desirable marrying of the curriculum and its assessment, for the
Boards it meant adjusting to a reconfiguration of this important relationship and the
uncertainty that such change engenders.
In that same year, the Government made a change to the system of school inspection
that was to have a significant if indirect effect on the Boards. As part of the general
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move toward increased accountability, the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted)
was established. Its inspection reports on schools were to be published both locally
and nationally, and together with the publication of 'league tables' of schools'
examination results to spotlight schools' relative performance. Because of the vital
role of all this data in parental decisions over choice of schools, examination results
now were clearly linked with schools' future survival. This new power of
examinations was translated into ever-increasing appeals over unsatisfactory results.
For the Boards this meant a major acceleration in the processing of appeals - an area
that had never before been more than a minor activity.
In 1996 Sir Ron Dearing, knighted for his achievement in reviewing the National
Curriculum and its assessment scheme for 5-16 year olds, was asked to tum his
attention to the post-16 age-group in his Review ofQualifications for 16-19 Year Olds
(the Dearing Report). A critical assessment describes Dearing's reports in general as
" ...masterpieces of compromise, placating warring players rather than offering
visionary solutions..." and his 16-19 Review as "couched almost entirely in terms of
employment needs - universities get an occasional mention, but beyond that, the
whole section is conceived in terms of workplace requirements" (Wolf 1998: 222).
Despite this focus, his report was to generate significant changes to qualifications, to
the regulators and to the examining boards. It designed the route which led to the
Guaranteeing Standards consultation in 1997, recommending changes to the
awarding bodies' structure, and to Qualifying for Success following the Labour
victory in 1997 which led to the redesign of A levels through Curriculum 2000. All of
these will be considered in more detail later in the chapter, but the cumulative effect
of these policy documents on the examining boards was profound. They were the
means of "an unprecedented centralization ofeducation policy and administration in
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England and Wales" with "ever-increasing regulation and oversight of the whole
examining process" (Wolf 2002a: 216) By 2000 the Boards were organisations whose
independence was at the very least severely limited if not illusory.
Now, in order to analyse how various aspects of these policies impacted upon the
Boards, the strands that comprise the whole fabric have to be pulled apart and
considered individually. I have categorized one group of these aspects as external and
stemming from factors beyond the Boards'control and a second group as internal and
affecting the organisational operations. The four external pressures I have identified
are:
Marketisation
Unification
Regulation
Standards
The three 'internal' pressures are of course related to the external factors:
Staffing problems
Upgrading information systems
Financial pressures
I maintain that the interaction of these issues had a destabilising effect on the
performance of the Boards which, because of their gradual loss of professional
independence, they were powerless to counteract.
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External Issues Affecting the Examining Boards
I must again make it clear that I am in no way claiming that the examining boards
were alone in facing these pressures. As organisations functioning within the culture
of the 1990s they were of course subject to the prevailing winds of policy, commerce
and social change. However, I believe it is valid to consider the effects of these
general trends on a particular group of organisations which had functioned for a
century virtually untouched by such environmental influences. The first and yet most
intangible of these I wanted to consider was the effect on the whole terrain of
secondary education brought about by the introduction of a post-16 'market'.
1 The Examinations Market: Old loyalties to exammmg boards
disappear
The market as applied to English examinations is perhaps best described as a version
of what Whitty has termed:
...quasi-markets [which involve] a combination ofparental choice and school
autonomy together with a greater or lesser degree ofpublic accountability and
government regulation.
(Whitty 2002: 46)
In the case of the examinations market, one can substitute in Whitty's description:
teacher choice and departmental autonomy, accountability in the form of schools'
examination 'league tables' and tighter central regulation of the Boards. The evidence
for the argument in this section is based on data gathered from a variety of sources but
also on the researcher's close involvement in the issues. Following Yin's advice, cited
above, concerning bringing " .. .your own prior expert knowledge to your case
study"(Yin 1994: 123), I contend that here too personal involvement can offer certain
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insights into the widespread perceptions that prevailed at a time when, as in an large-
scale decision-making process, perceptions are often the deciding factor.
Certainly my experience supports the view that firstly the introduction of GCSE and
later the move toward competition between 11-18 schools and 6th-form or FE colleges
substantially altered the way teachers made decisions about post-16 qualifications
providers. No longer could established connections be taken for granted. In the
absence of objective information in this instantly-created qualifications market, these
decisions were being made on the basis of hearsay. Therefore what was being said is
relevant in building a full picture of market-related pressures on the boards.
Although the examining boards had effectively operated competitively since their
inception, in practice they had tended to serve particular client groups. Having been
first created by universities to administer their own selection process, since the advent
of national School Certificates, any Board could in theory be chosen by any school. In
practice schools tended to stay with the one with which they felt at least a tenuous
connection.
With the post-war introduction of GCE examinations and the significant growth in
candidate numbers, the informal configuration of core 'clients' solidified into the
following pattern:
• the public schools continued to use the Oxford & Cambridge Joint Board
which had been set up to serve them;
• other private schools used either the Oxford Delegacy or the Cambridge
Syndicate;
• southern grammar schools used the London Board;
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• virtually all state schools north of Watford used the Joint Matriculation Board;
• Further Education colleges used the Associated Examining Board.
This pattern was unaffected by the introduction of the CSE because that qualification
was administered through regional bodies. Schools were not free to select any CSE
provider, but were restricted to that of their geographical area because of the high
degree of teacher involvement in the qualification. There was, therefore, little
significant movement from one board to another until the inception of GCSE in 1986
occasioned considerable upheaval. Then "the inertia which had tended to keep
institutions with the same exam board over the years was suddenly replaced by the
need for a clear-eyed look at what each board offered' (Sturgis 2000: 33). The new
single examination at 16+ was an unknown quantity and required each department in
each school in the country to consider all the new syllabuses and decide which would
be most appropriate for their students.
When this form of 'product differentiation' was applied to choice of examining board,
the historical balance of their respective market shares altered as the ties of some old
loyalties weakened. Although strong northern solidarity meant that the traditional
links of schools in the north generally transferred to the Northern Examining
Authority (NEA), in the rest of the country few certainties remained. The Midland
Examining Group (MEG), with access to the deep pockets of Cambridge for the
necessary resources, stole a march on the other Groups by rapidly getting its
syllabuses into schools and running training courses in the new style of examination.
This pro-active approach proved effective in winning a larger share of candidates, as
an official with that board recalled:
MEG had always punched above where it was meant to be in terms ofits weight
and its entry. And I remember quite a few conversations with my friends in the
163
north, who were really sort ofput out by the amount we had taken from them.
Nonetheless, we actually did take more market from the south, and it was
London who was weakened by MEG's strength, not the NEAB.
(OCR22003)
Although at the time such sensitive commercial information was kept very quiet,
persistent rumour suggested that both the AEB, responsible with the Oxford Board for
the Southern Examining Group (SEG), and the London Board's London and East
Anglia Group (LEAG) had suffered serious losses of candidates and hence of income.
Long after the event, a former Secretary General of AEB admitted that:
In summer 1988, the first year ofGCSE, the SEG lost one-third ofthe total entry
which the five original boards had attracted for 0 level and CSE examinations
in 1987, but the SEG was still operating in 1989 with the same number ofoffice
premises and broadly the same numbers ofstaff.
(AEB 2004)
By working hard at improving unpopular syllabuses, buying out the Oxford Board's
share of SEG and closing regional offices, the AEB managed to regain its market
share and recover gradually. Although initially bruised by its early experience of the
modem market, the AEB managed to adapt to the GCSE effect. It was the next
qualification change that would have more serious repercussions for this board.
The hard-hit London board, its location perhaps symbolic as a supplicant just outside
the gates of the University of London's Senate House, had always been kept on a
strict financial regime by the university, and with the advent of GCSE faced a more
uncertain future. Its principal client group, the grammar schools, were a vanishing
breed as comprehensive schools gradually replaced them. Regional loyalty seemed
non-existent in the capital and the home counties, and its GCSE syllabuses failed to
attract new adherents. (Sturgis 2000: 34) It was clear to the inner circle of examining
boards managers at the time that London was in crisis, as one from another board
recalls:
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London's motives were simply to find someone who could bail them out.
Financially they were in a very difficult position, and [London Board's Chief
Executive], who 1 know very well, told me at the time that if he hadn't pulled
this off, which is the one [merger] with BTEC, he was simply going to say, 'The
system just can't stand it; we've got to have the one, single awarding body. ,
Now actually 1 don't think that would have solved the problem either in that
context, but that's what he said to me.
(OCR22003)
In the highly marketised ambience of the 1990s, the London Board's still-solid
academic reputation linked to financial weakness made it an attractive target for
takeover.
As the education market began to take hold, it should be made clear that the
marketising of public services as a fundamental part of the Conservative
Government's ideology was being widely criticised. Many voices were raised to
question the efficacy of the market philosophy within the public sector generally and
specifically within education. To take just three examples: in 1992, Edwards and
Whitty reflected on the concept of parental choice and questioned "[the] optimism
about the capacity ofa 'free' educational market to guarantee a raising ofstandards
and a breaking up ofthe 'monolith' for the benefit ofall" (Edwards and Whitty 1992:
114). Others, who examined the conceptual terrain and found that market proponents
claimed "that there is general benefit from competitive self interest", concluded that
"ultimately, markets operate according to the logic ofprofit, only in certain sets of
interests and let the 'weak' go to the wall." (Kenway, Bigum 1993: 120) In a
statistician's criticism of the validity and reliability of the 'league table' comparisons
of schools which marketisation introduced, the creator of multi-level modelling
suggested that "these contributions have so much statistical uncertainty attaching to
them that it is impossible reliably to make valid comparisons between most schools"
(Goldstein 1998: 8).
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While these critiques questioned marketisation as it affected schools, there was no
corresponding voice raised to ask whether requiring examining boards to form a more
vigorously competitive market would be of benefit to their performance. Once more
the Boards were overlooked by academia. However there was certainly disquiet
within at least one board:
...1 am so out ofsympathy with the notion that examination boards compete in a
market fashion: the notion or perception that they do. There has been an
increased emphasis on this, 1 think to the detriment of the educational qualities
and characteristics of the ...boards which in my judgement ought to be part of
the educational scene, and providing the service that gives voice and public
credibility to the attainments ofstudents in schools. You could say that in some
senses competition in one form or another has always existed. But what has
happened in a very damaging way is that the emphasis on competition has come
as much from outside factors, in terms ofthe regulators, in terms ofgovernment
policy ...and boards themselves have had to look very much more to their
marketing as a means ofensuring that schools see them as the body that they've
got to put their students into. But 1 think at the end of the day the only two real
factors which will attract students are the nature of the specifications
[syllabuses] and the service which an examination board gives.
(AQA22003)
Despite such reservations about the market, the Boards duly made attempts to market
themselves more effectively. Yet theirs was certainly not a market in the true sense.
The overall number of 'clients' was fixed. There was no real price sensitivity:
" ...evidence suggests that marketing in the sense ofpricing doesn't actually influence
the choices" (AQA2 2003), possibly because the teachers who select the syllabuses
don't pay the examining fee. The 'product' was increasingly externally controlled.
The issue that arose as to which board should bear the commercial burden of running
uneconomic small entry subjects illustrates that market rules do not really apply. A
leading member of the regulatory body recalls that the "sense ofproviding a service"
won out over market considerations to resolve the matter:
A really good example of behaviour there was in the small entry languages,
where we [the regulator] actually weighed in. Do you remember, there were
nearly diplomatic incidents when Portuguese looked to be under threat? This
country's oldest ally? So, the sort ofdealing that we did then was only possible
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because people did have a sense ofproviding a service. And people shared the
pain, didn't they? There was also the recognition that ifyou wanted access to
the market, ifyou wanted to be one of these organisations that was given the
right to offer GCSE English, for example, then there was an expectation that
you offered a fuller portfolio: that you couldn't really cherry-pick. That wasn't
going to be sustainable and there'd be public opprobrium if you did that -
certainly ministerial opprobrium and doubtless regulatory opprobrium too. So I
guess it's a bit ofa mix really, ofold-style service mentality and recognition of
the realities, the market realities.
(QCA22003)
Nevertheless competition in the qualifications market was about to become more
intense.
In a clear instance of the inter-relationship of developments in this period, the
incorporation of Further Education and 6th-Form colleges was underwritten by a new
funding mechanism. Their funding, provided by a new national Further Education
Funding Council (FEFC), would be directly related to student numbers and
'successful outcomes' - which meant attaining qualifications. The consequence was
that all post-16 providers began to compete seriously for students. Once again, this
market was not a real one. The cohort of traditional A-level students tended to follow
the route their predecessors had taken, whether to a school sixth form or a college.
Thus it was the non-traditional 6th-formers who, as a form of 'floating voter', became
the prime targets for competitive recruitment. Since so many of these students were
likely to choose or more often be guided towards the new GNVQ courses, there was a
clear opportunity to promote to teachers a particular provider's version of that
qualification.
At this point, the vocational body BTEC found itself in the advantageous position of
being the 'brand of choice' for providing GNVQs (Edexcell 2000). Long successful
within further education through its Certificates, Diplomas and HNDs, BTEC was
able to acquire an instant foothold within the much wider market of sixth forms
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through the newly created GNVQ. Its solid reputation among further education
teachers as an established provider enabled BTEC to become also the favoured brand
for staff in schools who were faced with selecting a provider from among the three
vocational bodies offering the new qualification. The other two were City & Guilds
and the Royal Society of Arts (RSA). City & Guilds was well known for its
vocational qualifications but viewed with some misgivings by teachers who'd been
involved during the 1980s with its Foundation Courses and then the Certificate of Pre-
Vocational Education; its organisational infrastructure had been inadequate and there
were doubts that it would cope successfully with a new style of qualification.i The
RSA's examinations section had a strong reputation for its clerical skills certificates,
but it had no record in new GNVQ areas like Health & Social Care, or Leisure &
Tourism which most post-16 institutions intended to offer.
The result was that BTEC garnered the lion's share of entries for the GNVQ's initial
five subject areas. By 1999, when the newly-formed AQA was faced with buying out
City & Guilds' GNVQ qualifications, they learned that Edexcel [BTEC's merged
title] was providing 70% of GNVQs nationally. This success was financially very
rewarding since the entry fee per student was set at £65 and the only external
assessment BTEC provided for the fee took the form of brief multiple-choice tests,
with a one-off visit from a BTEC moderator to check final portfolios whose detailed
marking had been done by teachers. This meant that, atypically in the world of
qualifications, BTEC was in a sound financial position.
With a new Chief Executive from outside the examining board world, BTEC was
about to set in motion another feature of the commercial market: the takeover. What
had been happening gradually within the Boards since the introduction of GCSE
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could in hindsight be described as a series of takeovers and mergers. But they had
proceeded at a decorous pace and above all were instigated by the Boards without any
outside prompting. During the 1990s the pace accelerated rapidly and for those
reluctant to move there was external pressure, if not directly from a Minister, at least
very definitely from one civil servant whose diktat impressed representatives of two
different Boards:
1 can remember when [a senior DillE official], DjES - or DjEE, rather - came
into a room ... to tell us about what was going on and "There'll be three
[awarding bodies]. " It was in the basement of Sanctuary Buildings ...and he
made this statement. We'd had a meeting with him, and this was right at the
end. And [AEB's Secretary General] then went to [NEAB's Director] and said,
" ... We've got some serious talking to do!"
(OCR2 2003)
A second version of the incident was equally precise:
...1can't remember whether there was any ... whether it was ever said that there
had to be a merger of some bodies in order to create those boards, but the
writing was very much on the wall that that sort ofcoming together was needed.
And 1 do recall, and 1 even recall the date on this: the twelfth of December,
1997, sorry 1996, a meeting in the Department where [a senior DillE official]
really made it clear that the expectation would be that there would be only three
unitary awarding bodies.
(AQA22003)
The external pressure was therefore made very explicit to the Boards, and although
markets encouraged choice, in this instance there was to be no choice if a board
wanted to continue to be accredited as an English awarding body. Yet there remained
within the regulator the rather naive impression that the mergers were all voluntary on
the part of the Boards:
1 think there's some sort ofeducational logic underpinning the linkage between
general and vocational, which was part of the story anyway that led to the
creation of current unitary authorities. 1 remember - 1 think 1 might have even
coined the word 'unitary' in that context at the time - and that sort of
stimulated, on the one hand by evolutionary pressures that arose from just
review and reflection on the examining system and how well it was working but
on the other hand political pressures, with ministers having views about what
might constitute an appropriate number of awarding bodies. Then those two
things coming together in a fairly mysterious way to lead to the creation of the
unitary bodies. And that was interesting, because, ofcourse, ministers have no
power to tell the examining boards to do this. They put pressure on, they
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encouraged them, they said "Patently, we think this is a good idea. " But there -
I suppose there were implicit threats that something unpleasant might happen if
the boards didn't want to go that way. But I'm not quite sure what they might
have been because, had the boards stood their ground and said, "Actually, no,
we'd rather do it this way, I guess ...they could have done that. And it's
interesting to speculate what might have happened had they chosen to do that. I
presume, since they didn't do that they broadly agreed with the philosophy: that
a degree of rationalisation, and certainly a degree of greater coherence
between the general and the vocational was desirable. So they went along with
it - I mean, apart from all the sort of difficulties of deciding which partners
quite to work with - there didn't seem to be any objection in principle to the
idea ofthat degree ofunification.
(QCA22003)
It is particularly curious to note that this experienced member of the regulatory body
didn't recall that the "something unpleasant that might happen if the boards didn't
want to go that way" was indeed a very significant power in the hands of that very
regulator: a Board could lose its accreditation as a recognised provider of
qualifications in England. While Cambridge, with its sound international business
stream, might have been able to survive such a loss, it would have been instantly fatal
to any other awarding body. This evidence indicates that at least some in the
regulatory body were not acknowledging the degree of control they had acquired over
the Boards. Equally, the process of general or academic and vocational awarding
bodies coming together was "fairly mysterious" only in the case of Cambridge -
which has always moved in a mysterious way. The other two instances of takeover
and merger were based - from the examining boards' perspective - on simple
survival. Before moving to a detailed consideration of these moves, it is important to
note the influence on the Boards of yet another strand in the 1990s marketised
zeitgeist: the idea that the merging or unifying of disparate entities strengthened them.
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2 The Unification Principle
The desirability of unification seemed to apply whether in the case of a high-street
bank like the Midland, bought out by the Hong Kong and Shanghai International
Bank to add to its global brand HSBC or trade unions like NALGO and NUPE, which
merged to form the giant UNISON. Within "the education state", the first significant
move demonstrated a symbolic acknowledgement of the growing conviction that the
nation's economy was going to be linked increasingly with its 'human capital' in the
form of the skills level of its workforce. Early indications of this trend dated from the
mid-1980s when the Manpower Services Commission section of the Department of
Employment had devised - and funded - experiential learning schemes like the
Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI) described above. The merger of
the Departments of Education and Employment (DfEE) in 1995 was concrete
recognition of the perceived inter-connection of these two agencies.
An interpretation of the pressures for unification based on purely educational factors
suggested that:
The unification process in England can be seen ...as an evolving reaction to a
range ofpressures - problems ofmaintaining standards and creating parity of
esteem in a divided qualifications system [such as the] effects of the
marketisation of awarding bodies .... It can be argued therefore that pressures
to regulate and co-ordinate a divided and voluntarist system set in motion a
rolling and evolving process starting with the merged DjEE, the formation of
QCA and then the rationalisation ofawarding bodies.
(Spours 1998: 13)
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Unifying Departments
Certainly a first move in the unification process affecting the world of education was
the merger in 1995 of the 30-year-old Department of Education and Science (DES)
with the huge Department of Employment to form the Department for Education and
Employment (DfEE), an enormous ministry which was based in Sanctuary Buildings
in Great Smith Street, from which it overflowed to many subsidiary offices. The
significance of the merger was made clear by David Blunket, Secretary of State for
this new behemoth, in a speech to the Institute of Economic Affairs on 24 January
2001:
The unique importance ofDfEE 's role stems from its responsibility for ensuring
that the UK has a well-functioning labour market. It is here that we are
clarifying the economic relationship between the citizen and the government - a
relationship of rights and responsibility, with the goal of ensuring both
economic efficiency and fairness for all.
Since the amalgamation of the Department for Education with the Employment
Department there has been a much clearer national and international
understanding of the synergy between education and employment policies,
which is so vital to the global competitiveness ofthe British economy.
(Blunkett 2001: 2-3)
By clearly placing education as an element in the labour market, Blunkett indicated
both what might in his terms be described as a 'synergy' between his government's
view of education and that of his right-wing audience and the department's
responsibility for justifying educational investment according to its "social rate of
return"(Blunkett 2001: 8). This expression of the ideology of the "managerial state"
shows how the concept of the link between education and the economy had moved on
since Callaghan's Ruskin speech in 1976. It offers a rationale for the interventionist
policies which were being implemented across the public sector, and makes the case
for joining previously disparate departments. When after the general election later in
2001 this synergy was deemed no longer to be effective and the two departments were
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separated into the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) and the Department
for Work and Pensions (DWP), David Blunkett was not called on to explain the
change. He had been appointed Home Secretary and replaced at the DfES by Estelle
Morris. The department's new title signified that its remit went beyond educational
institutions to include the skills level of the wider population. But changing its partner
did not signify a reduction in its powers: rather the reverse would be seen to be the
case during the crisis of September 2002.
With this great expansion of the department, the status and influence of the Minister
had greatly increased. Added to the major increase in named ministerial powers
accorded by the 1988 Education Reform Act, the effect of the merger was to add
weight to the habitual claim of civil servants when challenged by the Boards over a
particular issue. The view of several interviewees was summed up by an OCR
official: "<It's with the Minister' means it's civil servants" (OCR2 2003). Now the
Minister's increased power, or that of his civil servants, made the success of any
challenge by the examining boards very unlikely. For this study, in addition to
underlining increasing central power, the significance of these changes was to indicate
that unification had moved into education, where it was to have an unprecedented
impact on the examining boards.
Unifying Regulatory Bodies
The series of changes to the bodies which have regulated the examinations system is
illustrated in Figure 4.2. A principal exponent of the virtues of unifying agencies was
Sir Ron Dearing. However his motives were based not on market principles but on his
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deep-rooted conviction that, as he recalled in a recent interview, "the idea ofbuilding
the credibility of work-based learning and increasing the flexibility of the academic
side was worth pursuing" (Dearing 2003).
Dearing had first-hand experience of the unifying of regulatory agencies when in
1994, to general approval, the National Curriculum Council (NCC) and the Secondary
Examinations and Assessment Council (SEAC) merged to form the Schools
Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA), with Ron Dearing in the chair. Since
their creation in 1989, rumours had proliferated of tensions and rivalries between the
NCC in its pleasant canal-side offices in York and the SEAC, which existed in more
of a rabbit warren in Notting Hill Gate. Whether or net there was any substance to
such rumours, the stated objective in merging them was the logical one of seeking
coherence between the bodies regulating both the curriculum's structure and the
means of assessing pupils. In this merger too the examining boards experienced a shift
in the balance of power: the unification of the curriculum and assessment bodies lent
greater weight to judgements emerging from SCAA.
Another continuing concern was ensurmg the validity of the new vocational
qualification, the GNVQ. As Chair of SCAA, Ron Dearing had an ex officio seat on
the body that had been established to regulate vocational qualifications, an
arrangement which made him "familiar with both sides of the equation" (Dearing
2003). The equation in question involved the new qualification that NCVQ had
designed. The regulatory arrangement for the General National Vocational
Qualification (GNVQ) paralleled that between SCAA and the examining boards. The
three vocational bodies BTEC, City & Guilds and RSA had developed the new
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qualification, submitting each stage of their proposals to the NCVQ, who "laid down
preconditions for approval" (Wolf 2002a: 218).
Despite the success of GNVQ courses in attracting students in school 6th forms and
and both 6th_form and FE colleges, widespread criticisms of the assessment process
were a major factor leading to the Government's request that Sir Ron Dearing
investigate and report on post-16 qualifications. It was nat surprising that one of his
1996 Report's recommendations was that the academic and vocational regulatory
bodies - SCAA and NCVQ - should unite. Dearing's place on the vocational body's
Council had enabled the development of an "interesting dynamic" with John Capey,
Figure 4-2 Changes to the Regulator
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who chaired NCVQ. A QCA official who had been closely involved in drafting the
Capey Report observed that:
Dearing always had a word with Capey after every meeting to find out where
we were going, and it was interesting that some of the very - ifyou read the
Capey Report - [suggestions were] deeply tentative about what was needed. But
kind ofa month later in the Dearing [Report} it was set in stone ....
(QCA32004)
What Dearing set in stone was based on his profound hope that the ever-elusive
'parity of esteem' between academic and vocational qualifications would develop
from a unified regulatory body and what were described as 'unitary awarding bodies'.
Dearing was convinced that a 'three-track' qualifications system - academic, general
vocational and specific vocational - was the way forward for England. From his
informed perspective, but even more from his personal philosophical conviction, he
believed that the way to build public confidence in the new GNVQ and NVQ
qualifications would be for the regulation and assessment for the whole range of
qualifications to reside with single organisations which would erase the "binary line,
as a frontier that largely divides the awarding and regulatory bodies, [and]
symbolises and enshrines the way we categorise achievement" (Dearing 1996: 29).
Dearing wanted to transfer to the new qualifications the examining boards'
established expertise. An assessment expert explained the effect he was seeking:
... the 'track record' ofawarders creates something akin to what art historians
call provenance, which is ofcrucial importance in establishing the credibility of
the awards. Awarding bodies understand this very well, which is why they often
appear cautious with new developments. Any new system of awards will be
treated very suspiciously by users until their awards have similar provenance.
(Wiliam 1996: 304)
To oversee the arrangement he was proposmg, Sir Ron recommended the
amalgamation of the academic and vocational regulators - SCAA and NCVQ. The
unification of the two agencies took place in 1997, when the Qualifications and
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Curriculum Authority (QCA) subsumed SCAA and NCVQ and set up new offices in
Piccadilly. But this time, there was an additional factor that went beyond all previous
moves toward unification. An examining board manager was all too aware of the
important change in the status of the unified regulator:
The fundamental change in regulation was the statutory regulation that came
with QCA. Because nothing was statutory before that. And the fact that you've
got statutory regulation means that you're backed up by a law which means
they could step in, they could come and see our books, for no...very strong
reasons, really. There's only one other organisation that can walk in and look
at your books and that is Customs & Excise. But they can. The Secretary of
State can just say, "Go and see their books." I think that changed the
relationship quite significantly.
(OCR22003)
QCA was described as "in many ways a classic late-twentieth century quango -
officially independent of its parent department, but in practice highly dependent on
the ministry that created and pays for it" (Wolf 2002b: 216). Dearing indicated in his
Report that he was aware of some potential pitfalls in his recommendations. He
spelled out possible "disadvantages ofafull merger" [ofNCVQ and SCAA]:
• The concentration ofpower and influence in one body, in an area ofkey
national importance.
• A risk that the strength ofthe systems developed over the decades for the
academic awards, and the standing they have with the universities, could lead
to these approaches superseding those valued by industry.
• A very demanding role for the chairman/woman and members ofthe
Authority.
• The risk that to cover all interests adequately, the membership ofthe
controlling body could become large and cumbersome, with an associated loss
ofeffectiveness.
(Dearing 1996: 32)
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Looking back after nine years, he acknowledged ruefully that, "Well, I recall that
there is one page in the Report - I can't tell you which one, but it's there ifyou read it
- where I predicted most of the things that might happen and subsequently have"
(Dearing 2003).
Because he produced his reports during an active retirement, it is unsurprising that he
had not foreseen another potential problem that might result from the changes he was
recommending. However, younger policy makers should perhaps been aware that
changing organisations was not a simple matter. As an outcome of the 1980s takeover
frenzy and the 1990s fondness for 'downsizing' organisations, the subject of 'the
management of change' had become something of a growth industry in management
literature. For example, in August 2003, a search of the Institute of Education library
catalogue using the key words 'management of change' produced 295 records. Yet
while in each instance of merger detailed above there was a certain logic in the minds
of policy makers, none of their plans seemed to indicate any awareness of the
potential hazards of organisational change. This was a surprising oversight at a time
when the writings of both serious academics like Michael Eraut (Eraut 1985) and
management gurus like Charles Handy (Handy 1995) had made something of a cliche
of the idea that if it were to succeed, change required careful management. Both
academic research and organisational experience confirmed that if change were to
bring hoped-for improvements, it must be planned with care and each stage
introduced with the support of the staff who would implement any new system. Yet
these major changes were imposed with no apparent expectation that they would have
any repercussions on the organisations involved. One person directly involved in one
of these restructurings - he was Director of Research at NCVQ and about to move
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from the Euston road to QCA in Piccadilly - expressed some reservations about all
these mergers and reflected on the possible effects:
These are not simple transformations. These organizations have different
cultures and curriculum principles: it is in this process of transformation of
apparatus that particular views about assessment and learning, coherence and
diversity will be in strong competition. In matters of assessment the details
count. The details will emerge from the mergers, the discussions on the
characteristics of AlAS, GNVQs and NVQs and the outcomes ofpilots of new
approaches. That is why precise predictions are extremely hard to make. One
new form of consensus is arising in the discussions on assessment across the
system and that is that three factors are dominant: rigour, cost and
manageability. One feature shines through - increased central control through
qualifications.
(Oates 1997: 146)
However, Ron Dearing was intent upon the need "to make explicit the equal standing
of academic, applied and vocational qualifications ...." (Dearing 1996: 12). His
background as a successful non-academic who had made his reputation within the
Post Office lent credibility to his commitment to abolishing the 'binary line' that had
always divided the academic from the vocational. He recalled the rationale for his
recommendations clearly when interviewed:
I believed there would be substantial benefits from the bringing together of the
long experience that SCAA represented with the new approaches NCVQ had
introduced such as departing from written assessment as the only reliable
measure. There is a need for people to be able to talk about how to do things -
both in the workplace and in fact anywhere.
(Dearing 2003)
His recommendation of the merging of the regulatory bodies - SCAA and NCVQ -
was tested, as had now become standard practice, through quick soundings taken by
means of a DfEE consultation entitled Building the Framework. The merger took
place in 1997. However, as seems usually the case when organisations merge, the
entity that emerged in new premises at 83 Piccadilly was not simply a sum of its
constituent parts. The new body, the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA),
was perceived by many observers to be dominated by officials from SCAA. This view
180
was confirmed in a subsequent interview by one who was directly involved in the
merger:
...The merger, when NCVQ joined SCAA to become QCA, was seen in terms
offairly hostile power struggles, and who's winning out And I think it was
quite clear that in that sense the power had gone to the SCAA traditional exams
section. And, again, those who moved over I think felt very much [that] they
were second class, just like vocational qualifications - in pay scales and this,
that and the other ....But all that was indicative ofthis feeling that nobody really
cared about occupational and vocational qualifications. That wasn't where the
action was. It was to do with national curriculum stuff and conventional,
general examinations. So an interesting struggle there ...with quite a few NVQ
[staff] moving off, retiring and that kind ofthing.
(QCA22004)
Ecclestone, in her interviews regarding the policy debates around GNVQ assessment,
found a similarly dominant academic bias, not only within the regulator but more
widely:
An academic tradition, deriving from 'cultural restorationist ' ideas about norm-
referenced 'standards' rooted in subject knowledge, was represented by civil
servants in the ex-DES and DjE, ministers, ex-SCAA officials and OFSTED
inspectors. These constituencies were much more influential inside policy than
the 'vocational modernisers' and 'liberal humanists' represented by civil
servants in the ex-ED, officials in NCVQ, FEU and the awarding bodies, and
the FEFC inspectorate.
(Ecclestone 2002: 173)
Evidence of the balance of power was provided by subsequent changes to GNVQs.
QCA required adaptations to the assessment system to reflect more traditional
approaches. " ...external assessment, now termed 'independent' assessment, would be
seen as a prime instrument of accountability" (Spours 1998: 12). It seemed that the
very innovations that NCVQ had inspired to shape a new qualification suited to
different learning styles in the post-16 population had lost out as a result of the
powerful reliance on the A-level model as the 'gold standard'. Many teachers felt that
rather than bridging the academic/vocational divide, the effect was that GNVQs were
being moved across that divide to replicate the academic model of assessment.
(BusinessStudies 2002) Others concerned over the weaknesses in GNVQ assessment
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felt that it made sense to bestow on the new GNVQs the reliability conferred by the
examining boards' long history of A-level examining. The major differences in
assessing practical as opposed to theoretical performance were not considered
problematic - except by those directly concerned. The Chief Executive of City and
Guilds had expressed his own continuing reservations about 'gap bridging':
J have real problems relating to the attitude of the academic awarding bodies
towards vocational training and accreditation of training, and J think it's
endemic in the country - the attitudes towards craft versus academic skills.
There are some very strong prevailing ...social snobberies associated with 'it's
better to have been to university than it is to be a plumber. '
...J think it is probably far more appropriate to leave the accreditation of
vocational training to those organisations who understand it such as City and
Guilds ...and to leave the [assessment of] academic or full-time education to
those people who understand that.
(City & Guilds 2000)
This view was not shared by everyone. Many - who later expressed their concerns
during the Guaranteeing Standards consultation in 1997 - were disappointed that the
Dearing Report did not address the problem of the many workplace qualification
providers. In connection with NVQs, Dearing had mildly suggested that "Government
departments should consider ways of encouraging a reduction in the number of
awarding bodies (currently over 100) awarding NVQs". There was no such diffidence
in the section of his report devoted to "The regulatory and awarding bodies" (Dearing
1996: 28).
Unifying 'Awarding Bodies': Takeovers, Mergers and 'one-stop shops'
Dearing was very clear that bringing together the examining boards and the vocational
bodies administering GNVQ could both "unify the present binary structure" and
through reducing "the excessive proliferation ofawards" ensure "parity ofstandards
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across the whole field' (Dearing 1996: 29). Of the 35 paragraphs in that section of his
report, only five were concerned specifically with "The awarding bodies in England,
Wales and Northern Ireland". However the points he made in relation to the English
providers of GCSE, A levels and the GNVQ lacked any ambiguity:
The objective should be to reduce the total number ofbodies making awards.
Except through joint awarding arrangements, no GCSE or A level awarding
body should be authorised to award the GNVQ, and none of the three bodies
awarding the GNVQ should be authorised to offer A level awards, or to extend
the present provision of GCSEs, except in partnership with a body already
authorised to make those awards.
(Dearing 1996: 30)
Before considering the movement among the Boards precipitated by the above
recommendation, it is important to note a significant change in language that was
formalised in the Dearing Report. Although the principles of discourse analysis are
primarily useful for "attempting to bring certain methods to bear on qualitative data
so as to produce rigour in presenting evidence" (Cameron 2003), one can use the
associated skills to reflect on the implications of the introduction of the term 'unitary
awarding bodies' .
The Dearing Report stressed 'unitary' as the important concept: if vocational and
academic awards had the same provenance, it was hoped that they would be deemed
of comparable reliability. The change from 'examining boards' to 'awarding bodies'
has, so far as one can tell, escaped comment. Yet this shift in terminology suggests a
shift in function. No longer are they 'boards' with overtones of an elite selecting or
rejecting applicants; they become the more neutral 'bodies'. Even more telling is
replacing 'examining' - a process involving passing or failing - with 'awarding'. No
negative outcome stems from an award. This linguistic means of changing the role of
these organisations sent a subtle message about their changed status. Yet it was
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apparently too subtle for the public at large to absorb, as was seen in the
misunderstandings inherent in the debate over standards, to be considered below.
The examining boards had not simply stood still while the unification movement was
gathering momentum around them. However, the Dearing Report's recommendations
had suggested that "the process ofawarding bodies coming together across the binary
line should be encouraged by the Government" (Dearing 1996: 30), and this
suggestion was quickly acted upon. Dearing's clear message led Gillian Shephard, the
Secretary of State for Education, to launch in February 1997 a consultation to collect
views about the appropriate future shape of awarding bodies. Naturally, civil servants
at the DfEE designed this consultation paper: Guaranteeing Standards. With its title
indicating clearly the stated objective, the language of this 'consultation' was
reminiscent of the Latin structure of 'questions expecting the answer yes'. Core
questions began, "Do you agree ... ?" It proposed a reduction in the number of unitary
awarding bodies which would offer a reduced number of academic syllabuses
together with GNVQ qualifications. It was perhaps unsurprising that many did agree.
Despite the attachment of teachers in England to their right to choose from a range of
syllabuses and different Boards, widespread concerns about comparability of
standards weighed more heavily in the end with their representative bodies' responses
to the consultation. The education world's response to Guaranteeing Standards
showed support for unitary awarding bodies which would deliver a reduced number of
both academic and GNVQ qualifications. The only major objection came from those
who had hoped for a more radical unification. Many, from the Confederation of
British Industry (CBI 1997) to the newly-formed and ambitious Edexcel awarding
body (Edexcel 1997), were disappointed that there was to be no attempt to bring the
fully vocational NVQ qualifications under the same umbrella as A levels and
184
GNVQs. Once again the longstanding tradition of regarding work-based qualifications
as outside the province of education had prevailed. Disappointment with this stance
was articulated strongly by the one-time Chief Executive of RSA Examinations:
I would be a strong supporter ofeliminating artificial barriers between types of
qualifications. But they may even have created a still starker barrier because it
was only about GNVQs. NVQs and other vocational qualifications were
explicitly excluded from the proposals. It ...led to something that I personally
deplore, and that's a stark divide between school qualifications and
qualifications for post-compulsory [sicJ rather than a system that would allow
credits and so on, but that was prevented.
(OCR 1 2000)
Once again the English tradition of regarding work-based qualifications as outside the
province of education had prevailed. Instead, like the Dearing Report in reference to
NVQs, the document made rather vague exhortations to "rationalise.: the sectoral
training" and other improvements which "are likely to be carried forward with the
creation ofthe QCA" (DillE 1997a).
This reservation apart, it seemed clear that mergmg the awarding bodies was
generally seen as a positive step. The awarding bodies themselves, in a united
response from 'The Joint Forum for the GCSE and GCE' and the' Joint Council of
National Vocational Awarding Bodies', broadly accepted the Dearing vision and the
concept of a national qualifications framework, but sounded a warning note.
Observing that although the consultation paper suggested the benefits of reducing the
number of Boards, it overlooked other outcomes that might be less positive:
An imposed reduction in the number ofboards:
is no guarantee ofimproved standards;
will reduce the possibilities for, or prevent, a dissatisfied centre from seeking
better service elsewhere;
is likely to be at the expense of the guiding principles [ownership,
responsiveness, innovation, motivation, continuityJ set out above;
could create new and unwelcome barriers between GCSE, A levels, GNVQs and
vocational qualifications such as NVQs;
will be costly and time consuming;
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runs a high risk of disrupting the examination system at a time when major
changes to A, AS and GNVQ courses are being introduced.
(Tattersall and Townsend 1997)
Their views were perhaps dismissed as predictable objections. With hindsight, one
might suggest that had more effort been made to accommodate these points,
particularly the last, later problems might have been avoided.
Despite the intervening election of May 1997 in which a Labour Government ended
18 years of Conservative control - in June the results of the consultation were
published under the name of the new Junior Minister, Baroness Blackstone. The
impulse for increased central control crossed party lines - or perhaps originated from
the civil servants within the DfliE. The outcome meant that examining boards had to
offer both academic and GNVQ qualifications if they were to continue to be
accredited as English qualifications providers.
In the space of 13 years, the examining boards had worked with SEC, SEAC, SCAA
and QCA as the education department mutated from the DES to the DillE to the
DillS. With each change the central control tightened and the Boards were
expenencmg - but not openly acknowledging - a change from autonomy to
dependency. They were perhaps preoccupied by the changes they were undergoing
within their own organisational structures. In two of the three eventual organisations,
the process of unification was underway before Guaranteeing Standards made it
obligatory. In each of the three cases the motivation and process was very particular:
there was no typical pattern.
BTEC takes over the London Board
The decade's first overt move towards unification among the exammmg boards
resulted from the recognition of potential mutual benefit. It was initiated by two
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individuals who had not been inhibited by the usual long service of most of those
working in the examining world. A new Chief Executive had moved to the London
Board - after a career as a secondary head teacher, then a local authority
administrator. As the 1990s opened, he was considering retirement and was motivated
by a desire to avoid being responsible for the demise of the University of London
Examining and Assessment Consortium (ULEAC), as the London GCE Board and its
GCSE arm the London and East Anglia Group (LEAG) were now known, because of
its dire financial circumstances. By happy chance, BTEC's new Chief Executive was
simultaneously looking for a means of expanding into the schools sector:
[The London CEO] really initiated discussions, as he realised London was the
smallest board after GCSE, and was looking for a partner. The two of us had
some initial talks, and then...it was more to do with who bought who. So we
bought them out, in effect. And buying out was not a sum of money, but an
agreement to continue to rent the building, to be supportive, but to make sure
there was enough blue water between ourselves and the University.
(Edexcel3 2004)
The other Boards were perhaps slow to recognise the significance of the creation of
the new body Edexcel, described in significantly commercial terms as a 'one-stop
shop' where schools could find either academic or vocational qualifications. When the
new body was announced at their annual Joint Council Conference in Norwich in
September 1995, the general view of the other Boards was that it was a predictable
move given the desperation of the London Board and the ambition ofBTEC. They did
not at that point see it as a form of handwriting on the wall for themselves.
The new organisation "needed to make a profit because we needed to invest"
(Edexcel1 2000) - not least because their building in Russell Square needed major
upgrading after years of under-investment by the University of London.
London University did not run London Exams with its own finance director or
its own HR director, and it used the University ofLondon backup facilities ....
We picked up London Exams, which had not been invested in for many years,
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and that meant putting PCs on people's desks, it meant cabling this building -
so, so far it's been costs.
(Edexce11 2000)
To the managers of the other examining boards, steeped in their established culture,
this seemed less the style of an educationist than that of a commercial company
manager. The new organisation's Chief Executive expressed "strong support for
competition" with a regulator not like the existing educationally-based Schools
Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) but "looking to models from the
privatised utilities" (Spours 1997a). This was a clear challenge to the other
qualification providers. Marketised competition had truly entered what had been a
quiet commercial backwater.
Although opting voluntarily for unification, the newly merged BTEC did not accede
to the expectations of either NCVQ or Lord Dearing and quietly phase out its BTEC
qualifications in favour of the new GNVQ. Just as in the 1980s when NVQs were
created, it had "resisted angrily and young people continued to register for BTEC
awards in preference to NVQs" (Wolf 2002a: 220), Edexcel retained its successful
suite of BTEC qualifications and engaged in " ...a squabble with ...the old NCVQ who
very much opposed the fact that we wanted to keep our BTECs. But we fought for the
BTEC. It was a good alternative" (Edexcel3 2004).
Despite retaining its BTECs and its dominance of the GNVQ sector, of which it had
captured about 75% of candidates, Edexcel couldn't manage to increase its share of
the mainstream A-level and GCSE market. This left it financially fragile and therefore
vulnerable to another takeover, which occurred following the problems it faced in
2002.
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The Cambridge 'Brand': A global fish that swallows minnows
In another part of the examining world, a very different series of take-overs had been
quietly taking place which were based not on competition but on control. The
University of Cambridge had never in its long history yielded control over any of its
constituent parts to any other body, and it was not about to begin with the minor
matter of its examining 'business stream'.
The data in this section comes almost entirely from the interview I conducted with a
representative of what is now the OCR awarding body. While one would normally
research a variety of sources to achieve a balanced account, in the case of the
University of Cambridge this is not really an option. The complex and secretive
nature of its internal structures makes it virtually impossible for a researcher to gain
access to the decision-making processes that lie behind its operations. Therefore, I
found it both unexpected and illuminating when in the course of an interview the
subject broached of his own accord the series of takeovers Cambridge's examining
arm - known since its Victorian birth as the University of Cambridge Local
Examinations Syndicate (UCLES)9 - has pursued in recent years.
When asked for his perspective on the examining boards in the 1990s, he felt that he
could better locate his recollections:
...a bit earlier than that. I first came to UCLES in 1985 .... At that time there
were 22 exam boards ...and we were in the burgeoning Midland Exam Group,
and there were five of us: Southern Universities Joint Board (Bristol and
Southampton I think), Oxford & Cambridge [Joint Board], Cambridge, West
Midlands and East Midlands [CSE Boards]. Interesting Group, determined by
the Government. Cambridge was already talking to SUJB and ...within three or
four years ...had absorbed SUJB. That was painless. Utterly and completely
painless. Not much of the SUJB to absorb, in truth: offices in Bristol - both
very classical examination boards, looked the same. SUJB was losing money,
the universities of the south didn't want to carryon. So that was simple.
Relatively.
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(OCR22003)
This explanation of the hitherto mysterious disappearance of the Southern
Universities GCE Board is included to establish Cambridge's modus operandi in the
matter of takeovers: a process described as 'absorbing' and one that proceeds slowly,
away from media headlines. This minor episode in examining board history has not,
to the best of my knowledge, been chronicled elsewhere simply because of the
university's consistent silence on its operations.
This slow but inexorable process of Cambridge-style expansion continued for the next
ten years, with only the final one - the creation of OCR - occasioning any significant
publicity. Another feature of the Cambridge approach was that, unlike most such
operations, finance was never a major consideration. This was clear from the
interviewee's recollection of the creation of the GCSE Midland Examining Group:
The Midland Examining Group was interesting then [following the absorption
of SUJB]. It was left with/our: two GCE boards and two CSE boards. The two
CSE boards, West Midlands and East Midlands, were the soundest financially
ofall the CSE boards - north, south or middle. Both of them remained sound
right through to being absorbed. So there was no financial worry about MEG in
that context. In terms ofGCE boards, Cambridge was as sound as anything can
be. Oxford & Cambridge was ...not really. But we weren't aware of that at the
time in the late 80s as we came into MEG.
(OCR2 2003)
It seemed that this successful federation of four Boards felt that, as the other GCSE
Groups gradually formed single organisations, "MEG's federation was standing out a
bit." Then began another series of discussions "all around the shop" between
Cambridge and the West Midlands Board. They eventually came to an agreement that
West Midlands would sell its GCSE interest to Cambridge. Within twelve months the
East Midlands decided to merge with (ie, be absorbed by) UCLES. By 1993, the
remaining anomaly was "the Oxford & Cambridge Board's end of the GCSE'. How
to tidy up this anomaly:
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...became a University discussion ...and there was agreement that that should be
taken on by UCLES as well. So effectively in 1993 MEG became a single
organisation as part of UCLES...[with a] Chief Executive not in the sense that
you had total independence, because you shared an awful lot with
UCLES....UCLES has always been the parent.
(OCR22003)
Being the parent in this sense means having ultimate control, including financial
responsibility. This consistent policy of retaining control suggests a potential for
conflict with the parallel and equally strong tendency for central control over the
examining boards. This conflict was to come to a head with the A-level crisis of
September 2002, discussed in the next chapter.
Meanwhile, the various changes within the UCLES structure involved the need for "a
culture shift for quite a few people". MEG continued to flourish and "internally it
wasn't fighting too many battles. Much more ofthe battles [sic] were fought over the
A level". This was unsurprising when the complex moves taking place are described:
We had the Cambridge Board [and] independently the Oxford & Cambridge
Board. In GCSE terms, Oxford Delegacy ofcourse was in joint venture with the
AEB. But there was the Oxford Board for A level, and the University ofOxford
had decided that they didn't really want to be in this much longer. So therefore
it had only one organisation it was determined to talk to, and that was the
University ofCambridge. So the two universities decided to sort out their exam
boards. I expect you know that the Oxford & Cambridge Board has never been
a single board. Not throughout all its history. It was two autonomous bits. The
Cambridge end ofOxford & Cambridge was just another syndicate [committee]
at the University of Cambridge, set up specifically in conjunction with a
delegacy set up in Oxford which was just another delegacy [committeeJ of the
University of Oxford, for a particular group of schools: the independent
schools. Quite different in purpose to both the Oxford Delegacy and the
Cambridge Syndicate. Completely autonomous except for a board - literally a
board ofpeople - who sat on top ofthem And this board came to an agreement
to allocate subjects to their independent entities. So actually, when we came to
the A level, we really hadfour bodies.
(OCR22003)
This exquisitely intricate arrangement - derived from the enduring principle of the
need to ensure separate examination provision for the private sector by the two
ancient universities neither of which would yield control to the other - seems
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medieval in its complexity. It is unsurprising that none of this was understood in the
wider world. It is also unsurprising that forging a single body from these four separate
entities:
...was a much more contentious internal issue. These two universities,
Cambridge and Oxford, as you will almost certainly know are very proud. And
they're not really single entities. No, they're groups. And they were very proud
of their patches. So there were a considerable number of people in various
places in Oxford in particular who didn't actually want to do this. But
nonetheless the universities did do it. So then we had, in 1996, the first exams -
the deal was signed in 1995 - all the A level coming into the University of
Cambridge Examinations Syndicate. That was a culture shift, that was. We
therefore had, as we have now, the Southern Universities Exam Board, the two
ends of the Oxford & Cambridge Exam Board, the Oxford Delegacy, the West
Midlands and East Midlands ...and Cambridge itself: six if not seven pieces
wrapped into one.
(OCR2 2003)
When asked about how the A-level board Oxford & Cambridge Examinations and
Assessment (OCEAC), which had appeared in the mid-1990s, fitted into the overall
structure, the interviewee's the explanation was brisk:
Well, OCEAC - I missed OCEAC, yes. Well the OCEAC was a little sort of
diversion in a sense because we had to do something with the Oxford end of
Oxford & Cambridge, Cambridge end ofOxford & Cambridge and Cambridge
at the time, so we created OCEAC but of course OCR came along very soon
afterwards so OCEAC only survivedfor about three years, if that. [It was a very
short-term thing ...} Very short term thing, yes ....
(OCR2 2003)
Despite the outward appearance of a single entity, the established Cambridge method
of moving slowly when absorbing bodies was again followed, with the result that "the
first really common [OCR] A level exam was 2002". No reference was made in the
interview to any possible effect of this as a factor in the problems of September of that
same year; however it must be borne in mind when considering those events in a later
section.
Certainly, with all of these internal changes grinding along, the decision to form OCR
by buying out the GNVQ provision of the RSA's Examinations Section was a
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relatively simple one. However, incorporating yet another change seemed the
precipitating factor in a transformation of UCLES' overall structure. An
exceptionally long excerpt from the interview explains what might be termed the
modernising of the venerable UCLES organisation:
Come 1998 and the formation of OCR, UCLES itself was transforming itself
(and it's still doing that, but let's leave that for now). UCLES has a very big
EFL [English as a Foreign Language] business - it's the second largest
awarding body in the world in English for speakers of other language, and it
has a large international ,.: So we had seriously to think about how we
organised ourselves. So we then, as UCLES, decided that we would transform
ourselves into business streams. One of those business streams was OCR. And
the other business streams are Cambridge International Exams [GCSEs and A
levels] and English for Speakers of Other Languages. We have a corporate
organisation which is shared and is run by the group's Chief Executive. So
we've got corporate 1M [Internal Management] which is particularly important
in corporate finance, and we [OCR] are becoming more and more now an
UCLES organisation.
We are the largest awarding body - as UCLES - in the UK. But that isn't really
visible to many people. One ofthe successful things that 1 think we managed to
do internally ...is to transform particularly the RSA into an OCR brand. The
OCR did take on a name and has become known within the UK. Outside the
UK, nobody had the foggiest idea of what it is ...because Cambridge is
the ...brand.
So ...there were quite a few internal stresses that were nothing to do with the
external picture at all which had an impact on the organisation and in some
cases more ofan impact that anything that's happened outside. I think UCLES
is still very strong. Well, 1 know it's very strong. It's had a very strong bottom
line this year. We are supported quite a lot by how successful ESOL is. One of
the gains that OCR gets is being part of UCLES OCR is the only awarding
body at the moment, as 1 understand it, over the last two years that has
actually ...not only breaks even, but actually has kept its head above water, as 1
look at the accounts ofall the awarding bodies.
(OCR2 2003)
This extensive quotation has been included as evidence of two important factors. The
first indicates that Cambridge will always ensure that it controls any body with which
it becomes involved. The second is that its global brand in the flourishing ESOL
market means that it is not subject to the financial pressures that affect the other two
English awarding bodies. This basic position explains the lukewarm Cambridge
response to the changes in the structure of 14-19 qualifications recommended by the
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Tomlinson Committee in autumn 2004, discussed in the final chapter. For the
'Cambridge Brand', its international A levels were more important than OCR's share
of the English market.
The interviewee's response to my questions as to external pressures on the board
during the 1990s reinforced these themes, and indicated that:
The biggest external pressure was, ofcourse, when OCR was formed. We were
not [saying], "Oh Government wants three awarding bodies, what do we do
now?" We'd been working with them [RSA] for some time. So when ...in '97
there was this notion that there has to be three built on the GNVQ for us just
then to say to RSA, "Well, we'd better sort of find some way of working
together. " And we actually thought that it was going to be a joint venture. But
the RSA ...came along and said, "Well, don't know about that. What about
actually creating a single institution?" And the University of Cambridge of
course has got only one answer to that: the University ofCambridge is the only
owner when it comes to it. And the RSA itself [ie the ongoing Royal Society of
Arts] were happy to accept that. They got a generous deal ...out ofit.
[Although] it was a logical outcome, it [creating OCR] happened much faster
than it would otherwise have done, I'm sure of that, because of the
Government's ... Guaranteeing Standards.
(OCR2 2003)
This rather rosy version was not altogether the way it appeared from the RSA
perspective. Because Dearing had excluded NVQs from the one-stop shops,
discussions about unification involved only GNVQs for RSA Examinations, a definite
disappointment for that body, as an official explained:
That ...was very damaging in terms of the discussions, negotiations and
relationships that went on because it shifted the power. Because after all, [if]
you've got two organisations that are thinking about merging in some way or
other, one ofthe factors that's going to determine who dominates ... is to do with
power, it's to do with money. What's the volume ofthe turnover? Well the value
ofGNVQ ...was trivial,' whereas ifyou then said to an organisation like RSA, as
it was, "But actually, no, we're not talking about the £2 million from GNVQ but
we're talking about the £22 million from all ofthe qualifications ... it would have
significantly shifted the balance.
(OCR12000)
It seemed that circumstances had agam favoured Cambridge in the negotiations
preceding the creation of OCR. In considering the whole senes of takeovers or
absorptions that Cambridge negotiated, it appears that they were in a sense
endogenous and barely connected with the 1990s mergers culture - although the
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pressure from Guaranteeing Standards admittedly speeded up what Cambridge was
already planning.
In concluding his recollection of this period, the interviewee added a sort of
postscript:
You may know that subsequent to that there was an attempt at what I call "The
Grand Merger"...which was everything except Edexcel. Including City &
Guilds. But it didn't come off. It was never going to come offbecause ofcourse
the University ofCambridge was never going to merge itself into anything.
(OCR2 2003)
This statement might serve as a warning to the body in New Zealand that has recently
embarked with UCLES on creating a new university entrance selection test, to be
considered in the concluding chapter.
AEB and NEAB: The North/South divide eventually bridged by AQA
The birth of the third unitary awarding body followed a longer gestation than the other
two. It differed too in that it resulted entirely from governmental pressure. In the mid-
1990s neither the Associated Examining Board (AEB) nor the Northern Examinations
and Assessment Board (NEAB) was interested in altering what were established and
successful organisations. However, following a strong nudge from the DfEE official
in December 1996, referred to in the two interviews above, both Boards felt they had
no choice but to seek a partner who could provide the GNVQs without which they
could not continue to be accredited.
There has been subsequent speculation that they might have had other choices, which
suggests that officials at QCA were unaware of the clear instruction from the
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Department for Education and Employment. A QCA official expressed the view that
the Boards did have other options:
[The creation of current unitary authorities was] sort of stimulated on the one
hand by evolutionary pressures that arose from just review and reflection on the
examining system and how well it was working, but on the other hand [by]
political pressures, with ministers having views about what might constitute an
appropriate number ofawarding bodies. Then those two things coming together
in a fairly mysterious way to lead to the creation ofthe unitary bodies. And that
was interesting, because ofcourse ministers have no power to tell the examining
boards to do this. They put pressure on, they encouraged them, they said,
"Patently, we think this is a good idea. " I suppose there were implicit threats
that something unpleasant might happen if the boards didn't want to go that
way. But I'm not quite sure what they might have been, because had the boards
stood their ground and said, "Actually, no, we'd rather do it this way, I guess
they could have done that. And it's interesting to speculate what might have
happened had they chosen to do that. (QCA22003)
However such a robust stance would have required the Boards to produce a
coordinated joint response, and as Edexcel had already been created and OCR was
taking shape, there was no chance of that option. Certainly both AEB and NEAB felt
that if they were to survive as organisations, they had to work out some means of
cooperation with City & Guilds, the only remaining GNVQ provider who could
enable them to retain accreditation as providers of English qualifications.
The long-drawn-out series of meetings and negotiations between AEB and NEAB
forms the central section of my September 2000 Masters Dissertation (Sturgis 2000)
and will not be rehearsed again here. In summary, in autumn 1997 the two Boards
formed a Joint Venture with City & Guilds entitled the Assessment and Qualifications
Alliance (AQA) Almost immediately City & Guilds withdrew. The other two then
bought out City & Guilds' GNVQ provision, and following two years of negotiations,
in April 2000 officially merged the two parent bodies in AQA. Instead of pursuing the
detail of the entire process, I will focus on the observations of three different
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interviewees that perhaps the most significant and lasting effect of the whole episode
was the exit of City & Guilds from the AQA Joint Venture.
While the three unitary awarding bodies were subject to the ever-increasing
regulatory prescription which was diminishing their professional freedom, City &
Guilds acted so as to retain its liberty as an Institute established by Royal Charter and
therefore beyond the reach of the threats to withdraw accreditation which were able to
bring the AEB and NEAB to heel. This had been its stance throughout its history. As
late as the 1986-87 annual report, the Director-General "stressed City and Guilds'
own independence as the Institute's greatest asset". Catherine Bush, in her case study
of City and Guilds, described its position:
...It was established and operated in the selfhelp and voluntaristic spirit ofthe
[Victorian] age. The style ofgovernment was non- interventionist and liberal.
C&G was a model of this approach. From its inception C&G's activity
displayed a dual nature; to provide service to current industrial needs and
structures and although independent, to provide a mechanism for the
implementation ofgovernment policy.
(Bush 1993: 10)
Bush identifies the tensions resulting from "The initiative to develop NVQs and
latterly GNVQs [which] has marked the intervention and involvement ofGovernment
in vocational qualifications which is unprecedented" (Bush 1993: 5). It was the threat
of further government intervention which City & Guilds foresaw if it were to
relinquish its independent status to form a unitary awarding body that caused it to
withdraw from AQA.
In the OpInIOn of one observer, as the Dearing Report and then Guaranteeing
Standards aimed to ensure parity of esteem between academic and vocational
qualifications, "the model very much looked to at that point was three vocational
boards" (AQA 203). If that was indeed the basis of the desired number of unitary
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awarding bodies, one might assume that the policy anticipated that the three
vocational bodies would remain within the structure. However, one of those bodies
had a different agenda, in the opinion of an interviewee from another board. "What
was interesting was always the way City & Guilds kept themselves apart" (OCR2
2003).
City & Guilds, at that time led by a wily Director General - and "the cast of
characters is very important" (OCR2 2003) - held early discussions about
cooperating with AEB. After all, the AEB had been an offspring of City & Guilds.
However these talks came to an abrupt halt when it became clear that the City &
Guilds' objective was a straightforward takeover of the academic board. (Sturgis
2000: 40) Instead the discussions widened to become three-way negotiations
including NEAB - with whom, it transpired, City & Guilds had also been exploring
options. The resulting creation of AQA as a Joint Venture entered into by AEB,
NEAB and City & Guilds was announced with much fanfare by the New Labour
Junior Education Minister, Lady Blackstone, on 6 November 1997. Negotiations
continued over the detail of the new structure, with the City & Guilds representatives
becoming increasingly impatient with the slow pace of progress; they appeared to be
advocating a full merger as soon as possible. Then in February 1998, they electrified
the other two members of the Joint Venture: they offered to sell City & Guilds' GCSE
provision to AQA for £5 millions. This unusual method of leaving a legally created
Joint Venture had the immediate effect of forcing AEB and NEAB to negotiate a
more realistic price for the GNVQ provision they both needed to remain accredited
awarding bodies. The two Boards eventually merged fully on 1 April 2000.
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Although it is undeniably interesting to note the choice of language with which the
City & Guilds negotiator's actions have been described by those involved, the more
important factor is how the principal actors underlined the enduring impact of City &
Guilds' withdrawal. A view from a member of another vocational awarding body was
that City & Guilds' 'escape' was due to a lack of genuine government commitment to
bridging the academic/vocational divide:
...Some of the bodies, and RSA was one, had a vision that nevertheless they
wanted to enable a seamless web, if you like, of qualifications. Edexcel had
already taken the plunge; RSA chose to do so, whereas City & Guilds took the
opposite view. It simply sloughed off GNVQ and carried on. If they
[government] had been serious about trying to alleviate the difference between
academic and vocational qualifications, they wouldn't have set up a structure
that allowed that to happen.
(OCR 1 2000)
That individual was predisposed to take that view because of his disappointment that
NVQs had not been included within the unitary awarding bodies' remit, as cited in an
earlier excerpt from his interview.
Supporting that view of City & Guilds' action as having foiled the governmental
objective was the cautiously phrased observation of a QCA official who obliquely
seemed to suggest that City & Guilds had indeed foiled the regulator's intentions:
I presume that they broadly agreed with the philosophy that a degree of
rationalisation, and certainly a greater degree of coherence between the
general and the vocational was desirable. So they went along with it and, apart
from all the sort of difficulties of deciding which partner to work with, there
didn't seem to be any objection in principle to the idea of that degree of
unification. The City & Guilds story is an interesting one, of course ...and it
continues, ofcourse, in the context of ... [The sentence was unfinished.]
(QCA22003)
To another who had been involved in the negotiations, it seemed evident that:
...there was clearly an outside driver for those three parties to come together as
AQA, and to ensure that they had some arrangement that would enable them to
work together - that arrangement being the Joint Venture which finally
emerged, but a Joint Venture from which City & Guilds um... actually
'wriggled out' I think is the only word you can use. He wriggled his way out of
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it. Largely on the grounds that so much of its [City & Guilds'] activity fell
outside regulation. And also because it was willing to hive off its GNVQs, and
again, putting it bluntly, to sell them off. ...Had City & Guilds joined AQA in
the way that ...Cambridge joined with RSA and Edexcel was created out of the
merger of BTEC and London, then you would have had a much more tidy
situation than now.
(AQA22003)
This statement infers that had City & Guilds joined the AQA merger, the three
awarding bodies would have been more powerful. Without the authority of the
vocational awarding body which provided a huge volume of workplace qualifications,
the unitary awarding bodies lacked the power to withstand the centripetal force
exerted by QCA and the DfES. Unification may have brought about a reduction in the
number of awarding bodies, but it has not brought about any discernible bridging of
the academic/vocational gap - possibly because of the very large vocational fish that
got away.
Unifying the products
A principal objective of the Dearing recommendations was to bring together
vocational and academic qualifications under the roof of the same awarding body in
order that the established reputation of the examining boards could confer higher
status on vocational qualifications. A less publicised side-effect of this unification was
the required reduction of syllabuses to be offered by the unitary awarding bodies. The
limitations proposed on the number of syllabuses to be offered caused little comment
outside the examining boards, perhaps because of concerns about comparability
between subjects and between Boards. The justification for the reduction was based
on Sir Ron Dearing's suggestion that:
The regulatory bodies, working in partnership with the awarding bodies, should
reduce the number of syllabuses and options to levels where it is practical for
them to be satisfied that equal standards prevail ...while preserving a
reasonable choice for centres.
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(Dearing 1996: 88)
A year later, in the Guaranteeing Standards consultation document, this
recommendation was strengthened and set out as a given rather than an issue for
consultation:
Fundamental to any rationalisation ojprovision in academic examinations is a
significant reduction in the number of syllabuses offered in particular
qualifications. The Secretary oj State has already strongly endorsed the
recommendations in the Dearing review, and in the Standards over Time report,
for reducing the number oj GCE A level syllabuses, following a similar
rationalisation already put in place Jor GCSE syllabuses. SCAA has now asked
existing GCE A level boards to limit new syllabus proposals to a maximum oj
two in all large entry subjects.
(DillE 1997a: 17)
While this requirement seemed on the surface to be a straightforward one, in fact it
impacted very differently on the three awarding bodies because of the differences in
their historic 'market shares'. [See Figure 4.3] Clearly AEB and NEAB, later merged
to form AQA, had much to lose from such a development.
Apart from the financial impact, a more fundamental result of this reduction in
syllabuses was the significant reduction in the Boards' individuality, built up over the
years through designing syllabuses to cater for different students in different
institutions. This had been their principal raison d 'etre since their creation. It certainly
seemed counter to the market ethos which pervaded the decade. It also peeled away
one more aspect of the Boards' independence, and indicated that central control was
the means by which that independence was being diminished.
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Figure 4-3 Market Share by Board
A Level Percentage Market Shares by English Boards 1994-2000
Date 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
AQA (AEB+NEAB 51.10% 50.50% 49.20% 49.50% 48.80% 48% 48%
Edexcel 18.60% 18.80% 19.50% 19.40% 18.90% 19.20% 19.20%
OCR 23.40% 24.10% 25% 25.00% 26.40% 26.80% 26.80%
Total entries
(AQA 2000: 2)
732974 730415 740470 777710 790035 787734 772005
3 Increasing Regulation: Accountability justifies control
I will summarise briefly the previous stages in the regulation of the examining system
in order to emphasise the significance of the shift that took place during the 1990s.
From their creation in the 19th century, the examining boards had been independent
bodies accountable to their founding universities, until, to oversee the national system
of School Certificates, the Secondary Schools Examinations Council was established
in 1917 as an 'arm's length' regulatory body.
When after the 1944 Act the Boards lost their places on the Secondary Schools
Examinations Council and were replaced by civil servants from the Ministry of
Education, it was clear to a later analyst that:
The distribution ofpower over the examination structure changed significantly
in the post-war years. The Minister, Ellen Wilkinson, clearly wanted more
control of examinations; George Tomlinson, her successor, continued this
policy ....
(Lawton 1984: 97))
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Denis Lawton interpreted the Boards' removal from the SSEC in 1947 as a means of
reducing the influence of the universities over the GCE, but quoted an earlier view
which saw the change as clear evidence of a quest for increased central control:
Montgomery (1965) sees the constitution of the SSEC as a crucial factor in the
distribution ofpower. The removal of representatives of the examining bodies
from the SSEC was one important change; the increase in the Ministry's
nominees from six to eight members in 1961 was another.
(Lawton 1984: 97)
After 20 years, early concerns about increased central control had subsided. Then
when a widespread outcry about government interference greeted David Eccles' 1961
proposal for a Curriculum Study Group - designed to give the Minister access to the
'secret garden' of the curriculum rather than direct control over examinations -
Edward Boyle responded to these concerns by establishing a very different regulatory
body. The Schools Council exercised its regulatory responsibility in a very low-key
manner, as recalled in the interview by a long-serving member of the regulatory
structure, quoted more fully above:
Schools Council regulated, ofcourse. Yes, it was done through A-level syllabus
approval and scrutiny, wasn't it?
Yes, A-level scrutiny in Schools Council days was a voluntary activity. The
boards saw it presumably as in their interest to have an external view of what
they did
It was never really contentious. We sent our reports to the boards alone -
nothing public about them. And it was all done in a very ...civilised way in that
we sent these reports with recommendations and the boards were sort oftrusted
to get on with it.
(QCA22003)
A view from the Boards saw the regulatory control as broadly following in the same
pattern over the years:
So there has always been the presence ofregulation, as it were, in the schools
examinations system ...since 1917. And I think if you then advance it with the
creation of0 level and ...A level, ...the same features are there ofsome degree
of regulation of the system, with the government through the Ministry of
Education and [then] the Department of Education actually laying down the
features that the system should have, but leaving it very much to the boards as
deliverers.
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(AQA12000)
This last interviewee was quoted above as perceiving that the major shift to increasing
central control came with the GCSE and its criteria requiring government approval.
Replacing the Schools Council with the Secondary Examinations Council (SEC) and
the School Curriculum Development Committee (SCDC) for another analyst was "a
very centralist decision" particularly because "members of the two committees would
be Secretary of State nominees not representatives of any of the organizations that
had made up the Schools Council" (Lawton 1984: 10). From the standpoint of the
regulator, too the advent of GCSE signalled tighter central regulation:
...SEC [1984] was a bit harder edged, and began to take an interest in 16 [16+
qualifications] ofcourse, but that was because SEC was instrumental in putting
GCSE on the road. ...1 think, actually, that was quite a landmark because - do
you remember, GCSE was approved by Keith Joseph on the condition that there
were ground rules: general and specific criteria - those hotels around Russell
Square .... So there was a regulatory instrument in the GCSE criteria ....
(QCA22003)
When in 1988 the Secondary Examinations Council and the School Curriculum
Development Committee were replaced by the Schools Examinations and Assessment
Council (SEAC) and the National Curriculum Council (NCC), "SEAC was the first
statutory body" which meant that the "process became elevated in status because of
its statutory nature" (QCA2 2003). Although SEAC was indeed a statutory body and
therefore of an entirely different level from the easy-going Schools Council, its
control was still relatively minimal, but it bred a taste for ever-greater intervention by
the regulator in the details of the examining process. Speaking in 2000, the Chief
Executive of the regulatory body was very clear about this tendency to need ever
more central control:
...from 1989 to 1993, SEAC had increased its control, its regulation. The first
GCSE Code ofPractice - J mean, that was a major step in regulatory control of
awarding bodies. And this sort of thing snowballs in the sense that when you
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have the concerns that lead to the controls, the controls identify further
problems that lead to further tightening ofcontrols.
(QCAI2000)
I see this statement as key evidence of the effects of the 'accountability agenda' I
identified at the end of the preceding chapter as the hidden driver of change resulting
from the decay in trust. A similarly significant remark emerged in an interview with a
DfEE official who, when asked to comment on the importance of comparability
between Boards, perhaps inadvertently made a specific link between accountability
and the tightening of regulation:
1 would say comparability is a very important issue for us. And every year that
there's any suggestion in the press that things aren't comparable causes us to
intervene a great deal. Very important. (DfES 2000)
It followed therefore that each of the changes to the regulatory structure involved a
shift of some degree of control from the Boards to the central body. The inherent
conflict in the English structure was pinpointed by Kathryn Ecclestone in her 2003
analysis of the "Principles, politics and practice" of post-16 assessment and
qualifications:
Awarding bodies ...have vested commercial interests in maintaining their
presence in the education and training system. For governments intent on
standardising assessment systems in order to make them more transparent and
accountable, diverse and independent awarding bodies are barriers to central
regulation. (Ecclestone 2003: 74)
While I acknowledge the Boards' vested interest in remaining as key players in the
system, I contend that their assessment expertise has contributed to the checks and
balances essential in retaining public confidence in such high-stakes qualifications.
Oddly, while the Boards were of course aware of the increasing central control, its
gradual encroachment on their independence did not arouse any overt resistance on
their part. Their defence of their vested interest was minimal.
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In 1986 the GCSE Groups did take the step of consolidating the Joint Council for the
GCSE, initially created to ensure a common approach to the new examination, as a
forum where they could meet to formulate a common response to central proposals.
However they did not find the threat of central control to be sufficiently serious to
overcome their habitual mutual suspicion and use the Council as a platform for
resisting further centralisation. As centralisation accelerated during the 1990s there
was still no resistance - a curious passivity, but a function perhaps both oflong habit
and the distraction of other changes they were undergoing.
In 1992, the Boards received an early warning of potential change when John Patten,
as Secretary of State, having received a report criticising the Boards "for allegedly
allowing an erosion of standards in the GCSE examination", pointed out that
"although he did not control the boards, he had 'quite serious powers' that could be
employed ifhe was not satisfied' (Quoted in McCulloch 1994: 132). In October 1992,
Patten reiterated his implied threat of the Government taking control. In his speech at
the Conservative Party annual conference, he said: "1 have a message for those exam
boards. Listen very carefully. 1 will say this only once. Get your act together" (Quoted
in McCulloch 1994: 133).
Patten was soon replaced, but in 1993 the merging of SEAC and NCC into the
Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) consolidated rather than
increased regulatory control by clearly linking assessment to the curriculum - which
of course was centrally designed. It was still the case that the regulatory focus was
concentrated on examinations at 16. However SCAA was, together with NCVQ, its
vocational opposite number, gradually widening its areas of interest. Clear evidence
of the intensifying central control that was being brought to bear on the examining
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boards comes from a 1997 DillE summary of the powers gradually assumed by the
regulatory bodies from 1993 in the interests of assuring standards:
SCAA and NCVQ, both individually, and through their Joint Committee, have
done much to take this agenda forward through their work on quality
assurance:
Codes ofpractice for GCSEs, GCE A levels and GNVQ.
Scrutinies ofstandards across all three qualifications.
GCE A level subject cores and GCSE criteria, specifying syllabus coverage and
ground rules for assessment, and external assessors.
Common criteria for GNVQ centre approval and external verification.
Joint moderation sessions between awarding bodies for GNVQs.
'Pre-awarding' meetings between GCSE awarding bodies to reinforce the
consistency ofgrading standards.
Common GNVQ tests, run jointly by the awarding bodies.
Common elements in GCSE examinations.
(DillE 1997a: 21)
When following the Dearing Report, SCAA and NCVQ were brought together in
1996 to form the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), one interpretation
from an examining board interviewee was that:
...the fundamental change ...was the statutory regulation that came with QCA.
And the fact that you've got statutory regulation means that you're backed up
by a law which means they could step in, they could come and see our books for
no ...very strong reasons, really. I think that changed the relationship quite
significantly.
(OCR2 2003)
This view that the principal effect of QCA's power having statutory status was to
enable the agency to "see our books" seems extraordinarily naive - and perhaps
related to the fact that QCA did in fact carry out an audit of OCR in 2000 to
investigate the source of that board's problems in 1999. [See Figure 4.4] In fact, on
reflection this same individual did recognise that the statutory status of QCA's powers
marked a major shift of control from the Boards to the regulator: "Now challenge you
could do, until it became statutory. But once you've made them [regulatory powers]
statutory, challenges become very difficult, because there's no appeal mechanism"
(OCR2 2003).
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Figure 4-4 QCA Audit of OCR: Causes of problems in 1999
Staff within the Operations and Assessment Divisions were not sufficiently
trained to undertake some key roles. This deficit was at its most acute amongst
OCR staff in Cambridge and Birmingham responsible for the relocation of
scripts arriving from examiners. In particular, responsibilities were not
sufficiently clear and the level of supervision was inadequate to identify where
procedures were not being implemented.
2 Some examination centres did not send in entry data on time or did not follow
instructions correctly. This produced delays in processing entry data which had a
deleterious effect on subsequent examinations processes,
3 The centralised computer system provided by UCLES Corporate Services, the
Examinations Processing System (EPS), was prone to errors, slow at peak times
and generally difficult for staff to use. The EPS itself produced errors and delays
in many parts of the examination process.
OCR has been required to develop an action plan with key milestones the first of which is
in December 2000 to address the issues identified in this report which arise from the 2000
examinations. OCR must keep QCA apprised of progress on a regular basis. A QCA team
will analyse the progress reports, carry out its own checks and intervene where necessary.
(QCA 2000: 21)
QCA's statutory powers, to outsiders a minor technical adjustment, naturally loomed
very large in the Boards' view of their relationship with QCA. It meant that where the
Boards disagreed with QCA over an issue, they had no option except resort to judicial
review - a slow and high-level procedure. This rise in the regulator's status is
evidence of another shift in the balance of power. It remained largely symbolic until
real disagreements surfaced over the design of Curriculum 2000.
From the standpoint of a QCA official, while the significance of the change was
played down, there was no ambiguity over what QCA expected by way of control:
Accreditation [to] the national qualifications framework ...was conceived not so
much as a regulatory instrument as a user aid, and part of Dearing's
philosophy of trying to raise the status of the vocational by talking about a
common framework .... But actually the framework was the basis for regulation,
because you wouldn't accredit things into the framework without using some of
the parameters of the framework as the basis of accreditation. 1 suppose you
could say that's part of the regulatory system. And more formal monitoring,
scrutiny and ultimately ...public reporting of the outcomes of those scrutinies.
We still do scrutiny reports with recommendations, but it's slightly euphemistic,
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I suppose, the term 'recommendation', because there is an expectation that
there will be a response to it. And there is now a formal requirement ... that the
boards produce an action plan leading to those recommendations, and we will
take oversight ofthe delivery ofthat action plan. And in the last analysis, if the
action wasn't taken to remedy any of the perceived deficiencies, there'd be the
threat ofde-accreditation. (QCA2 2003)
That seems a clear statement of where power over examinations now lies. Yet this
significant increase in central control happened, as observed in a recent analysis, in
the "absence of any sustained intellectual justification for the theory and practice of
regulation [which is] notable when one compares the open debates that took place
prior to the establishment of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000"
(Blacklock 2003: 11). Blacklock also saw the establishment of QCA as part of a trend
within the sphere of education:
Through the Department [DtES] the government has given a statutory remit to a
number of non-departmental bodies (NDPBs) with responsibilties for regulating the
provision and quality of education and training. These bodies lie outside the
immedicate sphere ofgovernment but not beyond its ultimate control and direction.
(Blacklock 2003)
The question as to why the Boards offered no resistance to what seems the loss of any
vestige of real control will be considered in the next chapter. At this point their failure
to react will be attributed to their preoccupation with the external and internal
pressures within a climate of challenges to their reliability which, I shall suggest,
grew out of a confusion in English society regarding the basis on which grades were
awarded. What might have remained the subject of academic discussions among
experts on assessment had become a matter of public debate.
4 The Standards Debate: Are grades norm or criterion referenced?
This final external factor which I have identified as affecting the examining boards in
the 1990s may seem a rather arcane one. As the debates around norm and criterion
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referencing concern academic theories of assessment, it is an aspect of the modem
educational zeitgeist that cannot be claimed to affect the examining boards uniquely.
However I submit that a serious misunderstanding of the basis on which examination
grades are awarded has disturbed in an important but unacknowledged manner the
subsoil of the English social consensus around examination grades. The fallout from
the debate in terms of the breakdown in confidence in the reliability of examination
standards provided the justification for many of Dearing's recommendations and the
whole of Guaranteeing Standards. This section will analyse how this has corne about
and suggest that the confusion in public understanding as to how the examining
boards reach their decisions in awarding grades has been a definite factor in
undermining their reputation for producing results that are comparable, valid and
reliable. The doubt cast upon their performance has in tum facilitated the continuing
centralisation of control over them. I have identified this doubt, and the resulting
increased central control, as an effect of the underlying breakdown in social trust
which is at the root of the quest for accountability. Therefore I contend that this issue
is a fundamental one.
Any national qualifications system is deeply culturally embedded and dependent on
the society's acceptance of it. When a series of technical developments in assessment
practice had the unintended consequence of rupturing the English consensus over the
basis of the qualifications system, the result was bound to be a destabilising factor.
Yet the normlcriterion referencing issue is rarely highlighted in the regular debates
concerning the drive to maintain standards over time and through qualification
change. The crux of the issue is clear to academic analysts like Kathryn Ecclestone:
...reliability is still a central goal of quality assurance procedures used by
awarding bodies and the QCA. More recently this goal has been in conflict with
validity as a key feature ofoutcome-based systems [like] ...NVQs and GNVQs.
210
In these qualifications, designers wanted policy-makers, awarding bodies,
inspectors and end-users of qualifications such as employers and higher
education institutions to accept a high premium on validity and place less
emphasis on reliability, its supporters arguing that this shift would maximise the
credibility ofthe qualifications.
(Ecclestone 2003: 41)
It would seem on current evidence that the aims of the designers have yet to be
realised.
The matter finally surfaced publicly in October 2002 when Mike Tomlinson, in his
Interim Report into the September 2002 AS/A2 grades crisis, commented on "the
longstanding misunderstanding ofthe difference between maintaining a standard and
the proportion ofcandidates meeting that standard .... This misunderstanding appears
to exist at almost all levels ofthe system, and in society at large" (Tomlinson 2002a:
Conclusions). He might have resorted to more technical language and referred to the
confusion between norm and criterion referencing, as he did in his final report:
There is also strong support for the existing A level design principle that the
achievement required for an A level should remain the same from year to year
and reflect predetermined standards of attainment, irrespective of how many
students achieve the necessary standards. This is often thought ofas "criterion
referencing", although paragraphs 63 to 65 describe some ofthe difficulties of
applying pure criterion referencing to A level examinations and assessment. I
have encountered very little systematic support for a return to grading in which
fixed quotas ofgrades would be awarded to students according to rank order
rather than performance against a fixed standard of achievement (broadly,
"norm referencing").
(Tomlinson 2002b: 7)
In her work on GNVQs, Ecclestone suggests that " ... it is a populist portrayal of
norm-referenced reliability that now underpins comparisons in league tables of
qualification results between schools, FE and sixth form colleges" (Ecclestone 2002:
69). She perceives a fundamental schism underlying the debate:
...different meanings of 'standard' reflect disagreement about values and goals
in different qualifications and learning processes. This produces dissent and
confusion over whether assessment should be a norm-referenced measure of
consistent but selective achievement in order to promote reliable assessment
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decisions or a criterion-referenced measure of attainment to produce valid,
authentic decisions. Each interpretation offers a different meaning of what
constitutes 'fair' assessment.
(Ecclestone 2002: 74)
A related but again rarely acknowledged factor that complicates the debate - not just
in England - is inherent in the dual purpose the assessments are expected to fulfil.
This dichotomy was highlighted by the distinguished trio whom QCA asked (well
before the autumn grades crisis) to report on A-level standards in 2002:
The differences among the assessment purposes of selection (eg choosing the
best students for university admission) and of certification (eg assigning high
grades to those candidates who achieve the desired standard) have been the
focus ofpersistent discussion in the literature on educational measurement.
(Baker, McGaw 2002: 8)
Any discussion premised on inherent misunderstandings would be problematic.
However because the GCSE and A-level examinations are of such fundamental
importance in their effect on the lives of English young people, the debate here is
impassioned, with both sides vigorously proclaiming their view and neither side
acknowledging the conflicted basis of that view. The public manifestation of the
debate has been the annual glare of the media spotlight on examination results, with
accusations of 'grade inflation' greeting consistently increasing attainment levels
which are celebrated in other quarters. In order to show how changed public
perceptions affected the Boards, it is necessary firstly to set out the issue that has
significantly altered those perceptions about the basis on which grades are awarded.
This misunderstanding has left the examining boards caught between the two sides yet
unable to shed the necessary light on the debate.
The appeal of a truly fair assessment system
Because public examinations had evolved as selection devices" ...designed to identify
the best rather than identify those who had achieved some defined level or
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performance" (Orr 1983: 15), their assessment had always been based on norm
referencing. When GCE examinations replaced the School Certificates in 1952, they
retained the traditional psychometric or norm referenced approach which was based
on:
...the underlying notion ...that intelligence was innate and fixed... [and]
therefore could be measured and on the basis of the outcome the individuals
could be assigned to streams, groups or schools which were appropriate to
their intelligence (or 'ability' as it came to be seen).
(Gipps 1994: 5)
In 1960, the SSEC spelled out the norms for the Boards to observe in awarding GCE
which were to guide the awarding process for the next twenty-five years. [See Figure
4.5]
"Critics of the psychometric paradigm found problematic the assumptions it involved
ofuniversality and unidimensionality" (Goldstein 1993). Therefore there was perhaps
a predisposition to welcome 'criterion referencing', the assessment system Robert
Glaser devised in America in 1963. In his ground-breaking paper he explained the
basis of his system: "What I shall call criterion-referenced measures depend upon an
absolute standard of quality, while what I term norm-referenced measures depend
upon a relative standard' (Quoted in Gipps 1994: 79). Caroline Gipps identified his
"seminal" work as "signalling the emergence ofeducational assessment as a separate
enterprise from psychometrics and psychological measurement" whose key feature is
that it is "concerned with an individual's growth rather than variation between
individuals, and testing is linked to content matter taught" (Gipps 1994: 79). The
elimination of the need for subjective judgements, perhaps the most vexing element of
norm-referenced qualifications, seemed a fairer system which "appealed to policy
makers and qualification designers" (Wolf 1993: 6).
Figure 4-5 SSEC Norms for A-level Grades
APPENDIX A
Reconsideration of the A-Level Grading Scheme with
Special Reference to Grade C
The current general grading scheme for A level was agreed in 1960 by the
Secondary School Examinations Council (SSEC) and came into effect in 1963.
The scheme suggests that the percentage of candidates awarded each grade
should be as shown in the following table.
Grade A B C D E 0 F Total
'-.-'
Percentage
of entries 10 15 10 15 20 30 100
Source: Ministry of Education, The General Certificate of Education
and Sixth Form Studies, Third Report of the Secondary School
Examinations Council (HMSO, 1960).
These guidelines are the only published description of A-level grades to
which both the GeE boards and users of A-level results refer.
~In proposing the scheme the SSEC made it clear that th~ percentage
guidelines were to be regarded as no more than rough indications. In
practice, however, the distribution of grades Over all boards in each of the
large-entry subjects has conformed closely to the gUidelines, with only
marginal fluctuations from one year to the next.
(JMB 1983)
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An early indication of this appeal in England emerged with moves toward a single
examination at 16-plus: "A major feature of the proposed single system ofexamining
at 16+ is the requirement for national criteria" (Orr 1983: 7). The phrase introduced
in 1980 by Mark Carlisle as Secretary of State for Education was the notion of'grade-
related criteria'. Once again, as with the two previous instances of major examination
reform in 1918 and 1944, the task of drafting the national criteria (which would
ultimately be agreed and applied by the Secondary Examinations Council) was
given ... to the GCE and CSE boards jointly. A letter from the DES to all Boards
(dated 28 February 1980) inviting them to undertake this task included the following
suggestion in relation to grades:
'Consideration should also be given to the possibility of incorporating (in the
national criteria) some elements of criterion-referencing of grades, or some
grades in the 7point scale.
This might...go some way to free the award ofgrades from statistical norms, if
quality or performance changes over time. (Quoted in Orr 1983: 7)
Ignoring the irony which hindsight might detect in the "if' in the final sentence, it is
the case that the seed sown in that 1980 letter grew to produce a fundamental
confusion that contributed in no small way to the crisis of 2002. This occurred despite
the clear awareness of assessment experts like Desmond Nuttall, in 1983 a researcher
at the Schools Council, that "In practice, grading ofpublic examinations relies on
both norm-referenced and criteria-based considerations" (Orr 1983: 13). Despite this
expert insight, others had strong motives for endorsing the apparent desirability of a
criterion-referenced system. Orr and Nuttall attributed the growing interest in criterion
referencing to:
...the desire, mainly among politicians, to achieve greater comparability (a)
between examining boards (b) between alternative syllabuses ... in the same
subject (c) between years and (d) between subjects. The pressure to maintain
comparability in all these aspects arises principally from a desire to maximize
fairness in the competition between individuals with different qualifications.
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(Orr 1983: 19)
Other assessment experts were aware of these motives. Gipps and Stobart suggest that
"One ofthe reasons for the interest ofthe DES and Secondary Examinations Council
(SEC) in the development of criterion-referencing within GCSE was concern over
comparability, or rather the lack of it, in GCSE grades from different examination
boards" (Gipps and Stobart 1990: 77). However Gipps apparently decided against
direct attribution for the move toward criterion referencing by taking refuge in the
passive voice: " ...and then in the mid-1980s it was decided that both GCSE and
National Curriculum assessment were to be criterion referenced (Gipps 1994: 81).
Gipps' grasp of the technicalities of assessment is unfortunately all too rare in English
debates around the issues. Few outside a small circle of academic experts in
assessment and examination board employees realise the implications for the English
reliance on examination grades of Gipps' observation that, "Aggregating detailed
assessments into a crude single grade compromises the information offered by the
assessment" (Gipps 1994: 85). She later states that" ...Sir Keith Joseph's aim was to
get 80-90 percent of16-year-olds up to the level previously deemed to be average. On
norm-referenced tests ...by definition ...this would be impossible" (Gipps 1994: 89).
Then, just as GCSE was being developed - but in the more peripheral area of
vocational qualifications - a fully criterion-referenced qualification was created.
NVQs and Competence-based Assessment
The National Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ) was established in 1986
with the daunting objective of turning the jungle of over 800 different vocational
qualifications into a coherent structure. Naturally attracted by what seemed a clear
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and fair assessment system, the NCVQ opted to create their new National Vocational
Qualifications (NVQs) as entirely criterion-referenced, with a lead body for each
industry listing the required 'competences' for each of the five levels of award. Two
leading theorists in the vanguard of the move to criterion referencing explained the
advantages of the new model:
Indeed, in many norm-referenced systems of assessment - especially in
education - the chief function of the assessment appears to centre on
differentiation. In NVQ assessment, reliability is not an issue....Standards are
valid ifthe evidence meets the performance criteria.
(Jessup and Burke 1990)
This "seductive promise ...of complete clarity" offered by the criterion-referenced
assessment ofNVQs was neatly demolished by Wolf in her 1993 paper for the Further
Education Unit (FEU) Through the use of clear examples, she demonstrated that
"while assessment systems may vary in the degree to which ...complex judgements
come into play, such judgements are universal to all assessment" (Wolf 1993: 6). In a
later book, Professor Wolf chronicles the failure of all the bright hopes invested in
NVQs (Wolf 2002b), but the NCVQ's espousal of criterion referencing had
strengthened existing interest in the use of this new and apparently fairer system
within English educational circles.
The growth of a perception that examination assessment in England was abandoning
norm referencing was enhanced in the spring of 1986 with the 'cascaded' training of
all secondary school teachers for the new GCSE examination, teaching for which was
to begin in September 1986. Lulled by the mantra that the assessment process for the
new examination was designed to demonstrate what pupils 'know, understand and can
do, teachers underwent a fundamental shift in thinking about assessment. The notion
of the 'bell curve' of results with all its faults gave way to a belief that henceforth a
new and fairer system had been created.
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Then, in a less widely publicised move, the guidelines which the Secondary Schools
Examinations Council (SSEC) had drawn up back in 1962 [cited in Figure 4.5]
setting out "expectations for the proportion of candidates to be awarded each grade
in large entry GeE A level subjects" - ie the norms - were withdrawn.
A JMB initiative had been pressing for this change because of the extremely narrow
marks range allocated to the grade C band [See Figure 4.6] with the resulting
arbitrarily limited number of C grades awarded. Despite what seems this obvious
distortion of an expected 'bell curve' of results, it took until 1987 (Paterson 2003:
143) for the Secondary Examinations Council to alter the guidelines [See Figure 4.7]
Now the professionals knew that strict norm referencing no longer ruled, although at
the same time they were aware that the change would not be without difficulties. One
professional examiner summed up the high expectations the new form of assessment
had raised:
To implement criterion-referencing in large-scale examinations is
problematical, as the efforts to date show. No doubt there has been a cargo cult
mentality in evidence, believing that notions like grade-related criteria and
grade descriptions would overnight eradicate the bad practice and inequities
associated, sometimes unfairly and erroneously, with norm-referenced
examinations.
(Wood 1991: 9)
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The effect of these high expectations has been the negative reactions to the steadily
improving attainment levels in GCSE examinations.
This improvement has been generally welcomed as rising attainment by pupils,
teachers, parents, examining boards and Ministers. Yet what have on the whole been
louder voices have labelled the development as 'grade inflation' which implies a
steady erosion of standards. The opening salvoes in the standards battle were fired in
The Times Educational Supplement (TES) in late August of 1992. Two stalwarts of
the 'declining standards' faction queried yet another rise in the results at both GCSE
and A level. They were Dr John Marks, already known for his sceptical view of
educational developments following his contribution to the Black Papers in the 1970s,
and Dr Philip Evans, a ''former chief examiner with the London Board" who never
acknowledged the significance of that word ''former'' in his criticisms of a new type
of examination. (TES 1992) Then John Patten, Conservative Education Minister
added fuel to the fire by suggesting that the improved results were due to lax
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examination standards, supporting his view by leaking a report on the GCSE
preparedfor him by HMI under confidential cover. HMI reported "limited confidence
that standards are being maintained..." due to certain specified weaknesses. (HMI
1992) The Minister was sufficiently disturbed by the report's findings to establish an
inquiry on the basis of what had been revealed. His action provoked a media chorus
which became an annual reaction to the examination results, as illustrated by the
following headlines from the Times Educational Supplement:
Call for tighter checks on 'rising' grades as boards rally to defend A-level
record
(TES 28 August 1992)
Marking is not lax, says examiner
GCSE row provokes terse statement from Government's chief exams
adviser
Griffiths angered by Patten's inquiry
(TES 4 September 1992)
The disputes continued with variations on this theme throughout the 1990s:
Pass rises 'are real'
The best-ever GCSE results have coincided with new research evidence
that the exams are as difficult as ever
(TES 27 August 1993)
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Experts row over pass rate levels
This is not the slippery slope, say exam boards
(TES 25 August 1995)
A-level pass rate rises yet again
(TES 16 August 1996)
This continuing nse III English students' attainment might be seen from an
international perspective as overdue rather than a cause for concern. It was still the
case by 2000 that more than half of English 16-year-olds were still failing to reach the
standard which affords real choice as to their future direction. The data produced by
Gillborn and Youdell in their graph [cited above in Figure 4.1] are summarised below
to illustrate this under-achievement:
Percentages ofstudents achieving 5 A *-C grades at GCSE
1997 45.1%
1998 46.3%
1999 47.9%
2000 49.2%
(Gillborn 2000)
In August 2001, a Guardian editorial addressed the issue of grade inflation - raised in
that year by a former chief examiner regarding OCR's GCSE mathematics results. He
attributed the two-grade drop in attainment he was claiming to "competition between
exam boards when schools are ready to opt for easier exams to improve their league
positions." The paper's solution was that, if these allegations were upheld in the
independent review it advocated, "there is a simple remedy: end competition and have
a single national exam board." Its notion of a review was equally direct: " ... requiring
exam boards to release their pass marks over the last decade." Clearly the
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complexities of modem examining have not been adequately explained to journalists,
let alone to the public at large. The same newspaper on 15 August 2003, returned to
the standards issue in another editorial, this time in relation to A levels. In this
instance it took the opposing position. Confidently, if wrongly, stating that "the A-
level exam ...changed course 20 years ago ...when the exam was made 'criterion
referenced' - all those who reached the required standard passed', it asked, "Where
is the proofofa fall in standards?"
On 22 August 2002, Radio 4's Today Programme opened with the news that "The
GCSE pass rate rose for the J4th year in succession": that is, ever since its first cohort
in 1988. Yet it was not until October of that year that, as mentioned above, Mike
Tomlinson attempted to diagnose the reasons for the continuing dispute over the
significance of the rising pass rate.
An anecdote from my own experience illustrates his point about the fundamental
misunderstanding that has bedevilled the debate in England. On 24 October 2002, I
asked a class of year 12 boys if by a show of hands they would indicate how they
believed the ASIA2 examinations, toward which they had just begun working, would
be graded. Roughly one-third assumed criterion-referencing, one-third norm
referencing and one-third hadn't considered the matter. Although the technical
terminology is rarely used, the confusion has taken deep root and fractured the
English consensus about the meaning of grades.
The examining boards were inevitably tarnished by the corrosive effects of the annual
standards debate and their judgements increasingly challenged by appeals over grades
from students who felt they had not been awarded the grades they deserved. Perhaps
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the boards have been guilty of keeping their methodology a professional secret. Yet
my inquiry to an AQA official as to current practice elicited a clear response:
...the year-on-year statistical guidance is now our norm. We expect the
statistics to be within 2% of last year's outcomes, but approvals are given to
larger rises or falls if the qualitative evidence is convincing.
(AQA 2004)
Certainly, as the 21st century began, the Boards were increasingly being held to
account. Ironically, by that time they had lost the power to act independently even if
they had wanted to. However they were preoccupied by immediate concerns that
threatened their capacity to deliver the results of the examinations they administered.
The focus of the next section will narrow to consider some consequences of these
internal pressures that were particularly affecting the Boards' operations.
Internal Stresses Preoccupy the Boards
From the external factors which affected to varying degrees all organisations, I tum
now to the related but essentially internal factors the Boards had to deal with during
the 1990s. These resulted indirectly from the external pressures and were therefore
largely beyond the control of the examining boards. It will be suggested that the need
to cope with these immediate problems occupied the management and trustees of the
Boards at a time when they might otherwise have been able to mount some resistance
to the increasing control to which they were subject.
While they were being buffeted by the various external pressures that the 1990s
brought to bear on all educational institutions, the examining boards were of course -
again like other parts of "the education state" - dealing with internal stresses that, I
will suggest, absorbed a disproportionate amount of management attention. An
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official at QCA suggested that this may have been because they had existed for so
long as "secure, bureaucratic organisations" where staff "would expect you could be
there for life, because the function is a maintenance one more than anything else"
(QCA2 2003). Now as the 1990s ended they were having to adapt to increased
competition, mergers with former competitors, and increasing central regulation. The
individuals - whether staff or trustees - who were faced with these major changes
were for the most part ill equipped for developing strategies to respond to the forces
around them. With few exceptions, they came from what had been the sheltered world
of education and had little experience of the cut and thrust of the marketplace. They
were understandably preoccupied by the various internal problems because the nature
of the examining business brooks no delays; problems must be solved immediately in
order to meet inflexible deadlines. Whatever the reason, they failed to organise
serious opposition to the increasing central control which they were experiencing.
Their national forum, the Joint Council for General Qualifications, dealt with matters
like standardising entry forms and agreeing the examination timetable; in no way did
it fulfil the role of a lobbying body. They had never demonstrated the impulse towards
group solidarity, so when circumstances required it they failed to join forces to
preserve their independence. An official from one board identified this weakness:
[Finding a new role] is not easy, as is demonstrated by the difficulties which the
JCGQ has run into, where independent bodies find it very difficult to perceive
the need to work collaboratively and cooperatively - particularly in this
competitive arena ....
(AQA22003)
Instead they continued to look inward to deal with the undoubted problems they
faced.
Indications of internal problems began to appear gradually following the vanous
mergers after 1996. Well before the volcano erupted in September 2002, each of the
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restructured organisations was showing - privately or publicly - unmistakable
structural cracks. These incidents, although individually insignificant, must be
considered in the light of the long history of the Boards' previously successful
operation. The atmosphere was charged by an early tremor from Scotland, where a
newly merged Scottish Qualifications Authority (SQA) in summer 2000 produced
either late results or none at all for 17 000 students sitting the reformed Scottish
Higher examinations. In September 2000 the Scottish Executive commissioned
Deloitte & Touche to investigate the problems at SQA. The resulting report concluded
that, together with some general weaknesses in management, the organisational
structure had been:
...neither effective nor efficient in the new circumstances, and proved
insufficiently robust when faced with the challenging logistics of new
qualifications and a major IT systems implementation.
(Deloitte&Touche 2000)
Resignations of both the Chief Executive and Chair of SQA were necessary to quell
that particular storm. Despite the Deloitte Touche report's highlighting of weaknesses
in the compatibility of the computer systems following the merger of the academic
and vocational assessment bodies, there was no indication that QCA foresaw similar
problems resulting from similar mergers in England. Yet the size of the two Scottish
agencies and the numbers of candidates involved in Scotland were dwarfed by their
counterparts in England. Nevertheless, it seemed only the awarding bodies who
viewed the Scottish crisis with any misgivings about a similar event south of the
border. 10
As the unitary awarding bodies took shape, opinions were also forming about these
new constellations. Anecdotal evidence was rife. OCR was acquiring a reputation
with teachers and examinations officers for serious gaps in communication between
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its Oxford-based A-level syllabuses and its Cambridge computer systems: candidate
entries were unreliable, examination materials late in arriving and results frequently
full of errors. The new organisation had failed to produce common stationery and
compatible computer systems. Continuing complaints led QCA to investigate the
problems at OCR. In December 2000 it produced a report that confirmed that there
had been problems in 1999 and listed 'action points' following monitoring of the
process in summer 2000 [See Figure 4.4 above]
Despite OCR's weaknesses, it was Edexcel which achieved the dubious distinction of
becoming media shorthand for incompetence, disorganisation and unreliability. This
resulted from a series of highly publicised errors. In March 2001, 10 000 students
received incorrect results for Key Skills tests, and were offered re-sits - an admission
that the results were irretrievably flawed. In June, a mathematics paper was somehow
stolen and offered for sale prior to the examination. Despite the forced resignation of
its Chief Executive in September 2001, Edexcel in January 2002 produced an AS-
level mathematics examination paper containing an error which was obvious to
candidates. These lapses seriously undermined not only that organisation's reputation
but wider confidence in the whole system when presented by the press as in Rebecca
Smithers' article of29 January 2002 in Education Guardian (See Figure 4.8)
An Edexcel official later attributed such problems to "the enormous logistic pressure
within the awarding bodies" resulting from Curriculum 2000:
It meant, I think, far too much work for staff with no increase in resources ....
One of the consequences were [sicJpoorly proof-read papers at the end of the
day .... We ended up with an exam paper that came from one series ofchanges
and an answer book which reproduced some of the questions from another set.
And that was the famous 'AS maths disaster '.... Whilst the effect on the students
at the end ofthe day was virtually nil, the political damage to the system and the
loss ofpublic confidence was bad.
(EdexceI22003)
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While Edexcel had been suffering in the media and OCR was attracting teachers'
complaints, AQA had survived relatively unscathed - at least publicly - until summer
2002, when for the first time it did not get all results t centres by the agreed date.
Were these problems the result of inefficiency, incompetence or mismanagement? To
discover possible answers, some of the internal pressures affecting AQA will be
considered. AQA is the focus principally because of my longstanding connection with
that board and previously with the AEB, one of its constituent parts. As a result I have
had an unusual degree of access to matters that are normally confidential. I have, of
course, asked for and received permission to use the material I have cited.
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Figure 4-8 Smithers' list of Board lapses
Exam boards: a catalogue of failures
Feb 2000 OCR blames a shortage of markers for delays in appeals agains last
summer's grades.
April 2000 The first league table of exam boards are published; Edexcel and OCR
are warned they must "substantially improve the service".
Aug 2000 The Scottish Highers fiasco: 17,000 results late or missing. Ron Tuck,
chiefexecutive of exam board SQA, resigns.
Nov 2000 Chair and board of Scotland's education authority resign.
March 2001 Edexcel offers resits to 10,000 students given the wrong marks for a
key skills exams [sic].
June 2001 Edexcel pure maths A-level paper is leaked and offered for sale. An
AQA physics A-level paper contains an impossible question.
August 2001 Delays in sending out A-level results is [sic] blamed on pressure of
new AS exams.
October 2001 Christina Townsend resigns as chief executive of Edexcel after
complaints, citing a "particularly demanding year".
Jan 2002 An Edexcel A-level maths question is found to be impossible and pages
are missing from an IT exam paper; the government sends a "hitrnan" into the
troubled board.
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An additional factor that magnified the usual merger difficulties any organisation
faces was that the formation of AQA involved the extra complexity of the intangible
but nonetheless real 'north/south divide' as embodied in the two very different but
equally distinctive organisational cultures of the Northern Examining and Assessment
Board with offices in Manchester, Harrogate and Newcastle and the Associated
Examining Board located in Guildford and Bristol. This had the effect of exacerbating
- and for my purposes highlighting - the internal pressures that all three new unitary
assessment bodies faced.
The first internal problem I shall examme was one involving what is known in
commercial parlance as 'human resources'. As the only significant resource of an
examining board is the quality of its staff, personnel problems of any sort are a serious
matter. During the 1990s such problems occurred for AQA at two levels. One was the
disruption to permanent staff resulting from mergers at the same time as they were
adapting to changes in the qualifications they administered. The second was the
gradual reduction in the number of teachers willing to participate in the marking
process. The effect of these two problems was to affect the delivery of examination
results and add to questions over the Boards' reliability.
The second issue was one experienced by virtually every organisation during the
1990s: the escalating demands for ever-more-complex technology. Mergers inevitably
complicated technological issues further because of the need to ensure that newly
merged and usually very different systems were compatible. From the perspective of a
regulator, this was very often the source of difficulties, particularly when mergers
were involved:
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I suspect that one ofthe key areas ofdifficulty there has been computer systems,
you know more than people, where you're trying to bring together incompatible
things and somebody else is offering to make it all whiz-bang. I mean, I think
several of the bigger and more spectacular problems have been computer
generated - for Scotland as well, where there were similar very tense mergers
between vocational and academic.
(QCA32004)
The third internal pressure was a function of all the others: the cumulative effect of
externally-induced changes and internal personnel and technological pressures was an
inexorable rise in costs. The financial pressures on the three awarding bodies differed
in their severity and in how they were handled, but were certainly felt by all three. In
any market, the 'bottom line' is a vital indicator; for the Boards their eventual
acceptance of government subsidy was confirmation of their loss of independence.Of
the three factors, for AQA it was the personnel issue that was first to make itself felt.
1 Staff Problems Resulting from Change
The principal personnel issue was the destabilising effect of major change within two
long-established organisations as AEB and NEAB embarked on their Joint Venture,
the Assessment and Qualifications Alliance in Autumn 1998. Although the actual
change took place at the end of the 1990s, uncertainty about the future had been
hanging over staff since the publication of the Dearing Report in 1996 with its
recommendation that awarding bodies should seek "mergers, associations and
partnerships across the binary line "(Dearing 1996: 29). Once again, I recognise that
such uncertainty was not a problem for the examining boards alone; it was a feature
for many organisations facing mergers and takeovers during the 1990s. However in
this instance I submit that the change was imposed rather than chosen by the
organisations concerned. Then the negative effects of change had a direct impact on
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the ability of the organisation to fulfil its central role in providing reliable and valid
results for English students.
As indicated above, much has been written about the impact of change on any
organisation. The risks were well known to the first Director General of AQA. She
was a veteran of the 1987 merging of five CSE boards to form the Northern
Examining Association (NEA) for the GCSE followed n 1992 by the merger of NEA
with the Joint Matriculation Board (JMB) to form the Northern Examination and
Assesment Board (NEAB). These experiences had taught her that mergers were never
a simple process. Despite her evident concern to ease the process for staff, tensions
developed. The instability resulting from these tensions had real consequences for an
organisation whose only real asset is the skill of its staff.
From the emergence of AQA as a Joint Venture in November 1998, staff were
uncertain about their future and many were convinced that there was a north/south
power struggle involved under the surface. When after 16 months AEB and NEAB,
having bought out City & Guilds' GCSE provision to ensure their survival, agreed to
merge into a single organisation, any relief at this resolution was tempered by the
need to create a new staffing structure for the new organisation. Experienced and
long-serving staff were faced with deciding whether to apply for posts within the new
staffing structure, for which they had to undergo competitive interviews, often
involving employees from an organisation which they had always seen as a
competitor. While the new structure was taking shape, people had to learn to adapt to
new procedures. The two organisations had developed different approaches to
virtually every aspect of the examinations process. While it was readily agreed that
the principle of 'best practice' would guide the new organisation, in reality staff found
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that this could mean altering deeply ingrained habits. Yet there could be no
allowances made for all this when it came to producing examination papers,
processing entries, recording marks and turning out results on time. Even when the
new staffing structure had finally been put in place by the spring of 2002, there were
still considerable difficulties in forging a single approach. As mentioned above,
serious delays occurred in producing results in August 2002 which a subsequent
investigation attributed to staff failure to adapt to new uniform practices. It took
another year for these to become properly embedded. The then Director General
observed in a message to me in August 2003, following the end of my term as a
trustee, "You will be glad to know that so far everything has gone really well this year
- much better than 2002, a clear indication that merger had a real effect last year"
(Tattersall 2003).
A staffing matter related to the merger dashed AQA trustees' expectations that
eliminating the duplication inherent in two separate Boards would reduce costs. In
Bcreating the staffing structure for the new organisation, the directors had analysed
the staffing requirements of the five divisions of AQA and found that if they were to
be able to guarantee the required level of performance as qualifications changed and
demands for data increased, they had to increase staffing levels. This outcome - what
was clearly an internal issue resulting from external pressures - meant financial
reserves had to be tapped more deeply than anticipated. The financial effect on the
new organisation will be considered below.
Adapting to a new qualification structure
Not only did staff have to adapt to changes in practice In a new organisation.
Simultaneously they had to take on a completely new style of qualification and
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radically change one that had been a constant lodestar since 1951. The post-Dearing
decision that GNVQs should be provided by the same bodies that awarded academic
qualifications was addressed initially by AQA's purchase of City & Guilds' GNVQ
provision. The cost of this transaction [£1 million] had not been anticipated because
City & Guilds had been a member of AQA's initial joint venture until the threat of
government interference caused its strategic withdrawal.
To ensure a smooth transition, because the qualification was, of course, in active use
in post-16 institutions around the country, a core unit of City & Guilds staff continued
to administer the GNVQs for client schools and colleges while designated AQA staff
learned the procedures for the new acquisition. Such a hybrid arrangement proved
problematic and led to errors for which lines of responsibility were not clear. Even
when this dual control ended, the continual adaptations that QCA was suggesting for
GNVQ qualifications meant a drain on staff and consequently on costs. Then AQA
found that its acquisition of City & Guilds' market share - less than a quarter of
GNVQs across the country - did not provide the economies of scale that are essential
to ensure that administering a qualification is cost effective. This was another instance
of significantly increased costs resulting from an externally-generated requirement.
However, the GNVQ factor was a rmnor Issue compared with the complete
restructuring of A levels with the Curriculum 2000 reforms. While the wider effects
of this change to post-16 qualifications will be considered in the next chapter, here the
focus is on its effects on staff in the examining boards. The re-design of A levels
involved separating the qualification into a two-level structure. Advanced
Supplementary (AS) comprised three modules in each of four subjects as the norm for
year 12, and what was known as A2 meant that most students took three modules in
234
three subjects in year 13. For Board staff this meant a complete change in the rhythm
of their working year. There would no longer be a quiet season in the examining
world.
Following immediately on the ever-increasing appeals in September and October,
staff had to begin preparing for three sets of modular examinations in year 12, with a
33% increase in entries because virtually every student was now taking four subjects
as the norm rather than three. This change in itself would have required considerable
adjustment, but the new pattern had to accommodate the continuing administration of
what were termed 'legacy syllabuses': the second year of the 1999-2000 A-level cycle
plus retakes and various other leftovers. The effect was that staff were now handling
15 examination series in a year, each of which involved "detailed checking, handling,
aggregating and linking to entries within two IT systems" (AQA 2003a). For AQA
alone, examination entries increased between 2000 and 2002 by 14.5% This meant
processing 13 788 518 modules in the first year of the new staffing structure. Such
significant increases should have been good news for the newly merged organisation.
Unfortunately the increased administration generated by the move to modular
examinations required a 17.5% increase in processing staff at a cost which had not
been anticipated in the budget (AQA 2003a).
Adapting to the declining supply of markers
Another personnel-related issue also contributed to staff stress (and spiralling costs)
for all three assessment bodies. This was the growing shortage of teachers willing to
take on the task of examination marking. Problems in recruiting markers had been
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building gradually during the 1990s, but peaked at the end of the decade just as
demand for their services burgeoned. Since 1988 when the National Curriculum had
introduced Standard Assessment Tests at ages 7, 11 and 14, English pupils had
become the world's most externally tested school population. Yet it seemed that little
thought had been given to the source of skilled individuals needed to do the marking
of these assessments.
At one time it had been the case that teachers would volunteer to mark a-level or A-
level papers in order to combine increasing their professional expertise with an
opportunity to supplement a low level of income. Two apparently unrelated
developments had undermined this practice. Firstly, the Boards were supplying ever
more transparent data on students' performance. One no longer had to take on the
burden of marking in the evenings and at weekends in order to hone one's pedagogy
to ensure a better performance by one's classes. Secondly, with an ever-increasing
workload and an improving salary structure, teachers' motivation to take on extra time
commitments for a limited financial return was diminishing. Then Curriculum 2000
changed the A-level assessment pattern from what had been largely terminal
examinations to AS and A2 modules examined at three points in each year. It was left
to the Boards to cope with this diminishing supply of markers while the number of
assessments was suddenly increased by policy decisions beyond their control.
Neither the DfEE/DfES nor QCA - which as the system's regulator might have been
expected to take an interest in the issue - showed awareness of the problem until the
autumn of2001, when QCA's October Conference, oddly located at the Aston Villa
football ground in Birmingham, focused on the potential crisis in marker supply. The
departure of the DfEE delegation from this conference immediately after the keynote
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speeches and before the small group discussions with practitioners seemed indicative
of the curious lack of any feeling of responsibility by the Department. One wondered
whether Estelle Morris as Secretary of State for Education would have felt her civil
servants were serving her well by this failure to listen to practitioners who had been
invited at government expense to offer their experience of the realities of examination
marking. Certainly representatives of the examining boards and QCA took careful
note of what was said. However, none of the evidence of existing pressures had any
immediate effect. It took the crisis of September 2002 and the simultaneous arrival of
a new Chief Executive at QCA to do that.
Faced with the huge increase in the demand for markers, AQA established a unit of its
workforce dedicated to the recruitment of examiners and managed - just - to ensure
that all papers were marked by the August 2001 deadline. This, of course, meant
diverting the staff from other work and resulted in yet further costs to the
organisation. However, the staffing problems did not end when the papers had been
marked.
During the 1990s, the substantial increase in appeals over the grades awarded had
been a corollary of the increasing importance in those grades as 'gatekeepers' of
young people's future progress. What had once been a minor feature of the post-
results period was becoming a major activity for the Boards, absorbing staff time and
once again adding to costs. Then because the new AS/A2 awards of Curriculum 2000
had not earned any public confidence, the trickle of appeals became a flood. In
summer 2001, AQA had handled 29,757 Enquiries about Results; in 2002 the number
was 44,034 - a 48% increase (AQA 2003a). This enormous increase again was an
unbudgeted cost factor which meant yet more funds had to be found by senior staff
237
and agreed by trustees. All of these changes - in candidate entries, in modular results
and in appeals over those results - had to be produced by computer systems which,
though inanimate, were also showing signs of strain.
2 Upgrading Information Systems and Tracking the Data Explosion
Throughout the 1990s, all organisations were working against a background of rapidly
developing computer technology. For the examining boards, this meant the usual need
to replace typewriters with desktop computers, to ensure that electronic
communication reinforced telephone services - which teachers and examinations
officers now expected to be available whenever they wished to ask a question
(causing a near-revolt of switchboard staff in Manchester). AQA faced continual
problems in finding and financing the scarce and costly expertise needed to build
confidential data bases for the recording of results. Early experience with consultants
who failed to meet deadlines (which are not flexible in the world of examining)
demonstrated that the very specific needs of the examinations sector were best met by
ensuring a controlling role for AQA staff. Yet there was no spare capacity in the
staffing structure. If someone from the Information Technology and Communications
Division were to take on a particular development project, that individual's work had
to be covered by finding a suitably qualified person in a very competitive employment
market at a time when widespread fear of a 'millennium bug' was raising the costs of
computer expertise ever higher. In order to address this problem, the AQA trustees
had to make an exception in the new organisation's salary structure to provide
additional increments for the Information Technology division. This added another
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element to the very considerable costs of the necessary hardware and was, naturally, a
source of friction among other staff.
Whenever 'blue skies thinkers' considered the interface of the increasing volume of
papers to be marked and the diminishing supply of markers, a frequent solution
proposed was that the burden could be eased through the use of technology - usually
citing developments in North America or the Antipodes. This solution took no
account of the completely different terrain that qualifications occupy in England.
Firstly, there is no national qualification in the USA, Canada, or Australia, where
education is a state or provincial responsibility. As a consequence, any comparisons
with developments in New South Wales or Minnesota are on the basis of widely
differing numbers, purposes and cultural significance.
Secondly, because GCSEs and AS/A2 qualifications are uniquely 'high stakes' or
'gatekeeping' examinations, the requirements for reliability and validity are much
more rigorous. Thirdly, despite enthusiasts proclaiming the advantages of electronic
testing, there is a strong English suspicion that what is often referred to as 'tick box
assessment' is inferior to the individual's written answer to a question. Therefore,
although electronic testing is becoming increasingly sensitive, the Boards were all
aware that investment in more than a modicum of this technology could well prove
counter-productive if the users of examination results did not value the outcomes.
They were also becoming aware that there was a growing predatory interest in the
English examining scene from large-scale commercial organisations which specialise
in online testing. The attraction is undoubtedly the size of the English examinations
market: 26 million scripts and pieces of coursework in 2004. (Smithers 2004a) It was
the vocational field which experienced the first fully commercial newcomer.
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The interested party was the American test-processing company NCS, which
approached firstly OCR. Intervention from UCLES, never inclined to what it sensed
would be a subordinate role, halted embryonic cooperative plans and led to the
resignation of OCR's then Chief Executive. Next NCS turned to AQA, where
trustees' suspicions of a takeover in disguise led to the termination of a potential joint
project. Finally, in the autumn of 2002, Pearson, the multinational organisation which
describes itself as "the world's leading education company" (Edexcel 2003) - which
by then had acquired NCS as its assessment arm - found the entree it had been
seeking in a financially straitened Edexcel. As a result of what an Edexcel official
described as "one of the major downsides [to Curriculum 2000] - the financial
cost ...to awarding bodies" (Edexcel2 2003), Edexcel had posted a £7 million deficit
in 2002 (Edexcel2 2003). By spring 2003, Edexcel had placed the following
announcement on its website:
Pearson and Edexcel Create New Organisation to Modernise
Exam Marking and Processing
The new organisation, London Qualifications, was created with Edexcel owning 25%
and Pearson 75% of the equity. The website proclaimed that Pearson "plans a multi-
million investment programme over the next five years through London Qualifications
to introduce a technology-based approach to marking and processing examinations."
In a recent interview with the CEO and President of Pearson Assessment & Testing at
the impressive new Edexcel office in High Holborn, I learned that Pearson now
wholly owns Edexcel and is pressing ahead with its plans to introduce technology in
its quest to "close the loop" through providing assessments together with the support
through its textbook arm for identified weaknesses. (Edexcel4 2005)
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This acquisition of an examining board by a listed company was cited in September
2002 by a bitter Sir William Stubbs as evidence of Education Secretary Estelle
Morris's "amazing inability to turn educational ideas into policies." He claimed he
had written to her about "what would be a significant change to the system", but
received no reply. Then Junior Minister David Miliband later told him, "We believe in
a market policy; just let things go and see how it works" (Sunday Mirror 29
September 2002: I). Stubbs' warnings had certainly fallen on deaf ears, as the
takeover went through without questions being raised - except within the other
awarding bodies, who regarded with considerable suspicion this arrival of a listed
international company into their previously closed world of 'not for profit' bodies
with charitable status.
A less publicised takeover followed in November 2002 when the examinations
division of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry was acquired by GOAL
plc with plans to "exploit the Company's expertise [in the provision of vocational
qualifications] and extend its business into the UK post J6 education market and
overseas" (GOALplc 2001)
While aware of all this distracting activity, the awarding bodies' primary objective
was to ensure that their systems were able to cope with the ever-increasing demands
made upon them. Following mergers, they had to harmonise different systems. OCR's
problems in that respect were alluded to above. At the same time, the code of practice
drawn up by QCA required that their systems allocate a unique lifetime numerical
identifier for every candidate rather than simply allocate their own numbers to
candidates as entry forms were received. The advent of the modular AS/A2 meant
reporting results on a rolling schedule rather than an end-of-course basis. New
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employment regulations required a major upgrade in the personnel records kept on
their seasonally employed temporary staff - the thousands of markers and university
student checkers taken on for basic clerical tasks.
To address all these pressures, AQA planned 'IT Project AQAI5', which was to
design software capable of handling all the entries, module and overall results, plus
personnel data for both permanent and temporary staff. The Director of the
Information and Communications Technology Division estimated in January 2003
that: " ...project AQA15 will place even greater burdens on the team [likely to be
working on 10 to 11 other emerging projects], requiring 30 to 40 [external]
contractors at peak times." In making a case for increased staffing in his Division, he
pointed out that staff were:
...currently managing both the technical infra-structure for the AEB and NEAB
legacy systems and the technical infra-structure for the new AQA systems. By
2005106 AQA might expect to see some diminution in this workload as the
legacy syllabuses are de-commissioned In the short term it faces the dual
problem of managing the old and new in tandem and also supporting the
development and implementation of the new technical architecture (including
the management ofthe transitional problems).
(AQA 2003a)
These pressing needs in terms of personnel and technology, of course, translated into
spiralling costs for AQA. Yet the Board was powerless either to control many of the
costs or to increase its income substantially: a position of undeniable stress for any
organisation. Perhaps the financial situation illustrates most clearly that the Boards
were no long in control as independent organisations.
242
3 Not Calling the Tune, but Paying the Piper: The internal financial
pressures resulting from externally-generated change
It is difficult to credit in view of the dominant role of the English examining boards
within the financially hard-pressed English education system, but "their finances are
shrouded in secrecy. They are non-profit making organisations: limited companies
which also have charitable status" (Smithers 2002). Somehow the confidentiality
which they had acquired as professional examining bodies had covered their entire
operation. Never from their origins in 1903 (JMB) and 1953 (AEB) until the summer
of 2001 had any government agency investigated either board's finances. As
charitable bodies, they filed accounts annually with the Charities Commission, but
apart from confirming probity, such accounts reveal very little.
Then in 2001 QCA carried out an audit of the board's general qualifications
operation. AQA's Council, while confident that despite the ongoing restructuring
exercise the administration would stand up to such scrutiny, assumed that this was a
signal that government attention was beginning to look very carefully at the
organisation's finances. The Boards' curious status as non-profit-making bodies with
charitable status whose business was virtually entirely within the public sector meant
they received no state subsidy even for the costs of government-instigated
development. Over the years they had always tried to retain a prudent level of
reserves, a practice virtually unknown within the education sector and one that QCA
might well query. However the report in February 2002, while it commended the
"committed senior management team supported by equally committed staff' (QCA
2002a), no reference was made to the Board's finances.
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Yet at the same time, the rising costs of examinations to schools were a growing
source of complaint. The Secondary Heads Association claimed that "the exam bill of
an average secondary school of1200 students had doubled [as a result of Curriculum
2000] to around £100 000 in the past three years" (Smithers 2002).
Despite such complaints from those who had to pay examination fees, the Boards had
never been profligate. Throughout their existence, the presence as Trustees of a
number of practising educationists, who kept a weather eye on the budgetary
constraints within which the sector functioned, had ensured a prudent financial
regime. A clear example of such prudence was the decision of AQA's Trustees in July
2000 to hold the fees for the new Curriculum 2000 AS level examinations at £15
rather than increase the rate to cover the very considerable development costs. The
likely consequences to AQA's balance sheet were predicted in clear terms by the
Director of Resources. However, practising professionals among the Trustees pointed
out that the post-16 sector was facing the costs of the entire year 12 cohort sitting
three AS modules in four subjects without receiving additional government funding. It
seemed only fair that the costs of the new scheme be shared by the Board rather than
borne only by the institutions it served. In terms of the market, which had always to
be borne in mind, this was not an appropriate time to alienate 'clients' by raising the
price of qualifications.
As predicted, by summer 2002 AQA was facing a serious deficit. Because this is
illegal under the rules of the Charities Commission, the Trustees agreed to a rise in
fees for the following year. Rather than asking for full financial information to justify
the fees, QCA officials resorted to reminders that fee-capping was a power the
minister now held. (AQA 2002) This unwillingness to analyse the true costs of the
244
examining system is - to any outside observer - at the very least curious, and possibly
negligent behaviour by a regulator or a government department. Yet it is another
established feature of the English examining system.
No financial forecasts had adequately predicted AQA's sharply escalating costs. The
merger had been expected to reduce costs but instead staffing levels increased; the
doubling of appeals over results had not been anticipated; IT developments required
ever-increasing investment. Inroads were made into reserves to cover the capital costs
of new hardware and software and to fund the increased staffing costs resulting from
the merger. Eventually that source was exhausted and in January of 2003 AQA's
management had to request from its governing Council a supplement to the budget of
a total of £760 103 as a result of a combination of budgetary pressures summarised as
follows:
AQA has faced a number ofextraordinary financial pressures since its creation
in 2000. Firstly, it had to develop new syllabus specifications, designed and
assessed by QCA without regard to development costs, for all ofits mainstream
services [A-level subjects). This has also included the delivery ofhuge volumes
ofprinted materials to support the new specifications and deliver substantial in
service training programmes to support the teaching community. Secondly, to
create the infra-structure and ICT systems needed to deliver the new services.
These factors have generated both one-off development costs which have still
not completely run through the system [sic]. They have also generated some
ongoing costs as AQA 's examinations have moved predominantly from a linear
style of operation to a modular style. Thirdly, it has incurred one-off costs
created by the merger. Finally, it has been obliged to address a number of
fundamental issues outside the scope ofits control. For example:
National shortage ofexaminers.
Impact ofmulti-regulation on AQA 's affairs.
Increases in national insurance contributions.
Increases in pension contributions coupled with the full impact ofthe loss oftax
exemptions to superannuation schemes.
Shortage ofaccommodation.
Plunging equity markets.
Increased litigation from former employees and fee-earning personnel.
(AQA 2003a)
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From a surplus at 30 September 2000 of £3.71 millions, the board's position had
moved to a deficit of £17.64 millions as at 30 September 2003. This led ultimately to
the closure of offices in Newcastle and Bristol, with resulting redundancies.
Similar financial pressures on the London board had led to the takeover by Pearson
described above, while OCR - as always able to rely on the financial strength of
UCLES - shows signs of withdrawing somewhat from the heavily regulated arena. An
OCR official hinted at considerable dissatisfaction when he suggested that the
regulatory body comprised "mostly the staff who'd been [there] and therefore were
finding it very hard to understand what regulation was about. In fact [they] never
applied regulation; they actually applied government direction." This may explain his
saying that "now perhaps a little bit more than ever we're back fully in the fold ofthe
university and 1 think that colours the views and outlook ofthe organisation" (OCR2
2003).
The Boards Destabilised: The wrong time for major change
By the end of the final decade of the 20th century, the combined effects of these
external and internal pressures left the three unitary awarding bodies under severe
stress. Their professional autonomy had been significantly breached by increased
regulatory control, their organisational stability challenged by mergers, their financial
position weakened by unbudgeted costs. A necessary preoccupation with coping with
these various issues may have masked a full realisation of the extent of their loss of
control. It was at this low ebb in their history that they faced the greatest change to A
levels since they were created. At a point when their professional judgement was most
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sorely needed, the balance of power had altered to leave them in the position not of
the regulator's active partners but rather of passive clients. The result was a flawed
assessment structure for the revised A levels which led to the grades crisis of
September 2002. The debate surrounding the awarding of the first grades of
Curriculum 2000 will be presented as clear evidence that the Boards were no longer
in control of their central function.
Looking beneath the 1990s agenda: What was really happening
Again, before moving to consider the crisis which I suggest grew inexorably out of
the instability of the Boards brought about by the pressures of the 1990s, it is
important to return to my research questions and to reflect on the underlying
significance of the analysis I have presented.
This chapter has, I believe, has gone much of the way to answering the second and
third questions:
2 How did the successive changes to the examinations structure affect
their role?
3 What evidence is there of a shift in control from the Boards to the
State?
I believe I have demonstrated that the change to a single 16+ examination began the
process of reducing their professional independence over the technical aspects of that
qualification which continued and increased with the advent of GNVQ. I have
presented a volume of evidence that control was moving from the Boards to the state
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in the guise of a state-appointed regulator. Additional and, I suggest, conclusive
evidence for this power shift forms the core of the next chapter.
However, reflecting on my initial assumption that this power shift formed part of a
wider strategy of marketisation, I must acknowledge that the evidence suggests a
different interpretation of what happened to the examining boards during the 1990s.
Although marketisation may have been altering other sectors of the "educational
state ", the Boards experienced a virtual suppression of their established market.
Their freedom to trade as providers of English qualifications was dependent on a
regulatory licence, their products were controlled, and their prices subject to
regulatory capping. This reversal of a general trend has become clear only as a result
of assessing the evidence.
At the same time, I believe I have provided glimpses of the gradual decline in trust
which I suggested at the end of the previous chapter is the underlying shift that is
taking place in England. The State, in its quest for accountability, invokes ever-
tightening central regulation as the means to that end, without taking cognisance of
the cost of suppressing professional responsibility - whether in examining boards,
teachers or medical staff. I argue in the next chapter that the events of September
2002 provide clear evidence of such a cost in overriding the professional judgement of
experienced assessors.
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Chapter 5 The A-level Grades Crisis of September 2002: The
Boards become hostages to fortune
In August 2003, The Guardian's editorial referred to the previous year's crisis as "the
most damaging event in the [A level] exam's history". (The Guardian 14 August
2003) I shall consider this dramatic episode in the history of English examining
boards from the perspective of control: where power lay as between on the one hand
the three awarding bodies and on the other the grouping of their regulator, the
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), the education department (DillE,
then DffiS) and the Government as represented by ministers. Evidence will be cited to
suggest that by September 2002 the examining boards had lost control over what had
always been their professional preserve: both the A-level subject specifications and
the examinations to assess them. By this stage they were effectively providing an
administrative service without the ability to exercise their professional judgement. In
trying to sustain a particular argument based on such very recent events, I shall be
instructed by Denis Lawton's observation about his attempt twenty years ago to assess
the growing central control of the curriculum: "Part ofthe difficulty in trying to write
about continuing developments is that it is rarely possible to tell a complete story with
a happy (or even an unhappy) ending" (Lawton 1984: Preface) In this instance the
'story' is certainly not complete, although I will suggest possible alternative directions
it may take.
The chapter is structured with an introduction followed by three sections. The first
will concentrate on the period of the design of Curriculum 2000 prior to its launch in
September 2000. Then a brief section on some initial problems will be followed by an
analysis of the issues that surfaced in the crisis of September 2002. Much of the
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evidence will necessarily be derived from press coverage in the absence of other
sources considering such recent events. The lens through which the events will be
considered will be the perspective of the Boards. My contention is that with the
advent of Curriculum 2000 effective control had moved inexorably from a putative
partnership to reside fully in QCA hands - hands which may be considered a proxy
for government control.
A basic difficulty with this approach comes from attempting to establish a clear binary
position for the locus of power as between the three awarding bodies on the one hand
and QCA, the DfEE/DfES and the Government on the other. On one side, the
examining boards are difficult to treat as a single entity because they are becoming
more divergent than they have ever been - partly I will claim, in response to their
diminishing control over their core business.
On the other side, the lack of clarity in the relationship between QCA and the
DfEE/DfES compounds the questions which have always existed about the division of
responsibility between a minister and his/her advisers. This issue was raised directly
in the wake of the events of September 2002, when a Liberal Democrat MP
questioned QCA's independence from government "following revelations that its
deputy chief executive [Beverley Evans] is a civil servant from the education
department." Phil Willis's letter asked the Minister, "How can the government have
no role in the QCA 's operations when a serving civil servant from your department
occupies so senior a position there?" (EducationGuardian.co.uk 10 October 2002)
Even the new Chief Executive of QCA admitted shortly after taking up his post that:
In the education sector, the QCA does not have the conspicuous independence
that is the foundation of the credibility and authority of Ofsted, which is
accountable not to the Department for Education and Skills, but to Parliament.
Nor does it have the authority of bodies that regulate competitive markets in
250
other sectors and in other countries, such as the public provision oftransport or
energy or financial services.
(Boston 2002: 12)
Leaving aside considerations as to his view of QCA as a regulator equivalent to the
Financial Services Authority, Ken Boston's admission of the equivocal position QCA
occupies supports my case that it is difficult to separate out the responsibility for
policy decisions. Therefore I shall proceed on the basis that separating the strands of
power within that combination of forces is beyond the scope of this research. While
several interviewees have suggested that references to "the Minister" are probable
shorthand for civil servants' influence, for the purposes of this analysis, QCA as the
regulator will be treated as the locus of power confronted by the awarding bodies.
When QCA was established in 1997, the booklet which introduced it - claiming a
'Mission' for coherence and 'Values' which are open - described its 'Partners' III
prose which conceals more than it reveals:
The Government, which is responsible for maintaining the skills base of the
nation. QCA is a non-departmental government body under the Department for
Education and Employment, and has close links with it.
Awarding bodies, which offer a wide range ofqualifications including GCSEs,
GCEs, GNVQs and NVQs. They are responsible for syllabus development,
centre approval, standardisation ofmarking and quality assurance.
(QCA 1997: 7)
The conundrum implied by the status of a non-departmental government body
"under" a named department did not disappear with time. While acknowledging the
fluid nature of these distinctions, I shall base my analysis on the working assumption
of a binary division which gradually shifted from a partnership in 1997 to one of
patron/client as QCA gradually garnered to itself the most important of the
responsibilities it had initially perceived as resting with the awarding bodies. The
analysis of the significant change as Curriculum 2000 took shape will concentrate on
the movement in this power relationship. Therefore the emphasis will be on the
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process of the reform rather than a detailed consideration of the AS!A2 structure,
except where specific issues around the changes to the qualifications illustrate the
source of control.
1 Redesigning a Qualification: Amateurs instructing professionals
Despite these being the first real changes to A levels since their creation in 1947, there
is no document to cite which explains the changes embodied in Curriculum 2000. The
proposed new structure was outlined in the consultation document Qualifying for
Success circulated by the Department for Education and Employment following the
New Labour 1997 election victory. The purpose of the consultation was made clear in
the introduction:
This consultation seeks views on how to implement our manifesto commitment
for qualifications - to broaden A levels and upgrade vocational qualifications,
underpinning them with rigorous standards and Key Skills. It also seeks views
on whether and how to move towards an overarching certificate to recognise
achievement across these qualifications. It aims to build on the
recommendations in the Dearing Review of Qualifications for 16-19 Year OIds,
published in March 1996.
(DfEE 1997b: 3)
There was some concern amongst advocates of qualification reform when this
document indicated "a considerable reduction of [Labour's] objectives [as] outlined
in its pre-election Aiming Higher." The proposed changes "had not gone far enough
in a unified direction, did not promote accessibility to advanced level and remained
voluntarist" (Hodgson 2003). However, the consultation proceeded and the results
were announced in spring 1998 - confirming that A levels would move to a two-tier,
fully modular structure. The lower 6th or year 12 would comprise four or five subjects
comprising three Advanced Supplementary (AS) modules which could be used as a
stand-alone qualification. The upper 6th or year 13 (A2) would build on three of those
subjects through three further modules, resulting in one overall grade for each subject
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completed. Students could also study vocational subjects through a revised GNVQ
structure and were expected also to work on Key Skills in literacy, numeracy and
information technology.
The process of schools and colleges adjusting to these changes was researched by Ann
Hodgson and Ken Spours, and analysed in their 2003 book Beyond A Levels:
Curriculum 2000 and the Reform ofJ4-J9 Qualifications. As longstanding advocates
of a unified qualifications framework, they make the point that the reform:
...could more accurately be termed 'Qualifications 2000 ' [with its] voluntarist
approach, [leaving] market forces to determine which of the new qualifications
blocks schools and colleges would offer, what learners would decide to take,
and what higher education institutions and employers would recognize.
(Hodgson 2003: 160)
They concluded that "New Labour committed a fundamental political error in
choosing the compromised, partial and short-term perspectives of Dearing rather
than the more radical, comprehensive and longer-term approach ofAiming Higher"
(Hodgson 2003: 159). They attributed the new government's decision to the demands
of " ...Third Way politics ...playing to both traditional and progressive educational
opinions." They felt that some of the design flaws of the reformed qualifications
derive from the fact that they "were never seriously discussed with education
professionals whose experience of delivery might have ground out some of the most
obvious mistakes" (Hodgson 2003: 160). As seems always to be the case with such
academic overviews, the writers do not include the awarding bodies among
"education professionals". They characterised the period following the consultation,
which ended in spring 1998, as ''followed by a protracted period ofsilence ofalmost
two years while ministers and the officials from the DjEE, QCA and awarding bodies
discussed the designs of the new qualifications." These discussions "took place
largely behind closed doors"(Hodgson 2003: 160).
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From the perspective of the awarding bodies, while their representatives may have
been behind those closed doors, their misgivings, based on professional judgement
and assessment expertise, were essentially either questioned or ignored. Even non-
partisan advice seemed to carry no weight. A report written in 1998 for QCA by
Roger Porkiss, experienced examiner turned maths consultant who had been
commissioned to design one of OCR's new specifications, had warned QCA that "the
system would lead to a rise in high grades ..." (The Observer, 22 September 2002: 8).
Although the Boards had been experiencing gradual inroads into their original
independence since the middle of the twentieth century, QCA was now exerting
control of a quite different order from what they had known during the creation of
either GCEs in the late 1940s or even GCSE in the mid 1980s. For the examining
boards, there was to be no question of voluntarism: QCA's requirements were
compulsory.
The time factor
The process of creating the new qualifications absorbed an inordinate amount of time.
Initially, the Boards had expected a less radical Dearing-based reform to be
implemented in 1999. An official from one board explained how delay and
subsequent changes proved costly to the Boards:
When the decision was made to implement some of [Dearing's] more radical
suggestions, it was a bit late in the day. Because ...there was intended to be a
'Curriculum 1999', although it wasn't called that. All of the boards were
geared up to producing [that version] and indeed we'd done most of the work.
Certainly from Edexcel 's point ofview, our expenditure hadjust about exceeded
£1 million when ministers decided everything would go on hold and be changed
radically for the following year. Interestingly enough, that development cost
was borne entirely by the Boards, and multiplied up by, in fact five, because
Wales and Northern Ireland were all involved. And it did create a large hole in
our budget.
(EdexceI22003)
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However a less obvious cost was in time. The protracted discussions and debates left
insufficient time for the proper processes of development, because, "for most of us
there is a two-year lead time to preparing an exam paper" (Edexcel2 2003) Yet
essential decisions could not be taken by Board staff because it was clear that the
power to make final decisions lay elsewhere. The same official expressed this feeling:
Throughout the whole, we thought there was considerable political interference
in both the pace of curriculum development and some of the decisions that
needed to be made. Many ofthe decisions were allegedly 'with ministers', which
is code for the 'civil servants' normally.
(EdexceI22003)
As time was passing and QCA was still withholding approval of many of the new
subject specifications, the Boards suggested postponing the implementation of the
new system for another year. They were aware that schools and colleges recruit in the
autumn for the following year's intake to post-16 courses. Those institutions were
understandably keen to be clearer about the courses for which they were recruiting;
yet it was not until 19 March 1999 that a letter went out to Heads and Principals from
the DillE informing them that "QCA will be sending you a briefing document on the
details behind the reforms early next month" (DillE 1999). The understandable
frustration of the institutions at such a delay was directed toward the awarding bodies,
who were perceived to be slow at producing their new specifications.
As the first year of the new all-modular structure proceeded, a dawning realisation of
some consequent pressures were surfacing in the education press:
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Large sixth-form colleges may struggle to cope with this summer's A-levels
because popular exams for students in the upper and lower sixth have been
scheduledfor the same day.
(TES 19 January 2001: 10)
The work is taking up so much time that it doesn't leave much for anything
else, " said Harriet Riley, 17, who is studying English, art, drama and general
studies.
(I'ES 18 May 2001: 24)
As many as 100,000 students will take the new exam and as a result the cost of
exam fees, invigilators, new desks, administration staff and full-time
examination officers has increased as much as 50 per cent for some schools.
(TES 8 June 2001: 6)
At Colchester sixth-form college staffare grappling with a logistical nightmare
to ensure that students get the chance to sit their papers. The number ofexam
entries at the college, which has more than 2,000 students, has more than
tripled to 24,000 this year. The exam budget ...will be £320,000, a huge rise on
the £178,000 spent last year.
(TES 8 June 2001 :6)
This early frustration was one of the contributing factors that fuelled the schools'
outburst of anger with the awarding bodies in September 2002. Of course QCA did
not confess to its role in holding up specifications nor did the DillE explain that the
timetable was politically driven and there was to be no question of delay. They
followed the prudent practice of saying nothing and did not admit to any
responsibility for the timing problems. This left the Boards in an invidious position.
Had they responded by blaming QCA for the delay or made public their requests for
postponing implementation of the new system, they would have been publicly
acknowledging their weakness. Nonetheless, I consider that this failure to defend
themselves in the face of the frustration expressed by schools and colleges to be
another indication of their loss of autonomy.
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Structural weaknesses: building in grade inflation
There were myriad rmnor disputes which reinforced the powerless status of the
Boards. One Board official detected the influence of a strong hand during the process
of approving the new syllabuses - henceforth to be known as specifications II:
We had countless very small but accumulated [changes]. They aggregated to
become something big. Small influences: for example, the approval of
syllabuses. The detail and the changes forced on us which in truth have made
assessment difficult. And in some cases stupid! They were telling the experts,
'This is what you've got to do.' That's not regulation; that's government
stipulation. Well, and then I'm not even sure that ... it's Government. I can't
believe the politicians ...are the ones doing it. It's a group ofpeople who are
acting under some sort of aegis that they believe that they got for themselves
that other people find difficult to challenge. Now challenge you could do, until it
[regulation] became statutory. But once you've made them statutory, challenges
become very difficult, because there's no appeal mechanism.
(OCR2 2003)
There were apparently minor issues the Boards tried in vain to raise as needing more
reflection:
Things like re-sit rules, things like requirements for synoptic assessment, et
cetera were all a bit poorly thought through. And also the 'one size fits all'
model, in other words all subjects go into six modules, was a backward step;
some of the more successful modular syllabuses had been four rather than six.
(Edexce12 20003)
This is clear evidence that in matters involving assessment expertise the Boards were
no longer able to win arguments. Control had passed out of their hands and had now
effectively moved to government agencies, if not to Government itself
From at least one viewpoint on the regulatory side, it appeared that a parallel process
was inhibiting regulatory decisions: in this case, it seemed that policy ruled regardless
of findings based on evidence. Even here it seemed that important decisions were
being made elsewhere:
It doesn't matter what you've found; if it's not comfortable with the policy, it
doesn't matter. So there were elements of that. I suppose it's always that
interesting thing in those policy-gearedplaces like QCA that there is the buzz of
policy - but there's also the total frustration it dictates. It doesn't matter what
you've found, if it's not comfortable with the policy it doesn't matter. And that
whole fascinating thing about how decisions are made - and rarely are they
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made on sifting carefully the evidence, because ...everybody's moving from one
meeting to the next so quickly that nobody actually reflects on very much at all.
I mean, there were several of us, including the awarding bodies, who were
arguing ...about how you combine AS and A2 scores and warning about what
was going to happen.
But then you're told that this cannot be countenanced by the Minister, who
probably hasn't said a thing about it at that point. You know, that whole
'Minister is minded' sort of mind-reading bit which is deeply frustrating
because ministers are often much more flexible than the people who are
protecting them.
(QCA32004)
This perception that ministers are in some way at the mercy of their civil servants has
a long history and some reliable data, as well as television's Sir Humphrey, to support
it. However there may be a decision-making network that is more complex than
appears on the surface. This was certainly the case in the central issue in the dispute
over grades in September 2002.
This was the critical matter of the combination of ASIA2 scores to produce a final
grade. The source of the problem was a combination of semantic and mathematical
misunderstandings. In their research into the early stages of Curriculum 2000,
Hodgson and Spours reported that Lord Dearing, in confirming that the new AS
proposed in his 1996 Report would form a constituent sub-set of the full A-level
course as well as a self-standing qualification in its own right, also:
...confirmed that the weighting for the AS, in terms of the total A level grade,
would be 40 per cent and 60 per cent for the rest ofthe A level (later to become
known as A2), because the former was intellectually less demanding than the
latter. At the same time, however, he argued that in terms of UCAS points,
performance tables and national targets, the AS should count as 50 [per cent of
an A level] because it was covering halfthe content and halfofthe time ofa full
A level. The reason for the allocation of 50 per cent UCAS points was to
incentivize the take-up ofthe ASfor broadening purposes.
(Hodgson 2003: 83)
Dearing's entirely sensible differentiation between the 40/60 weighting of ASIA in
producing a final overall grade as distinct from the allocation of 50% of UCAS points
for each award proved too complex for general consumption. Following the 1998
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consultation by New Labour via Qualifying for Success "the issue ofcredit value was
clarified with the AS now counting for 50 per cent of the A level grade as well as 50
per cent in terms of UCAS points and in performance tables" (Hodgson 2003: 84).
The use of the agentless passive "was clarified' can be assumed to indicate
responsibility to rest with either a minister's Labour Party political advisers or
education department civil servants. What is certain is that no one with any sound
grasp of the results of such a 'clarification' would have failed to realise that it would
mean an inevitable rise in grades.
Yet both an able administrator and an intelligent Minister endorsed the decision. In
January 1999, Sir William Stubbs, Chairman of QCA, wrote to Baroness Blackstone,
Junior Minister with responsibility for qualifications. He was reporting on the
proposed changes that the regulatory authority had developed "to implement the
Government's policy to broaden A levels ...." Introducing the criteria for the new
Advanced Subsidiary examination, he referred to "a new AS qualification
representing the first half of the full A level and contributing half the weighting"
(Stubbs 1999: 6). This letter provides incontrovertible evidence that Sir William
suffered a form of cognitive dissonance regarding the finer points of assessment. His
advocacy of equal weighting for AS and A2 was in direct conflict with his second
firm principle about maintaining standards overt time, reported on the BBe's
website:
QCA chairman Sir William Stubbs said on Wednesday the three awarding
bodies "had it made perfectly clear to them that they had to maintain standards
over time, that the standards ofA-level were not expected to go up, nor were
they expected to decline, and they have been reminded of that a number of
times. "
(BBC.co.uk 19 September 2002)
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The representatives of the Boards had argued against equal weighting from the outset,
as recalled by a QCA official:
...there were several of us who were arguing that, you know, that the whole
combination - and including the awarding bodies - about how you combine AS
and A2 scores and warning about what was going to happen, and all that kind
ofthing. And 1 know lots ofpeople have come out ofthe woodwork and said, 'It
was my idea' and 'We said it' and 1 think in truth there were three or four
groups saying it at the same time: that the way to do it is to separate it. But
then you're told that this cannot be countenanced by the Minister ....
(QCA32003)
Those who could foresee the inevitable result of equal weighting tried to explain that
the standard students might be expected to attain at the end of one year of study could
not reasonably be as high as that at the end of two years. Therefore AS level
assessments would have to be set at a lower standard than those of A2. If the two sets
of results were then weighted equally, there was a mathematical certainty of higher
grades - leading to the dreaded accusations of'grade inflation'. Their arguments were
to no avail. When Baroness Blackstone replied to Sir William Stubbs on 19 March,
she endorsed the equal weighting in unmistakable terms:
Where the AS represents the first halfofthe A level, it should contribute 50% of
the marks available for the full A level.
(Blackstone 1999: 1)
It is difficult to understand how two intelligent people, no matter what their advisers
were telling them, could have failed to foresee the inevitable result of this decision. It
was all the more puzzling in view of the opposite approach being taken with regard to
GNVQ assessment. Here, because the individual could select from a variety of
modules to put together a three-unit, a six-unit or a twelve-unit course, it had been
deemed necessary for reasons of rigour to assess all units at the synoptic level - that
is, making no allowance in degree of difficulty for modules taken during the first year
of study. It was again evident to those experienced in assessment that the proposals
were building in a disparity in outcomes between A levels and AVCEs (the new title
260
for Advanced GNVQs) despite an overriding objective of the whole reform being to
bridge the academic-vocational divide. This refusal by QCA and the Minister to
accept sound professional advice from the awarding bodies confirms that their proven
competence in technical assessment matters no longer carried any weight. They had
become clients rather than equal partners.
There were additional inflationary features of the new structure whose effect no one
seemed to have anticipated: the opportunity for students to re-sit modules in order to
improve their results and to discard the weakest of their AS levels and carryon with
their three strongest subjects. Because students would receive the results of their three
AS modules serially, they could decide to re-sit modules where their results were
unsatisfactory. Then, when embarking on their A2 year, it would clearly be in their
interest to continue only with those subjects which would earn them the highest total
points for university entrance applications. These factors would, like the equal
weighting decision, have meant an inevitable upward drift in results. Perhaps only
those working in schools who understood the instrumental approach students take
towards subject choice in order to maximize their chances could have foreseen this
behaviour, and as Hodgson and Spours had found, those educationists were left
completely outside the discussions of Curriculum 2000 (Hodgson 2003: 160).
A final factor that was overlooked was the motivation teachers now had to ensure that
their students achieved the best possible outcomes. Once the annual publication of
'league tables' of examination results had begun, those results had become of vital
importance not just to the candidates but to the future of the institution they had
attended. Assessment research has uncovered consistent evidence to endorse the
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ability of teachers to maximise the performance of their students if there is external
pressure to do so. One expert in the field expressed this finding:
Ifyou make a particular performance indicator a policy target and make the
stakes high enough, then the people at the sharp end will do everything they can
to improve their score on the performance indicator.
(Wiliam 2001: 59)
Regulating the qualifications market
A third issue that concerned the Boards was QCA's approach to reducing the number
of specifications. Although the wide variety of syllabuses had been developed in
response to the demands of teachers over the years, the Boards had accepted Lord
Dearing's observation that, in the interests of comparability, "There is a strong case
for reducing syllabus numbers in a controlled and systematic way to improve the
quality ofexaminations and to enable a more comprehensive monitoring programme
to be carried out" (Dearing 1996: 87). Their concern at QCA's manner of reducing
the syllabus numbers changed to alarm when a letter from a QCA official to the Joint
Council for General Qualifications stated bluntly that:
The number of specifications should reflect the reduction in the number of
awarding bodies in England. It is not appropriate for one ofthe three awarding
bodies in England to offer 30% more specifications than the other two; the
numbers of specifications in art, economics, English, psychology, and media
studies offered by AQA are not consistent with the overall pattern ofprovision.
(QCA 1999)
This was particularly difficult to accept in the context of market forces and the
enforced merger of the two Boards offering the largest number of A-level syllabuses
which in 1998 had handled 65% of the A-level entry (Tattersall 1999). [see Figure
4.3]
A compromise of sorts was agreed, but this issue was further proof that the Boards
were no longer free to design qualifications suited to their different client groups.
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Decisions about what they were allowed to offer were being taken with no regard to
previous patterns of choice by teachers. They were now in the position of 'licensed
traders' whose products could be offered only with the imprimatur of QCA, who were
running a strictly controlled market.
QCA's Leadership Problems
At the most critical period in its brief existence, QCA experienced major changes at
the top which were to affect the way it dealt with the problems resulting from the new
qualification structure. First, in summer 2000 the founding Chief Executive, Dr
Nicholas Tate, resigned to become Head of Winchester School. After the events of
September 2002, Tate was quoted as telling the Headmasters' Conference that:
As early as 1996, we were worried about how we were going to get the grading
right. Ifwe had been more open about the fact that grades were likely to go up,
there would have been less concern when they did
(The Daily Telegraph 2 October 2002: 1)
This was something of an understatement. His successor was Professor David
Hargreaves, who took the helm as Curriculum 2000 was launched in September 2000.
In the first year of the new structure, head teachers complained about the problems
they faced in running so many additional examinations, students criticised the
timetabling which meant some had to sit multiple papers in a single day, and teachers
felt they were rushing to complete modules. These 'teething problems' were
investigated by Professor Hargreaves, who produced a rather anodyne report,
suggested improvements to the examining timetable then promptly resigned his post.
He too, in hindsight, confessed to the Headmasters' Conference that "there was a time
when he was responsible for the new exam that he thought the best course would be
'to pull the whole thing apart'" (The Daily Telegraph 2 October: 1) The heads were
reported as noting that neither Dr Tate nor Professor Hargreaves seemed to accept any
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responsibility for the debacle, nor did either explain why they had failed to warn the
Government of the impending storm. This failure to accept responsibility seemed to
be normal behaviour at QCA.
Following Professor Hargreaves' sudden departure, QCA's board faced a leadership
hiatus at this crucial time; their solution was to appoint their chairman, Sir William
Stubbs, as acting Chief Executive until they could arrange to appoint Professor
Hargreaves' successor. This decision, like that over the weighting of AS and A2
grades, had serious consequences.
Sir William Stubbs was a very experienced education administrator who had risen to
become the last Chief Executive of the Inner London Education Authority before its
abolition, then gone on to lead the Further Education Funding Council. Descriptions
of him regularly hint at a combative nature: "rumbustious as ever" or "respected but
not liked [in QCA]". (The Guardian, 28 September 2002: 5) More important, perhaps,
was his complete lack of experience of the finer points of examination assessment
when he was about to be involved in a crisis which hinged precisely on assessment
details. In his combined role of QCA Chairman and Chief Executive, Sir William was
very much in charge of all the discussions with the examining boards as Curriculum
2000 took shape. The questionable decision over AS/A2 weighting which he
commended to Baroness Blackstone was referred to above. It was only in May 2002
that a new Chief Executive was eventually appointed, to take up his post in September
2002 and face the consequences of Sir William's actions.
The new leader of QCA was Ken Boston, an Australian who had successfully
managed the introduction of a scheme of vocational education in New South Wales.
The enthusiasm he was expected to bring to widening the appeal of vocational
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education in England had no chance to flourish. He had barely arrived at the QCA
office in Piccadilly before the crisis burst upon him.
2 The September 2002 fiasco: Awarding bodies in the dock
Following the first set of results for the restructured A2 qualification, the reliability of
some of the grades awarded was questioned at a national level in September 2002.
Press coverage of what became known as 'the A-level fiasco' began with an article in
The Observer of I September detailing the inexplicable result for a Hertfordshire
student whose expected A grade was dragged down to a C because an examining
board had awarded U grades to the two final modules. The perceived injustice of such
an outcome hinged on the fact that the student then failed to meet the grade
requirement for her university place. Over the next fortnight, an ever-growing number
of similar cases emerged, until n" September, when the TES published a front page
article headlined: Teachers' outrage at exam board A level fix. The charge by a
considerable number of head teachers was that the awarding bodies had altered some
students' module results to ensure that the new A2 grades were not inflated in relation
to preceding A-level results. Such was the resulting media furore that the QCA's
bound collection of one month's press cuttings on the issue weighed 2.4 kilos (QCA
2002b).
As discussed above, decisions taken despite the Boards' protests had virtually ensured
higher grades for the A2. Therefore the crisis is considered as conclusive evidence of
the Boards' role having become that of virtual pawns in the system. They were caught
between head-teachers' irate accusations of unfair meddling with marks and Sir
William Stubbs' insistence that he had done nothing more than make clear to the
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Board that standards must be maintained. In fact, he went so far as to make a
statement to the press that seemed to be a confession of his responsibility for the grade
changes to anyone who knew of his earlier insistence on the equal weighting of AS
and A2 modules:
QCA chairman Sir William Stubbs said on Wednesday that the three awarding
bodies 'had it made perfectly clear to them that they had to maintain standards
over time, that the standards of A-level were not expected to go up, nor were
they expected to decline, and they have been reminded of that a number of
times.
(bbc.co.uk 18 September 2002)
To quell the outcry, Education Minister Estelle Morris requested that QCA conduct
an immediate investigation into the grading process. Ken Boston, in post at QCA for
barely a fortnight, took charge and reported on 20 September that "some teachers or
schools ...might not have understood what was expected ofpupils under the new A-
level exam system" (bbc.co.uk 20 September 2002) This suggestion raised the level of
outrage in schools still further. Many of the schools involved were in the private
sector and had a financial interest in protecting the reputation of their teachers as
above reproach. The result was that the Minister asked Mike Tomlinson, former Chief
Inspector of Schools, to carry out another investigation into the affair. He was to
report initially by 27 September with recommendations for solving the grading
controversy so that aggrieved students would have their status clarified. Then he
would continue his investigations to produce a full report by the beginning of
December.
The heat was taken out of the crisis with the publication of Tomlinson's Interim
Report on 27 September. He broadly exonerated both QCA and the Boards, who
clearly had felt under pressure from QCA to "deliver outcomes largely in line with the
performance of students in 2001", but did acknowledge that "the actions taken with
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regard to the marks ...did vary across the three boards." OCR had made more radical
alterations to bring grades into line with previous norms. His wider conclusions were
that the roots of the problem lay "in decisions made by the DjES and QCA" and, as
cited above, "a longstanding misunderstanding ofthe difference between maintaining
a standard and the proportion of candidates meeting that standard' (Tomlinson
2002a).
The Boards were required to reconsider all instances of borderline grades, and
ultimately "1,945 candidates received higher overall AS and A grades" (Tomlinson
2002b: para 10). Estelle Morris dismissed the truculent Sir William Stubbs
immediately and resigned herself later in October, both casualties of the affair.
However, it is the position of the Boards that is of concern here: as the CrISIS
progressed, their role altered perceptibly from that of actor responsible for wronging
students to that of victim of others' decisions. In what was intended as a political slur
on the government, the Daily Mail perhaps inadvertently summed up their position:
Given this impossible position, where the QCA has responsibility without
power, it is no surprise that it presided over the persistent watering down of
exam standards, allowing successive ministers to claim success for their
education policy. At the same time, it has tightened its grip on the supposedly
independent exam boards, who are frightened oflosing their licences and do as
they are told.
(Daily Mail 21 September 2002: 7)
Damaging fallout from the crisis
The Boards' reputation was, of course, severely tarnished by the whole episode.
Tomlinson's Interim Report had absolved them of culpability, but had qualified this
general exoneration with the words:
I am, however, concerned that the OCR AO (Accountable Officer, ie Chief
Executive) judged that his duty to maintain the standard made it necessary to
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lift grade boundaries in a significant number of units so substantially in the
light ofstatistical evidence.
(Tomlinson 2002b: para 34)
Subsequent conversations with several of my acquaintances from the examinations
world reveal a widespread view that the Boards would have emerged from the crisis
in a better light if the Chief Executive of OCR had followed the Minister's example
by resigning. His remaining in his post reinforced the impression that the Boards
cannot be held responsible for their actions because genuine control resides
elsewhere. Perhaps, had he acknowledged as he did when interviewed in 2004 that
2002 "was the first really common A-level exam at OCR" (OCR2 2003), he might
have gone some way to explaining that the difficulty was specific to OCR rather than
a fault in the whole system. Certainly that was the retrospective view of another
examining board manager:
What was wrong with Curriculum 2000 was that it created a very complex
technical problem and it went wrong in one awarding body. [The Chief
Executive of OCR] alone decided against dealing with the complexity. That was
the cause of the whole thing. One board's decision affected a small number of
candidates. There was no real crisis.
(AQA32005)
This was far from the general view prevalent at the time. In the national press the
Boards' reputation had been repeatedly impugned, and the need for their existence
questioned in an unprecedented manner. After suggesting that the September 2002
crisis should be regarded as evidence that "the whole system ofpublic examining in
England is not worthy ofthe confidence ofparents, students or teachers", The Times
raised the issue of comparability:
The more serious [than bureaucratic errors] accusation, however, is that exam
boards acquire a specialism in terms of their clients (some 90 per cent of
independent schools use OCR for example) and this may influence policy. The
suspicion remains that the same individual could acquire varying grades for
essentially the same material depending on which board held their scripts.
(The Times 7 September: 21)
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The Daily Telegraph also assumed varying levels of rigour among the Boards:
Schools that choose the OCR - and they are by no means all fee-paying - do so
precisely because it is seen as the most rigorous of all the examining boards.
(The Daily Telegraph 17 September: 21)
Although it would seem logical for a school determined to exploit differences among
the Boards to select the one most likely to produce the most favourable grades, this
suspicion that one was "more rigorous" than another had survived virtually from the
Boards' creation. One of the aims of merging the examining boards had been to put an
end to concerns about comparability. It seemed that the grading crisis had resurrected
such concerns, and cast a shadow over the Boards.
The Boards may no longer have been in control of the qualifications they
administered, but a subtext in the media coverage suggested that they were somehow
both incompetent and financially motivated in introducing Curriculum 2000. A
headline in The Times of 24 September claimed that "Schools pay £40m a year to
boards". Although the article stated correctly that "costs have risen sharply under the
Government's 'Curriculum 2000' reforms", there was no indication that there would
have been corresponding increases in the costs to the Boards of administering all
those modular units.
Gratuitous blows were aimed from other quarters. Conor Ryan, who had acted as a
special adviser during David Bunklett's four years as Secretary of State for Education
- and presumably been involved in establishing QCA, wrote severely in The
Independent:
There is no justification for having three competing boards. Competition has
produced little innovation, and their credibility was poor before recent
allegations.
(The Independent 26 September: 2, 3)
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Acting to defend the government - which Tomlinson's Interim Report was to absolve
of influencing "the expected outcomes"(Tomlinson 2002a) - Graham Lane was even
more merciless in attacking the Boards. Speaking as chair of the Education
Committee of the Local Government Association, he told The Daily Telegraph:
We do not blame the Government. We put the blame on the exam system, which
is too secretive. It is a big, money-making business and the government is now
seeing the effects ofhaving exams run by private companies in competition with
each other.
This episode also raises the question ofwhether we need just one exam board
(The Daily Telegraph 21 September: 8)
Occasionally journalists took a wider view and recognised that the issue was not a
simple matter. The Financial Times interpreted the episode as revealing the perils of
"the new breed ofregulators" who have become "new decision makers":
The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority did what Whitehall dreads. It
became a loose cannon, a rogue regulator, unpredictable, challenging its
department, apparently unable to supervise its patch effectively but at the same
time taking to the air waves to cause havoc elsewhere.
(Financial Times 3 October: 21)
Ted Wragg, a wry observer of the education scene, saw the crisis as yet another
incident in the predictable chain of events that take place every August:
Every summer two sets ofcombustible material are rubbed together .... First we
ask examination boards to process 24,000,000 scripts in very little time, a
tenfold increase compared with a few years ago. The resulting mountain of
paper is the tinder. The second element is an inescapable consequence of the
government turningpublic examination results into a 'high stakes' issue.... That
is the box ofmatches. Book the fire brigade in advance, as there is bound to be
at least one conflagration every August.
(Guardian Education 24 September: 2)
After the publication of Tomlinson's Interim Report and the resignations of Sir
William Stubbs and Estelle Morris, the media focus moved elsewhere while the
Boards carried out the reconsideration of the borderline cases. By the time
Tomlinson's final report was published on 2 December 2002, the issue had lost its
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urgency as a focus in the media. However it was of major importance to the awarding
bodies.
Tomlinson's Final Word on the Matter
Regarding the crucial issue of the relationship of QCA to the awarding bodies,
Tomlinson gently rapped QCA's knuckles:
In particular there is a significant lack ofclarity about the boundaries between
QCA 's role in overseeing and ensuring the health of the qualifications system
and the awarding bodies' responsibility for operational management of that
system and the qualifications outcomes to which it leads.
But it should not become involved in managing the detail of the awarding
bodies' responsibilities in relation to the setting, marking and grading of A
levels and other qualifications.
(Tomlinson 2002b: para 89)
He therefore recommended that:
...as clear a distinction as possible is maintained between (a) QCA's
responsibility for monitoring and coordinating delivery, andfor overseeing and
guaranteeing standards and the general health of the qualifications system and
(b) the awarding bodies' individual responsibility for managing effective
delivery oftheir own qualifications to students, schools and colleges.
(Tomlinson 2002b: para 95)
This might have implied that the Boards were to reclaim a degree of their former
autonomy. Tomlinson did endorse the continued existence of three awarding bodies,
both to provide choice to users and to limit "the risk ofsystem failure present where
there is only one" (Tomlinson 2002b: para 100). This rather faint endorsement along
the lines of 'for fear of finding something worse' was not lost on the examining
boards because Tomlinson went on to attack "differences between awarding bodies in
their administrative practices ..."(Tomlinson 2002b: para 102) and to recommend
moves toward greater consistency in fee structures, entry procedures, production of
results and appeals procedures. To an examination board officer, "all of it, I think [is]
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pointing to the independence and the different characteristics of awarding bodies
disappearing"(AQA22003).
Eliminating the administrative distinctions between the Boards may be dismissed as a
symbolic gesture. Tomlinson's Final Report went no further. In carrying out his
recommendations and working to fulfil their obligations in providing an effective
qualifications service the Boards were hard pressed financially, as was demonstrated
above. Loss of financial independence is certainly not symbolic, but signifies an
incontrovertible diminution of autonomy. To an individual who had spent a career
working at all levels in examining boards, the current situation is clear:
Increasingly, money is being offered from the centre - for example in terms of
the recruitment of examiners and improving the pay of examiners. But that
money comes with strings, as money always will come with strings from
government. There again the supposed independence - and I do say 'supposed'
because I think it has become more of a mirage as times have gone on - the
supposed independence of the boards [is] being eroded by their increasing
reliance on finances coming from the centre.
(AQA22003)
The above statement confirms my contention that at the end of 2002, the English
examining boards could no longer be described as independent. A concluding chapter
will summarise the basis for this position and suggest possible future directions for
the Boards.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions: The Boards in the 21st century
This final chapter will begin with a summary of the answers to my research questions
and a reconsideration of the conclusions the evidence has suggested. I shall then
present my overall conclusions and finish by outlining two potential scenarios,
stemming from those conclusions, for the future of the English examining boards.
What does the evidence suggest? My answers to my research
questions
1 How did the independent examining boards evolve?
The question as to how the curious constellation of independent examining boards
evolved from their origins accrediting matriculation to particular universities was
answered with historical data presented in the form of a narrative. This approach has
demonstrated how what were initially almost random decisions hardened into
established practice, aspects of which have lasted to the present day. Perhaps the most
significant of these was the inability of Oxford and Cambridge to agree in 1859 to
offer examinations jointly. This apparently minor difference of opinion set the pattern
of separate university examining boards. Other aspects of the initial arrangements
which were virtually set in stone from the outset were the timing of examinations in
June and the age for the two levels of external examination as 16 and 18. Despite all
that has changed, those basic elements of the pattern have survived, although the
recent move to a modular structure has eroded the dominance of June in the
examination timetable.
Then, despite recommendations in the Clarendon Report, the Taunton Report and the
Bryce Report, the concept of a single national examination system was never accepted
273
by Victorian policy makers who saw education matters as outside the remit of central
government. When the multitude of professional entry examinations led to the Dyke
Acland Report in 1911 with its recommendation of a single system of accreditation,
the existing university boards were charged with creating the structure of School
Certificates and Higher Schools Certificates. They were then installed as the majority
group in the Secondary Schools Examinations Council, established in 1918 to oversee
the system. Clearly, despite the move to a national examination structure, the Boards
had not only remained independent, but were virtually self regulating. Their status
continued unchanged for thirty years.
2 How did changes to the examinations system affect the Boards' status?
With the 1944 Education Act and the replacement of the system of Schools
Certificates by the single-subject General Certificate of Education at Ordinary and
Advanced levels, the Boards experienced a first move toward central control over
their operations. Firstly, they were sidelined by their own chairman Sir Cyril
Norwood in the publication of his report on secondary education and examinations,
which went directly to the President of the Board of Education. When they did see the
report, they were alarmed to learn that Norwood had suggested that their examinations
be phased out, to be replaced by schools' own assessments. That recommendation
never came to pass; on the contrary, examinations became ever more firmly
embedded in English educational culture. It was in relation to these examinations and
a particular instance of the "messy obscurity ofpolicy processes" (Ecclestone 2002:
174) that I was in danger of overlooking perhaps the most significant long-term effect
of the Spens/Norwood/Butler exchanges. This was the change from the School
Certificates, a grouped qualification like those common around the world, to single-
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subject 0 levels and A levels, which made English qualifications umque. In
retrospect, the embedding of English students' right to choose the subjects they study
has led to the series of varied but unsuccessful attempts to build in a general education
core requirement that generated the qualification reforms that I have chronicled.
While I have touched briefly on the significance of the change to single subjects, this
is an area of English qualifications which further research could illuminate, as it has
so regularly been designated as a problem and regularly addressed by futile solutions.
At the time, however, for the Boards it seemed that the significant effect of the 1944
Act was the removal of their representatives from the Secondary Schools Examination
Committee, to be replaced by civil servants from the newly designated Ministry of
Education. This was the first step in what I suggest has been the gradually
accelerating shift in control from the boards to the centre. Despite this perceived
undermining of their position, the Boards managed successfully to devise the GCE
qualifications to whose overall design they had not been invited to contribute. This
pattern of the Boards' reliability in fulfilling their professional task, although
overlooked in qualification design, has been a consistent feature of the English
qualifications scene.
The only change to the configuration of examining boards following the opening of
secondary education to all was the creation of a new Board with no university
affiliation. Intended to answer the needs of the technical schools and further education
colleges, with no accompanying reform to widen access to qualifications, the
Associated Examining Board gradually became a clone of the others because of the
English reluctance to accept applied and theoretical learning as of equal worth.
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English society's steadily growing demand for qualifications assured the Boards'
commercial success, particularly after the value of their 0 levels was enhanced by the
less esteemed Certificate of Secondary Education from 1965. During the 1960s and
1970s, with a low-level regulatory regime in the hands of the teacher-dominated
Schools Council, the examining boards faced a series of possible reforms to post-16
examinations, none of which came into effect. The Boards were left to carry out their
function undisturbed by change, although there was little doubt of the need to improve
young people's levels of attainment.
Then, in the 1980s the Thatcher Government yielded to the longstanding pressure
from teachers and examining boards to replace the divisive structure of O-level and
CSE with a single examination at 16+ which could accredit the whole (or rather 60%)
of the age group. The price the Boards paid for this concession was a major ratcheting
up of central control. The Schools Council was replaced by the Secondary
Examinations Council, whose members were appointed in the name of the Secretary
of State. All syllabuses and examinations for the new General Certificate of
Secondary Examination had to be vetted and approved by this new regulator. This is
clear evidence that for the first time, the Boards' professional expertise was to be
subjected to the scrutiny of a state-appointed body.
In addition to this clear imposition of tightened central control, the indirect effects of
the change to GCSE were to have a cumulative impact on the power balance between
the Boards and their regulator. Improved attainment rates in the new examination
combined with economic pressures on youth employment opportunities led to a steady
increase in the post-16 staying-on rate. This created more pressure on the 'gate-
keeping' function of examinations as increased numbers aimed for higher education
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and consequently focused attention on the reliability, validity and comparability of
examination grades. Because government ministers were increasingly being held
responsible through constant media pressure for any problems with the system, they
tightened central control through a series of changes to the regulatory body to ensure
that central scrutiny over the Boards became ever more rigorous. I have identified this
tendency as an aspect of the approach to public service accountability of the
"managerial state". (Clarke, 1997 #287)
Reflecting on my analysis, I believe I have been guilty of imposing the orthodoxy of
the time on a body of evidence which - reconsidered objectively - suggests a quite
different interpretation. Anticipating that the generalised effect of marketisation
would have had an impact on the examining boards, I tried to present the evidence I
was amassing to fit that assumption. Yet a clear assessment of that evidence leads to
the unavoidable conclusion that - far from being changed from a quasi- to a fully-
fledged market, the Boards' freedom to act as a market was being steadily restricted
by regulation to the point where it had virtually disappeared.
If I now accept that what happened to the examining boards was in fact the reverse of
the effect of marketisation, I must then question whether the undoubted shift in the
balance of power between the Boards and the regulator resulted from a conscious
policy or whether it was, as it had been in the past, the unintended consequence of a
series of attempts to mend flaws in the system. It must be admitted that the latter case
is the more likely within the modem context of policy formation - as described
above by one interviewee as: " ... that whole fascinating thing about how decisions are
made - and rarely are they made on sifting carefully the evidence,
because...everybody's moving from one meeting to the next so quickly that nobody
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actually reflects on very much at all" (QCA3 2004). Ecclestone's research detected
this tendency of many policy-makers to accept "the apparent irrationality and
messiness of 'policy on the hoof' [as] neutral and rational" (Ecclestone 2002: 80) It
seems that my early assumption of a coherent and consciously constructed policy is
best adjusted to acknowledge that it was probably more a case of benignly muddling
through.
I do, however, maintain that the perceived need to mend the system resulted at least in
part from a major difference of opinion regarding the basis on which grades are
awarded. This led to widespread criticism of the Boards regarding the reliability and
comparability of their assessments. It was not until after the crisis of September 2002
that Mike Tomlinson explained the fundamental confusion that had developed
between norm and criterion referencing. While I have attempted to delineate the
confusion that has grown around this issue, I have given only brief consideration to
what I believe to be a deep-rooted misunderstanding amongst different sections of
society. It seems to me to be an important area where further research could well
assist in achieving Mike Tomlinson's long-term aim:
Finally, I believe it to be vital that there is greater public understanding ofthe
examination process and that as a consequence there is an end to the annual
argument about A level results. The standard has not been lowered if an
increased proportion ofstudents meet it as a consequence of improved teaching
and hard work.
(Tomlinson 2002b: 4)
As a result of the undermining of confidence in the Boards' professional expertise, by
the time Curriculum 2000 was being planned, their ability to avert problems in the
assessment pattern had been severely curtailed - a situation which contributed
significantly, I contend, to the crisis of September 2002.
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In 1992, attempts to bridge the academic/vocational divide led to the creation of a
hybrid qualification which combined applied study with a core of general education,
the General National Vocational Qualification. Despite its initial success across the
post-16 sector, its assessment scheme was criticised as lacking the reliability that
external assessment provided for academic qualifications. The solution proposed in
the Dearing Report of 1996 was that the reputation for reliable assessment the
examining boards had established could benefit this new arrival if they were to
include it within their suite of qualifications. To this end, the Boards were required
from 1997 to become 'unitary awarding bodies' offering GNVQs as well as their
traditional A levels and GCSEs if they were to continue to be accredited within the
English state sector. This central diktat meant that the Boards' organisational integrity
had been breached: they were forced into mergers if they wished to survive. The
effects of these imposed changes challenged their performance as never before.
I suggest that the third change to the examinations structure administered the coup de
grace to the Boards' ability to apply their professional judgement to the complexities
of assessment. This was the introduction of Curriculum 2000, which substantially
changed the structure of A levels to that of two self-contained years involving three
modules in each year. In the discussions around the appropriate weighting of the
modules for the first year of study in relation to the second year, the Boards' advice
was flatly over-ruled by both the Chief Executive of QCA and a Government
Minister. I submit that this is conclusive evidence that the Boards have become
reduced to the role of qualifications providers expected to work to specifications
designed by others. They are no longer permitted to fulfil their role as skilled
professionals whose expertise underwrites their product.
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3 What evidence is there of a shift of control from the Boards to the State?
As well as the evidence of increased central control related to the above changes in
examinations, I have produced evidence of a general tightening of central control.
Whether this was part of the wider culture of the 1990s' moves to marketisation, with
its preference for unification and increased accountability through central regulation,
or, as I now conclude, an almost accidental consequence of a series of attempts to
rectify systemic flaws, the result has been a severe reduction of the examining boards'
ability to make independent decisions.
The marketisation fervour that infused the world of education after the 1988
Education Reform Act had a limited effect on the examining boards - in their case
increasing the need to compete for 'clients': firstly following the introduction of
GCSE and again after they were required to form unitary awarding bodies which
provided GNVQs. However their market was an artificial one, in that the clientele was
a fixed age-group and their 'product' was heavily regulated. After limited success in
'selling' its GCSEs, the London board was forced to merge with the more successful
BTEC vocational body and continue under the name Edexcel.
When after 1997 the now unitary awarding bodies were required to offer GNVQs as
well as their academic qualifications, the tables were turned and the body least
favoured by the market was suddenly 'in pole position'. Edexcel had inherited
BTEC's 75% market share of applied qualifications and then its financial basis was
secured when it was bought by Pearson International. Next it was the previously
dominant AQA which was coming under increasing financial pressure, having been
forced to buyout the uneconomic GNVQs offered by City & Guilds. Similar financial
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pressures would have affected OCR had it not been subsidised by its Cambridge
parent.
What this quasi- or controlled market in qualifications has certainly demonstrated is
that it is not a profitable enterprise. Two of the three boards have required external
financial backing to make up for the inevitable shortfalls, which leaves a question
mark over the future of AQA, still trying to survive on fee income alone. This may
mean that the state will have to step in and take actual rather than virtual control. A
fruitful area for future research is the whole question of the costs of the English
examining system. Despite regular complaints by headteachers or critics of the
examining boards, it is extraordinary that there has been no systematic investigation
of the system's finances.
Moves to unify the regulatory bodies - from SEAC to SCAA to QCA - resulted in
each instance a shift to greater control over the boards, with QCA's powers becoming
statutory and therefore not subject to any form of objection by the Boards below the
level of judicial appeal. This increased central control was exercised directly in 1997
to require the boards to unite with a vocational awarding body if they wished to retain
accreditation as providers of English qualifications. In each of the three resulting
awarding bodies the process of unification has involved stresses which interfered with
their ability to function effectively, adding to the financial pressure referred to above.
With an ever-stronger regulator, the Boards' professional expertise - which would
weigh heavily as their greatest asset in a genuine market - proved to carry no weight.
When they objected to the proposed weighting of AS/A2 marks in the design of
Curriculum 2000, their professional judgement was ignored. When the inevitable
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'grade inflation' resulted, they were held responsible. This I maintain is clear
evidence of their loss of professional control over the qualifications they administer.
At the same time, the consequences of these external pressures generated internal
pressures that destabilised them as organisations and raised questions about the
comparability, the reliability and the validity of the qualifications they offer. Evidence
of their instability was a series of damaging incidents that revealed for the first time
weaknesses in their ability to deliver accurate results on time. I suggest that these
episodes are a direct result of the Boards' loss of their ability to implement change at
their own pace and to reach assessment decisions based on their professional
expertise.
Above all, the pressures they have undergone have had senous financial
consequences. I believe that these pressures may well be a major factor in determining
their future.
4 The three English awarding bodies: centrally controlled but still extant
All the evidence leads me to conclude that the English examining boards by the end of
2002 can no longer be deemed to be independent in the sense that they were for most
of their history. Their regulatory body is not advisory but statutory. Their
organisational structure has to conform to a centrally-devised pattern, providing both
academic and vocational qualifications if they are to be accredited as providers within
the English state system. The qualifications they provide are designed centrally and
the specifications they draw up are vetted in detail by a government agency before
being accepted. Their administrative procedures must conform to a national pattern
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which they must agree with their competitors. Their fees are now subject to the
possibility of capping by the regulator, so they no longer exercise the level of
financial control they once held. Yet there is much more to the story than a simple
collapse into virtual serfdom.
Firstly, although I stand by the case that the Boards have become centrally controlled,
I do not claim they are alone in experiencing this shift. The move toward central
control could be seen in terms of an unstoppable cultural - or even global -
phenomenon rather than simply an aspect of the "managerial state" (Clarke 1997) or
what has been described as "Labour's atavistic centralising urge" (Education
Guardian 25 January 2005: 17).
A different slant on increased centralisation is suggested by John Kay in his recent
article on 'Market States':
Modern European government is principally a provider ofgoods and services.
The most important of these services are economic and physical security plus
health, education and the infrastructure of everyday life. This makes
government an economic agent little different from other economic agents, and
modern government is judged by similar criteria.
(Kay 2005)
These two interpretations neatly encapsulate what I now perceive to be the shift that
has gradually taken place in my interpretation of the Clarke and Newman concept of
"the managerial state". (Clarke 1997) When I began my research, I saw increasing
central control as one of the negative functions of marketisation. The evidence I
uncovered has suggested that perhaps my position was a rigid, ideological one.
The first inkling that I was perhaps overlooking something came when I re-read Peter
Gosden's suggestion that in the 1940s Board of Education officials were motivated by
other factors than a simple quest for power:
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This emphasis on the need for the Board to assert itself and to offer active
leadership corresponded exactly to the increasingly widespread view that the
disparity of provision between the various local authorities was no longer
acceptable and that far more emphasis needed to be placed on national policy;
only greater centralization could undo the inequity between children ofdifferent
districts which became so apparent during the evacuation and could ensure that
there would be more purposeful national planning in education.
(Gosden, 1976 #146: 240)
Then I began further to rethink my position after reading Michael Barber's
description of being unable, in opposing the 1988 Education Act, to offer positive
solutions to what was clearly an unacceptable state of affairs.:
We...had missed two fundamental points ....Firstly, we offered no credible
alternative to what was perceived by the public at large .,.to be an inadequate
existing state of affairs. Secondly, we had completely failed to identify a series
ofunderlying social changes which would sooner or later have forced a radical
shift in education policy whether we liked it or not.
(Barber 1996: 37)
Data I have considered which demonstrate the unacceptably low rates of attainment
by English young people are convincing evidence that the current qualification system
is still unacceptable. I concede that, since the voluntarist approach of the Schools
Council in the 1960s and 1970s was ineffectual, government has a responsibility to
take remedial action; accepting that responsibility is not necessarily a simple quest for
power.
A reassessment of my evidence indicates that the centralisation process may have
been the result less of a clear-cut policy than of a series of attempts to address
admitted weaknesses. Nevertheless, I suggest that at least some of the resulting
problems might have been alleviated had the examining boards been invited to
contribute and involve their high level of assessment expertise. The State' adopting of
an oppositional position and imposing change has not succeeded. A more positive
approach would involve these bodies who are genuinely motivated to contribute to
finding effective solutions to the need for qualification change. In a recent
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conversation, an awarding body Chief Executive spoke of their continuing
commitment:
There is no sign ofeither OCR or Edexcel pulling out ofit all. OCR has always
said it would get out when faced with change it didn't like, but it's right in there
as ever. What is our real concern is the strange orthodoxy in QCA that to make
the Diploma [proposed by Tomlinson and the 2005 White Paper] work, we have
to think about changing everything. There is no acknowledgement of the
enormous risks involved in this approach. Could we please look at the
alternative of giving the awarding bodies the job of doing it and stop
destabilising things with suggestions ofchange?
(AQA32005)
What future awaits the boards: public and bureaucratic or
independent and democratic?
In line with my changed interpretation of the centralisation impulse, I can envisage
two versions of possible future developments, the rather doom-laden one I produced
originally and a more positive one following further reflection.
This is more than merely idle speculation. I believe that the destiny of the examining
boards has serious implications for English qualifications and, given their important
'gate-keeping' function in society, for the young people whom they accredit. My
research has, I maintain, demonstrated that there exists a social consensus around the
issue of qualifications which has consistent parameters. Any attempt to bring about
change which ignores those parameters is unlikely to succeed in becoming embedded
in the nation's culture. Whether inspired by government's quest for acountability or
reformers' enthusiasm, any design which hopes to succeed must take account of the
pragmatism which has consistently dominated English responses to reform.
Wholesale change does not accord with that pragmatism. Yet government cannot
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simply accept the status quo because it is not addressing the needs of English young
people. How will the inevitable change come about?
Worst Case Scenario: Nationalisation by default
I believe that the following consequences could flow directly from the Boards' loss of
independence. Some of these I base on the evidence I have submitted, particularly the
interviews I carried out. Others are signalled in the White Paper of February 2005
which itself is a response to the Tomlinson Report of October 2004.
The likely outcome of this first scenario is that two Boards may restructure to protect
their independence, while the third will have no option but to become the franchised
provider of English qualifications. While AQA lacks other means of survival, both
OCR and Edexcel are poised to develop their respective specialisms which will both
evade the tight control of QCA and generate the income that their position as part of a
larger business requires. An official from another board summarised the Edexce1
position following its takeover by Pearson International:
The way I see London Qualifications operating ...is that BTEC is positioning
itselfas BTEC [and] is now deliberately strengthening the brand and separating
the other activity. Now I don't think Pearson would have bought the whole thing
without actually wanting this other activity, because that's what they want to get
into. [The Chairman of Edexcel], on the other hand, is vocational to the core.
Indeed I think [his] personal ambition was to throw off the general
qualifications, sell them to somebody, and he would do what he wanted with
BTEC. Now, he wasn't able to deliver that, so he's chairman of this foundation
which has got largesse from other people.
(OCR22003)
Since that interview, the Edexcel website reports that the short-lived 'London
Qualifications' title has been abandoned in favour of 'Edexcel Limited'. Its emphasis
is on its international role in delivering "our qualifications to more than two million
286
learners around the world' and in addition to its established BTEC suite of
qualifications, it is promoting its 'IGCSEs' (International General Certificate of
Secondary Education). This suggests that the strategic direction Edexcel is pursuing is
a reduction in its role as a mainstream provider of English general qualifications - at
least at AS/A2/VCE. That level has always been subsidised by the much larger GCSE
market, a fact which has not escaped Pearson Chief Executive Marjorie Scardino. She
was quoted in Education Guardian of 17 August 2004 in a speech at a European
media seminar:
The UK is highly inefficient in marking exams. They spend three times as much
per student on exams as American schools do and they spend a third as much on
educational materials as American schools do. So they could really use some
efficiencies in marking GCSEs. Even ifyou didn't add technology you could do
a lot better, and we think that's goodpotential.
A recent interview with the Pearson official now heading Edexcel confirmed this view
of the English examining market. When asked why Pearson had invested in such an
unprofitable enterprise as English qualifications, he replied, "Because the system is
incredibly inefficient, money can be made" (Edexcel4 2005). Even were the
Government to overcome its preference for competition and move to a single national
examining body, Pearson would be undeterred because their real objective is to move
into "support processes, which will continue" (Edxcel4 205). By support processes,
they mean textbooks and materials which their detailed database of examination
results enables them to produce for teachers to use in targeting their teaching to
improving outcomes.
With OCR too there are signs that it may be looking beyond a role as an accredited
provider of qualifications within the English state system. Following the publication
of the Tomlinson Report which recommended the replacement of GCSE and A levels
with a new four-level diploma structure, OCR responded by disagreeing strongly and
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suggesting that "these brands must stay" - an opinion which they "sent to ministers
for consideration when drawing up the white paper" (The Guardian 3 December
2004). This response is in line with their growing dependence on the financial stream
of international qualifications: IGCSEs, A levels and above all the Cambridge ESOL
certificate - the leading brand in the lucrative market of English qualifications both
for Slovakian au pairs and Polish plumbers in the UK, and for aspiring English
speakers around the globe.
All the evidence of Cambridge Assessment (formerly UCLES)'s behaviour shows a
marked disinclination to yield control. Since providing English qualifications is now
an activity where control resides elsewhere, a strong possibility is that OCR will
continue to offer a dwindling repertoire of general qualifications in England and build
its international business, providing 'old' A levels for use both the private sector in
England and an international market where the 'Cambridge brand' has proven value.
In April 2005 OCR's preference for moving outside the constraints of QCA-
controlled qualifications was confirmed by an announcement that UCLES was
working jointly with the Australian Council for Educational Research to develop an
academic reasoning and thinking skills test. Ron Me Clone, OCR's Director General
of Assessment said:
Our collaboration is a response to the [Professor Stephen] Schwartz report's
desire to minimise the burden of [higher education] admissions, whilst
recognising the need to give institutions a valid and reliable instrument for
achieving their selection and/or widening participation objectives.
(The Guardian 14 April 2005)
While the Australian Council would do well to consider the fate of Cambridge's
previous partners, this is further evidence of a desire to diversify. The scheme may be
undermined by the brief statement in the White Paper of 2005 that in cases where
288
there is major competition for higher education places, examining boards will be able
to release candidates' marks, which would facilitate the selection process. If this
practice were to become widespread, however, it could have significant unintended
consequences. Certainly it would obviate the market for a new selection test.
This picture leaves only AQA with no alternative direction to pursue. That
organisation has no alternative qualification provision, no international market, and no
financial resources except its fee income. An analogy could be made with MG Rover,
whose collapse in April 2005 was inevitable, according to the analysis of De Matthias
Holweg and Professor Nick Oliver. In their book Who Killed MG Rover? they suggest
that, "Without a strong [financial] partner, a slow death was inevitable" (Quoted in
The Guardian, April 27 2005). In the case of AQA, continuing to provide increasingly
costly English qualifications without some form of financial support could lead to
economic collapse. Such an eventuality could force the Government to save the
system by effectively nationalising the Board as it quietly did, to take another
analogy, when it created Southeast Trains after dismissing the French company
Connex. A glance at the most recent market share statistics reveals that AQA remains
to a significant degree the largest provider of general qualifications in England:
For the summer 2004 examination series these three awarding bodies
produced:
5.35 million GCSE examination results (AQA 59%, Edexcel 21% and OCR
27%)
700000 GCE A level examination results (AQA 47 %, Edexcel 26 % and OCR
27%)
959000 GCE AS examination results (AQA 49%, Edexcel24 % and OCR 27%
(QCA 2005)
These statistics indicate that for the system to continue in anything like its present
form, AQA must survive in some form or other. A second glance explains why
proponents of the abolition of the GCSE have not grasped the economics of the
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current system, but then the economics of it all have, as I have indicated, consistently
remained outside the focus of everyone but Board finance officers. This is an area of
research which is crying out for serious investigation.
Since AQA has always been, in the words of one of its competitors "a very public
service institution" (OCR2 2003), it might adjust relatively painlessly to such a
change. The other two boards could then opt in to provide the qualifications that
appealed to them, while conducting their principal business in the global market.
In this scenario, then, the future shape of English qualifications providers is likely to
be determined by economic rather than educational factors. However the possibility of
what would be virtually a single national examining board has major implications for
secondary teachers, who work within a strong culture of choice from a range of
providers. Not only would they lose such choice, but innovation, already greatly
reduced because of the high degree of central control, would become entirely the
preserve of the regulator. Yet, as the September 2002 grades crisis proved, the
regulator is not necessarily well versed in the finer points of assessment.
If this path were to be followed, I believe there would be other crises before English
qualifications reach a calm plateau.
Cautiously Optimistic Scenario: Professional and political pragmatism
I base my more positive assessment of future developments on the view that the
events of September 2002 demonstrated to the regulator - and to the DillS and its
political masters as well - that assessment is a complex process. Whatever else the
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grades crisis has done, it has demonstrated that it is foolhardy for the amateur to
tamper with that process.
It was, in my view, this realisation that lay behind the government's unwillingness to
endorse the wholesale changes proposed by the Tomlinson Committee in October
2004. The 2005 White Paper containing the government's response implied a
continuing regard for the awarding bodies by maintaining that:
GCSEs and A levels ...will be kept as a cornerstone of14-19 learning. They will
continue to be assessed through rigorous external examinations; and they will
be reformed to increase stretch and challenge and to improve progression.
(DillS 2005: 45)
This seems to me to indicate that the experience of the problems of Curriculum 2000
provided a severe lesson in the hazards of change that has not been clearly thought
through. What appear as underlying good intentions to proceed at a more deliberate
pace are signalled by the promise "to review progress in 2008".
Once again, a major change appeared in a very understated fashion in the White
Paper. This was the half-sentence which quietly stated, "We will ...support those
universities who wish to have marks as well as grades ..."(DfliS, 2005 #302). This
simple statement, at a stroke, addressed the longstanding complaint by universities
that A levels currently are proving inadequate for the increasing burden of selection.
This tactic should enable a period of calm reflection so that the promised review in
2008 can proceed without at least one very vocal pressure group as an inhibiting
factor.
Although to date at least one of the awarding bodies is expressing some concern at
QCA's invitation that they should "think about alternative structures" such as fixed-
price contracting deals for designing syllabuses or devising assessment schemes,
(AQA3 2005), at least the signs suggest that discussions are alive and continuing with
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all three Boards fully involved. This is reassuring counter-evidence to my gloomy
scenario of two of them withdrawing from the field.
Were the Boards' professional expertise to be newly appreciated in these discussions,
they would be fully prepared to contribute that expertise because, despite the
pressures they have endured, they have managed to retain this expertise in the form of
staff stability. I have not collected data to support this observation - this is yet another
area that could provide useful data for subsequent research - but during the years
firstly of my involvement with one Board and then of my research, I have been struck
by the continuity of personnel in all three organisations. This was in marked contrast
to the rapid movement I encountered, certainly at high levels of the DillS and even
more strikingly into and out of QCA. One can only speculate that this is perhaps
because the examining world is a very specialised sector so that the expertise staff
acquire is not easily transferable. My point is that, were the present situation to be
recognised as wasteful of a body of expertise, that expertise remains ready to be called
on.
A small step toward a new direction could be discerned in QCA's creation in April
2004 of the National Assessment Agency (NAA). Initial alarm that it presaged
nationalisation of examinations was lulled by consulting the Agency's website. It is
committed to "working closely with the awarding bodies". Its function, which is
described as "to supervise the delivery and modernisation of GCSE and A level
examinations", in fact is confined to the technical mechanisms of the system. Perhaps
this is in effect a recognition by QCA, by the DillE and by Government, that the role
of the regulator is best fulfilled by ensuring that the technical aspects of the
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assessment system are in good order. This would enable the professionals to
concentrate their attention on their central area of expertise.
Further positive signs can be detected in the 2005 White Paper (DillS 2005). The
series of changes signalled in this document involve consultations with awarding
bodies, pilots of revised qualifications and a gradual pace of change - all of which
suggest that lessons have been learned as a result of the crisis of autumn 2002.
Will the examining boards be redeemed from the level of outsourcing agencies to
which my research has consigned them? With each of the three examining boards
having appointed a new Chief Executive since 2003, with a new Chief Executive at
QCA in 206, and with the habitual short-term tenure of DfES officials and
government ministers, the slate of previous significant actors is being wiped clean. In
the words of one of them, "Much depends on who the players are; personalities count
for a great deal in this dynamic situation" (Edexcel4). In the interests of the young
people whose future is so significantly shaped by the qualifications they achieve, I
hope that this new group of"players" will proceed judiciously and take account of the
English examining boards' undoubted strengths as they attempt to address the
system's undoubted weaknesses.
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Appendix: Key to Interviewees
[I have referred to Lord Dearing, autumn 2003, and Professor Peter Gosden, 2000 by
name, as they were interviewed as individuals in their own right rather than as
officials of a particular body.]
AEBl: AEB General Secretary (retired) (Letter), June 2004
AQAI: AQA Chief Executive, 2000
AQA2 : AQA Former Chief Executive, October 2003
AQA3: Chief Executive & Deputy, June 2005
Business Studies: Head of Business Department of 11-18 School, November 2003
City & Guilds: City & Guilds Chief Executive, 2000
DfES I: Director of Qualifications: Lifelong Learning Directorate, DfEE, 2000
Edexcel l: Edexcel Chief Executive, 2000
Edexcel2: Edexcel Director of Policy and Qualifications, October 2003
Edexcel3: Edexcel Former Chief Executive, March 2004
Edexcel4: President Pearson Assessments & Testing, September 2005
NUT: Headteacher member of Schools Council (retired), phone interview, 2000
OCRI: OCR Former Chief Executive, 2000
OCR2: OCR Chief Executive, October 2003
QCAI: QCA Chief Executive, 2000
QCA2: QCA Deputy Director and Former Director of Qualifications, November
2003
QCA3: Former member ofNCVQ Research Department then ofQCA research
department, January 2004
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J In the interests of clarity, I shall capitalise 'Boards' when referring to them without a modifier such as
'examining' or 'English'.
2 The meaning of the word 'matriculation' has changed along with the purposes of examinations.
Originally referring to 'enrolling at a university', it has gradually come to mean 'achieving the final
school-leaving examination' as it is now used, for example, in South Africa.
3 This radical step explained University College's being known in some circles as 'the godless
institution in Gower Street' and led to the establishing of King's college as a means of ensuring an
Anglican voice within the university. Montgomery, R. J. (1965). Examinations: an account of their
evolution as administrative devices in England. London, Longmans.
4 I am indebted to Carol Dyhouse's research for the full list of England's nine 'other' universities [in
addition to Oxford and Cambridge] that existed by 1939. " ... With the dates of their charters, [they]
were: Birmingham (1900), Bristol (1909), Durham (1832), Leeds (1904), Liverpool (1903), London
(1836), Manchester (1903), Reading (1926) and Sheffield (1905)." With the exception of Reading,
each was involved in an examining board. There were of course also the "University Colleges, with
their dates of foundation, [which] were Exeter (1901), Hull (1926), Leicester (1922), Nottingham
(1903) and Southampton (1905). (Dyhouse, 2002. Footnote 8 page 46)
5 Cyril Norwood had a long innings in education. As a young headmaster of a Bristol grammar school,
he provided evidence to the Dyke Acland Report in 1911, and then moved to the private sector where
he eventually became head of Harrow School.
6 The nine included the Welsh board; this study concerns only the English boards which then numbered
eight.
7 As it happened, BTEC and its succeeding body Edexcel were to become bywords for administrative
incompetence among teachers, a reputation which anecdotal evidence continues to sustain.
8 The Capey Review was commissioned to consider structural weaknesses in the GNVQ assessment
structures and reported in 1995. A parallel investigation into NVQs was conducted in the same year
and was published as the Beaumont Report. Both grew out of the perception that "the problems of the
qualifications system, arising from the 1991 White Paper, were becoming apparent." P 197, Spours, K.
and M. Young (1997b). Towards a Unified Qualifications System for Post-Compulsory Education:
Barriers and Strategies. Dearing and Beyond: 14-19 Qualifications, Frameworks and Systems. A.
Hodgson and K. Spours. London, Kogan Page.
9 On 30 October 2005, I heard a reference to "Cambridge Assessment" in a television news broadcast.
An internet search revealed that "Cambridge Assessment is the new brand name of the University of
Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate (UCLES), offering qualifications through three examining
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bodies: University of Cambridge ESOL, University of Cambridge International Examinations and
OCR". The value of the 'Cambridge brand' is thus being more directly exploited.
10 At the annual JCGQ Conference in September 2000, several speakers referred to the Scottish fiasco
and sugggested it might well herald similar difficulties in England.
11 This change in terminology, like that from 'examining boards' to 'awarding bodies', is significant.
The application of discourse analysis would suggest that the choice of the word 'specification' with its
flavour of building or engineering rather than abstract intellectual activity implies a shift towards
criterion referenced rather than judgement-based assessment. Yet QCA officials, who initiated the
change, apparently failed to realise that there might be repercussions in the pattern of results. [Chapter
4, page 163 QCA2 quote refers]
